In the realm of online discourse, there exists a tendency for individuals to oversimplify the intricate "nominalism vs. realism" debate. Some argue that nominalism has led to the rise of liberalism and the decline of traditional society. They present objections based on a narrative that attributes the collapse of these traditional societies to nominalism, supplemented with philosophical arguments when necessary. However, this portrayal is heavily biased and one-sided, failing to encompass the true depth of the debate. Consequently, it leads to flawed judgments and the dissemination of misinformation.
Now, let us delve into the nature of this debate. The question itself admits of numerous possible answers, and attempting to reduce it to a simple dichotomy of "realism vs. non-realism" proves equally unhelpful. Where, then, shall we commence our exploration?
In the realm of contemporary philosophy, Platonism refers to the belief in abstract objects—entities that exist beyond the reach of sensory experience and do not exert causal influence on objects within the domain of sensory experience. For instance, the existence of mathematical objects has been a topic of debate throughout the late 19th and 20th centuries. In the context of 20th-century philosophy, a Platonist was an advocate of the existence of abstract objects. Notable Platonists of the past century include Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Willard Van Orman Quine. It should be noted that although Quine was a physicalist, denying the existence of purely mental states or objects, he remained the most renowned proponent of Platonism in the past century, despite his failed attempts to develop a system devoid of abstract objects, a project he pursued alongside Nelson Goodman.
Both Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, as Platonists, affirmed the existence of abstract objects. However, classical Platonists argue that Plato's system encompassed not only the existence of mathematical objects but also the notion of forms—the eternal archetypes of sensible objects, existing independently from them. Sensible objects, in this view, merely imitate their respective forms, which account for the resemblance observed among various particulars. This position can be broadly referred to as "realism," encompassing essentialism and perhaps "natural kind realism." While Russell did not adhere to this perspective, he is still considered one of the primary proponents of modern Platonism. Why? Because many of the presuppositions held by the Greeks were not shared by Russell. Russell adopted a bundle theory, positing that objects are merely collections of properties. In contrast, substance theory, prevalent in Greek philosophy, posited ontological substrates or substances as bearers of properties. Substance theorists argue that objects possess properties, while bundle theorists contend that objects are nothing more than amalgamations of properties. This distinction holds particular significance within Aristotle's metaphysics. Under bundle theory, there is no room for essences or natural kinds; only properties are recognized. Although bundle theorists may acknowledge the existence of universal properties, this form of realism deviates from the vision advocated by Plato and Aristotle, as their realism encompasses more than just properties. Russell, for instance, acknowledged the existence of universals, as he believed any resemblance theory that rejected universals would regress into infinite complexity. Hence, we find universals such as "red" or "green," which are subsequently bundled together to form our perception of objects.
In the realm of Aristotle, it is now opportune to introduce further intricacies. Plato and Aristotle both held beliefs regarding "forms," but their perspectives differed significantly. Plato maintained that forms were entirely separate from the particulars that purportedly "instantiated" or imitated them. Consider the analogy of the divided line: while all points on the line exhibit continuity, there is no overlap. The line is clearly demarcated.
Plato's view entails a distinct separation between the intelligible world of forms, the realm of mathematical objects, and the realm of sensible objects. However, there is no intersection between these domains. The world of forms serves as the foundation for the intelligibility of the sensible realm, yet remains fundamentally distinct from it. This perspective is sometimes referred to as extreme realism.
Aristotle's understanding of forms diverges significantly from Plato's. While both acknowledge the existence of forms, their manner of existence differs. Aristotle's position, often termed moderate or immanent realism, became prevalent in both Eastern and Western Christian thought, with some adjustments made to accommodate a doctrine of divine ideas. According to Aristotle, forms are, in a sense, "within" their particulars. There is no independent world of forms in which they subsist, separate from the objects they shape. The form is an integral part of the substance or individual object and cannot be conceived of separately. Aristotle posits that a substance is a combination of matter (hyle) and form (morphe), a hylomorphic compound. Matter represents pure potentiality, capable of assuming any form, yet devoid of actuality until joined with form and given shape. According to Aristotle, a form cannot be ontologically separated from its particular. This position contrasts with the Platonic perspective but still upholds a realist stance, acknowledging the existence of essences that account for the resemblance observed among particulars.
Later in his works, Aristotle would explore a form of divine conceptualism, which would gain prominence in Christian theology, both East and West. Aristotle distinguished between what can be referred to as "particular" and "universal" forms. The particular form denotes the form component of the hylomorphic compound, while the universal form represents an object of thought in the mind of the Prime Mover, a pure, self-subsistent act of thinking known as "God" in Aristotle's framework. Christians would adopt a similar view, asserting that the divine ideas constitute the object of God's thought, which then serves as the model for creation, giving rise to the hylomorphic compound derived from divine ideas.
It is evident that the debate is far from simplistic, as some may portray it. Simply stating one's position as a nominalist or realist fails to capture the nuances within specific contexts. Realism can manifest in various forms, such as mathematical realism or realism concerning natural kinds or essences. Essentialism, too, requires further specification, distinguishing between immanent and extreme realism. It is worth noting that this type of "realism" or "essentialism" is not as foreign to modern philosophy as some may suggest. Prominent philosopher and logician Saul Kripke, a renowned figure in 20th-century analytic philosophy, advocated for the existence of essences and sought a revival of Aristotelian categories.
In summary, the oversimplified narrative of "nominalism vs. realism" is deeply flawed and fails to capture the complexity of the matter. Merely labeling oneself a "realist" or "essentialist" lacks meaningful specificity. Even adopting the title of a Platonist can be problematic, as exemplified by Quine, a staunch defender of realism concerning abstract and mathematical objects. Despite his physicalism and rejection of forms/essences, Quine is considered a Platonist due to his realism about abstract objects, contrasting with classical Platonistic theories. This topic has been extensively discussed over the centuries, and its trivialization through oversimplifications aimed at advancing specific political and historical narratives should be approached with caution. It is important not to be swayed by such simplifications. Additionally, it is worth noting that many idealists, including George Berkeley, were nominalists, rejecting the existence of essences.
Now, let us delve into the nature of this debate. The question itself admits of numerous possible answers, and attempting to reduce it to a simple dichotomy of "realism vs. non-realism" proves equally unhelpful. Where, then, shall we commence our exploration?
In the realm of contemporary philosophy, Platonism refers to the belief in abstract objects—entities that exist beyond the reach of sensory experience and do not exert causal influence on objects within the domain of sensory experience. For instance, the existence of mathematical objects has been a topic of debate throughout the late 19th and 20th centuries. In the context of 20th-century philosophy, a Platonist was an advocate of the existence of abstract objects. Notable Platonists of the past century include Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Willard Van Orman Quine. It should be noted that although Quine was a physicalist, denying the existence of purely mental states or objects, he remained the most renowned proponent of Platonism in the past century, despite his failed attempts to develop a system devoid of abstract objects, a project he pursued alongside Nelson Goodman.
Both Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, as Platonists, affirmed the existence of abstract objects. However, classical Platonists argue that Plato's system encompassed not only the existence of mathematical objects but also the notion of forms—the eternal archetypes of sensible objects, existing independently from them. Sensible objects, in this view, merely imitate their respective forms, which account for the resemblance observed among various particulars. This position can be broadly referred to as "realism," encompassing essentialism and perhaps "natural kind realism." While Russell did not adhere to this perspective, he is still considered one of the primary proponents of modern Platonism. Why? Because many of the presuppositions held by the Greeks were not shared by Russell. Russell adopted a bundle theory, positing that objects are merely collections of properties. In contrast, substance theory, prevalent in Greek philosophy, posited ontological substrates or substances as bearers of properties. Substance theorists argue that objects possess properties, while bundle theorists contend that objects are nothing more than amalgamations of properties. This distinction holds particular significance within Aristotle's metaphysics. Under bundle theory, there is no room for essences or natural kinds; only properties are recognized. Although bundle theorists may acknowledge the existence of universal properties, this form of realism deviates from the vision advocated by Plato and Aristotle, as their realism encompasses more than just properties. Russell, for instance, acknowledged the existence of universals, as he believed any resemblance theory that rejected universals would regress into infinite complexity. Hence, we find universals such as "red" or "green," which are subsequently bundled together to form our perception of objects.
In the realm of Aristotle, it is now opportune to introduce further intricacies. Plato and Aristotle both held beliefs regarding "forms," but their perspectives differed significantly. Plato maintained that forms were entirely separate from the particulars that purportedly "instantiated" or imitated them. Consider the analogy of the divided line: while all points on the line exhibit continuity, there is no overlap. The line is clearly demarcated.
Plato's view entails a distinct separation between the intelligible world of forms, the realm of mathematical objects, and the realm of sensible objects. However, there is no intersection between these domains. The world of forms serves as the foundation for the intelligibility of the sensible realm, yet remains fundamentally distinct from it. This perspective is sometimes referred to as extreme realism.
Aristotle's understanding of forms diverges significantly from Plato's. While both acknowledge the existence of forms, their manner of existence differs. Aristotle's position, often termed moderate or immanent realism, became prevalent in both Eastern and Western Christian thought, with some adjustments made to accommodate a doctrine of divine ideas. According to Aristotle, forms are, in a sense, "within" their particulars. There is no independent world of forms in which they subsist, separate from the objects they shape. The form is an integral part of the substance or individual object and cannot be conceived of separately. Aristotle posits that a substance is a combination of matter (hyle) and form (morphe), a hylomorphic compound. Matter represents pure potentiality, capable of assuming any form, yet devoid of actuality until joined with form and given shape. According to Aristotle, a form cannot be ontologically separated from its particular. This position contrasts with the Platonic perspective but still upholds a realist stance, acknowledging the existence of essences that account for the resemblance observed among particulars.
Later in his works, Aristotle would explore a form of divine conceptualism, which would gain prominence in Christian theology, both East and West. Aristotle distinguished between what can be referred to as "particular" and "universal" forms. The particular form denotes the form component of the hylomorphic compound, while the universal form represents an object of thought in the mind of the Prime Mover, a pure, self-subsistent act of thinking known as "God" in Aristotle's framework. Christians would adopt a similar view, asserting that the divine ideas constitute the object of God's thought, which then serves as the model for creation, giving rise to the hylomorphic compound derived from divine ideas.
It is evident that the debate is far from simplistic, as some may portray it. Simply stating one's position as a nominalist or realist fails to capture the nuances within specific contexts. Realism can manifest in various forms, such as mathematical realism or realism concerning natural kinds or essences. Essentialism, too, requires further specification, distinguishing between immanent and extreme realism. It is worth noting that this type of "realism" or "essentialism" is not as foreign to modern philosophy as some may suggest. Prominent philosopher and logician Saul Kripke, a renowned figure in 20th-century analytic philosophy, advocated for the existence of essences and sought a revival of Aristotelian categories.
In summary, the oversimplified narrative of "nominalism vs. realism" is deeply flawed and fails to capture the complexity of the matter. Merely labeling oneself a "realist" or "essentialist" lacks meaningful specificity. Even adopting the title of a Platonist can be problematic, as exemplified by Quine, a staunch defender of realism concerning abstract and mathematical objects. Despite his physicalism and rejection of forms/essences, Quine is considered a Platonist due to his realism about abstract objects, contrasting with classical Platonistic theories. This topic has been extensively discussed over the centuries, and its trivialization through oversimplifications aimed at advancing specific political and historical narratives should be approached with caution. It is important not to be swayed by such simplifications. Additionally, it is worth noting that many idealists, including George Berkeley, were nominalists, rejecting the existence of essences.
