Blackpill Lookism as Epistemic Injustice

[InMemoriam]

Lookism as Epistemic Injustice​

Thomas J. Spiegel

Pages 47-61 | Published online: 12 Jun 2022

• https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2022.2076629

ABSTRACT​

Lookism refers to discrimination based on physical attractiveness or the lack thereof. A whole host of empirical research suggests that lookism is a pervasive and systematic form of social discrimination. Yet, apart from some attention in ethics and political philosophy, lookism has been almost wholly overlooked in philosophy in general and epistemology in particular. This is particularly salient when compared to other forms of discrimination based on race or gender which have been at the forefront of epistemic injustice as a topic of research. This paper argues that lookism is associated with various forms of epistemic injustice. In the specific case of lookism, hermeneutic injustice takes the shape of the taboo of acknowledging that unattractive people are unattractive. This, on the one hand, results in a hampered understanding of one’s own situation insofar as one is deterred from seeing one’s looks as one major factor for one’s social position. On the other hand, this hermeneutic injustice serves as the backdrop of instances of a special kind testimonial injustice in which the ugly person’s burgeoning realization that their looks influence their social standing detrimentally is discounted due to the pejorative nature of ascribing someone the property of being unattractive or ugly.

 

[InMemoriam]

1. Introduction​

Lookism, (i.e. discrimination based on physical attractiveness), has been a subject of research in sociology, psychology, cultural studies, and economics for some time, the term being coined as early as the 1970s (Ayto Citation1999). However, lookism (just like the related fatphobia and cacophobia) has not received comparable attention in philosophy, but has rather been ‘widely neglected’ (Minerva Citation2017, 1). The social ramifications of looks (being ugly or being beautiful) has not been extensively featured in the debate on epistemic injustice. Lookism itself and epistemic discrimination based on attractiveness do not feature in Fricker’s seminal account of epistemic injustice (although this certainly ought not be held against Fricker). Even the comprehensive Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice (2017), the recent special issue Epistemic Injustice and Collective Wrongdoing edited by El Kassar and Altanian (Citation2020), the issue Epistemic Injustice and Recognition Theory edited by Giladi and MicMillan (Citation2018), or the recent overarching volume on Overcoming Epistemic Injustice (Sherman and Goguen Citation2019) focus on a great variety of aspects of epistemic injustice, yet do not feature the topics of beauty, ugliness, or attractiveness in general. And out of the hundreds of articles in academic journals featuring epistemic injustice, only few seem to bring aesthetics into play, if at all. But as shall become clear, there are good reasons to consider looks-based discrimination to fall under the umbrella of epistemic injustice.

It is fairly uncontroversial that lookism is a source of injustice, and there have been some reflections on lookism in ethics and political philosophy (Mason Citation2021; Minerva Citation2017; Tietje and Cresap Citation2005; Takac Citation2020). While the effects of being unattractive are arguably not as bad as discrimination based on gender, race, class, or (dis-)ability, it is clear that discrimination based on looks presents an injustice. For example, ugly people are denied various opportunities (regarding work, romance, friendship etc.) in life and beautiful people are not, for reasons solely determined by their looks. However, there are certain epistemic injustices ugly people may suffer in addition to being deprived of other social and economic goods.

In this paper, I argue that Fricker’s seminal conceptualization of epistemic injustice also applies to lookism as a social phenomenon. In particular, I am going to argue that lookism is associated with an epistemic structure best characterized as a taboo: unattractiveness in general (and the discrimination based on it) does not generate the same awareness as gender or race-based discrimination partially for the reason that there is a different kind of discomfort associated with being identified as ugly. This taboo constitutes a specific kind of hermeneutic injustice serving as a backdrop on which looks-based testimonial injustice takes place: on the one hand, unattractive people are not as readily believed comparatively, but more importantly, in stating that they face economic, social, and romantic discrimination in virtue of being unattractive, ugly people can be sometimes gaslit by the listener not accepting that interpretation, as overtly or covertly ascribing such negative aesthetic attributes goes against the taboo of ugly.

Furthermore, I am going to suggest that the positive forms of epistemic discrimination associated with lookism might constitute an, albeit lesser, harm to those positively discriminated. This lesser harm consists in very attractive people being motivated to adopt a distorted worldview: since both positive and negative looks-based discrimination is not talked about (like, say, racism or sexism) and since very attractive people receive a multitude of social, economic and romantic advantages, they can be systematically misled to adopt a view of themselves as more competent than they are and of the world being a more positive place than it actually is.

Lastly, I deliberately shall use the term ‘ugly’ as synonymous with ‘unattractive’ throughout this paper.Footnote1 This is important because just mentioning the fact that there are ugly people may seem offensive or impolite to some. ‘Ugly’ is undoubtedly a pejorative term: to describe someone as ugly means to describe them as looking a certain way and at the same time to evaluate this quality of appearance. I am consciously choosing here to use the terms ‘ugly’ and ‘unattractive’ in order to counteract what I identify as the taboo of ugly (cf. section 4), at least for the sake of analysis. This is to say that, at least in an academic discussion of ugliness, I do not mean to imply that ugly people are less valuable than attractive people (as the folk conception seems to imply).Footnote2

 

[Lonelyus]

Yeah ive been gnawling about that anime here since yesterday, Also i know its a term aswell and if i have to say it in an australian accent, ITS BROOTAL AS FOOK M8, There is no escaping it, If people cant see us for who we are but rather the shell we live in, Then its just better to rot, Its over for me 24 and to get a good degree is like 5 years, Ill be 29 by then and a creepy old man, Escorts will prolly refuse to have me aswell, Im really fucking thinking about buying an escort at this point.

 

[WorthlessSlavicShit]

on the one hand, unattractive people are not as readily believed comparatively, but more importantly, in stating that they face economic, social, and romantic discrimination in virtue of being unattractive, ugly people can be sometimes gaslit by the listener not accepting that interpretation, as overtly or covertly ascribing such negative aesthetic attributes goes against the taboo of ugly.

since very attractive people receive a multitude of social, economic and romantic advantages, they can be systematically misled to adopt a view of themselves as more competent than they are and of the world being a more positive place than it actually is.