东亚非自愿单身精英的新左翼亚文化（第四章）

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很快，老自由派和民主社会主义者也卷入与具有商业性质的新左翼势力有关的冲突。与纯粹志愿性活动的无政府主义者不同，老自由派和民主社会主义者或多或少具有商业化的倾向。其中，老自由派的运营模式大致上围绕着两个方面，分别是贩卖哲学书籍和哲学课程。卖书似乎没有让老自由派大饱口福，于是老自由派又推出价格昂贵的哲学课程，从广泛撒网转向精准捕捞，打算依靠少数高忠诚性的粉丝的钱包大发横财。老自由派曾经愤怒地谴责贵族大学里的网红哲学教授开设的商业化哲学课程。老自由派愤怒地揭露这种商业化哲学课程的性质，老自由派表示这种商业化哲学课程的主要受众不是哲学爱好者或者哲学领域的专业人才，而是附庸风雅的资本家。老自由派还说，这种商业化哲学课程类似于成功学。老自由派愤怒地将其斥之为骗钱。我们很难说这种商业化哲学课程的主要受众真如老自由派所言是资本家，还是渴望轻奢消费和自我提升的健全中产阶级社会。在念大学的时候，我们听说有些心理学家倾向于通过给资本家讲包装成所谓积极心理学的成功学来挣外快，据说这是一笔肥差。资本家喜欢大学教授围着他们转，运用一连串文绉绉的专业术语彬彬有礼地对着他们说一大堆阿谀奉承的话语，把他们从工人阶级身上剥削出来的剩余价值包装成他们的努力和才华，把他们的沾满工人阶级鲜血的私有财产包装为社会正义的体现。另一方面，心理学家捂着鼻子表示他们没办法跟工人阶级沟通。然而，令老自由派有感而发的商业化哲学课程，其主要受众应该不是资本家，而是老自由派的阶级兄弟。毕竟，这个系列的哲学课程发表于以中产阶级青年为主导的“哔哩哔哩”平台。资本家确实有可能突发奇想买网课，尤其是那种社会地位不会比老自由派高出多少的小资产者，他们无法像更加富裕的资本家那样面对面跟高僧、哲学家、心理学家坐而论道，而只能退而求其次，选择相对廉价的轻奢消费进行心理按摩，跟其他收入前20%的中产阶级成员一起上网课。在这里，我们可以看到老自由派展现出来的极端化仇富情绪。在理论上，老自由派是偏向于哈耶克的中右翼，有时候，老自由派甚至倾向于淡化极右翼的罪行，例如宣称纳粹德国的暴行主要针对于其他民族，至少不会针对于主体民族，而苏联更加可怕，苏联倾向于对内压迫。在理论上，老自由派坚定不移地维护市场经济，维护资本主义私有制，为此，学富五车的老自由派不惜直接造谣，例如把主张在几十年内终结资产阶级权力的瑞典职能社会主义曲解为一种以不侵犯私有制根基为前提的福利资本主义改革措施。但与老自由派存在竞争关系的贵族大学网红教授的商业化哲学课程是例外。当自己在市场竞争中处于相对弱势的地位时，老自由派就像占领华尔街的美国阶级兄弟一样出现充满仇恨的反市场倾向。在这里，老自由派把无形的大手和尊重市场的主体性等自由主义教条抛在脑后。老自由派仿佛变成阎王爷身边的判官，变成企图干预市场价格的极左恐怖分子，老自由派铁面无私地宣布别人的商业化哲学课程卖贵了，那些包装成哲学的成功学根本就不值数百元的定价，虽然老自由派自己漫天要价，将自己的哲学课程定价为数千元，是贵族大学网红教授的十几倍。不仅如此，老自由派甚至宣布别人的商业化哲学课程是骗钱，这无疑是在诽谤。没有任何证据表明贵族大学网红教授挂羊头卖狗肉，运用具有欺骗性的广告兜售消费者不想要的商品，相反，网红教授敏锐地捕捉市场的需求，精准地定位了具有强大消费能力的资产阶级和中产阶级的兴趣，并且将课程内容控制在互联网平台可以接受的范围内，完美地迎合了经典的市场经济共识体系，因此大发横财。消费者想要附庸风雅，网红教授提供的商品化哲学课程满足了消费者的需求，没有骗钱，没有强买强卖，只有一个愿打一个愿挨。我们看到，作为中产阶级，对自身以私有财产为基础的社会地位感到不满意的老自由派产生了比无产阶级意识形态夸张得多的仇富情绪。我们绝不用玫瑰色的语言来美化无产阶级意识形态。老实说，我们自己就有一些仇富倾向。我们发现，杰克·伦敦也具有仇富倾向。当我们发现杰克·伦敦在自己的小说里展现出仇富倾向时，我们会体验到快感和共鸣，也会觉得愧疚，后一种情绪总是在阅读运用具有报复性的情节时产生。我们认为无产阶级在获得权力以后对曾经的压迫者进行报复，是不道德的事情。杰克·伦敦告诉我们，那种亦步亦趋遵循着写作公式的商业文学简直恶心至极，但杰克·伦敦没有像老自由派诽谤网红教授的商业化哲学课程那样，说什么商业文学就是在骗钱。我们也不认为商业文学是骗钱。我们很少见到无产阶级产生与老自由派同等水平的仇富情绪，我们经常看到害怕无产化和渴望爬上更高位置的中产阶级产生如此强烈的仇富情绪，与之相呼应的是同样强烈的嫌贫情绪。在经济萧条的背景下，这种既嫌贫又仇富的极端化情绪得到加强，形成令人胆寒的周期性中产阶级激进反建制意识形态。无产阶级反对贫富差距是为了平等。中产阶级反对贫富差距是为了避免自己无产化，是为了动员社会底层，劫持和利用社会底层的声音，增加自己与社会顶层讨价还价的筹码，甚至满足自己谋权篡位的野心，中产阶级从来不是真诚的平等主义者。在愤怒地攻击自己的左翼竞争对手时，老自由派表示资本家是人类社会的健康运转不可或缺的一部分。当资本家给老自由派的父辈、社会地位高于老自由派的哲学教授输送大量金钱时；当资本家倾向于花费大量金钱享受心理学家和哲学家为他们精心熬制地阿谀奉承的心灵鸡汤时；当资本家没有给予老自由派终身教职和自由勋章，没有谦虚地向老自由派请教深奥的自由主义哲学细节时，老自由派突然间忘记资本家的创新能力对市场经济健康运转的重要意义了。老自由派没有说，作为消费者，资本家有消费自由，资本家想买什么就买什么，只有像苏联那样的极左地狱才会具有赤裸裸的强权意识，高高在上地去指导别人应该买什么，不应该买什么，此外，有了消费自由以后，资本家才能够充分发展自己的创新能力，因为资本家自己最清楚自己购买什么样的哲学课程有助于自己在商业层面的成功，资本家不需要自以为是的哲人王代替他们去思考。相反，老自由派也许会在某个孤独的夜晚梦见努力呼应中产阶级仇富情绪的伯尼·桑德斯大圣归来。

在中产阶级内部，老自由派的社会地位并不算高，老自由派不仅渴望金钱，而且还用金钱去衡量哲学的价值。在老自由派以个人利益为中心的幻想世界里，哲学价值与金钱的价值是单调递增的函数，哲学价值越高，就越值钱。贵族大学网红教授的商业化哲学课程，将附庸风雅的心灵鸡汤包装成哲学，简直是对哲学的侮辱，这种课程毫无哲学价值，因此不值钱，这种课程定价数百元，就是在骗钱，搞得好像这种课程里面蕴含着多么深刻的哲学真理一样。另一方面，老自由派将自己的哲学课程定价为令人咂舌的数千元，这不仅仅是因为老自由派像沙漠里的人们渴望水那样渴望金钱，而且是对自身才华的肯定。老自由派认为，自己才华横溢，因此自己开设的哲学课程无疑价值连城。老自由派认为自己拥有开创性的哲学价值，同时又幻想出金钱随着哲学价值而增加的单调函数，按照这个怀才不遇的中产阶级意识形态所建构的幻想世界，老自由派应该是豪宅里一辈子享受着幸福生活的哲学教授，而不是对自己的未来感到焦虑的边缘化中产阶级男青年。也许贵族大学网红教授的金钱、权力和名誉应该增加十几倍，然后跟老自由派互换社会地位。毕竟贵族大学网红教授唧唧呱呱地排泄着毫无哲学价值的庸俗之物，而老自由派向世界展示了纯粹的哲学，填补了哲学领域重要的理论空白。老自由派，被埋没的天才，给自己的哲学课程设定的昂贵价格，无疑将工人阶级排除开来。老自由派显然不打算给付不起昂贵学费的工人阶级讲解哲学，这里是不接待工人阶级的纯粹哲学，这里是君子不器的文人雅士的天堂，这里没有工人阶级的污染。毫无疑问，穷人没有资格接受老自由派的贵族教育。老自由派当然可以有选择性地掏出市场经济的法律与道德为自己制造的阶级隔离辩护，表示帮助工人阶级是情分，不帮助工人阶级是本分，表示自己没有帮助工人阶级的义务，并把强制性的知识分享解释为对私人领域的侵犯，这并不妨碍老自由派像形形色色的郁郁不得志的阶级兄弟那样利用和劫持社会底层的声音。正如各个派别的野心家一样，老自由派迫切地表现出为民请命的样子，甚至发表记录和夸大了清洁工低薪问题的图片。在这个图片下方的评论区里，老自由派的读者，同时也是老自由派的阶级兄弟，不约而同地留下充满同情心的表情包与文字。如果老自由派真的成功地动员了社会底层，或者亲西方的资产阶级夺取权力并且需要用老自由派的三寸不烂之舌来提供合法性，那么老自由派就能够获得自由勋章。在这种情况下，老自由派的哲学价值就会得到金钱的认可，老自由派就能够一辈子享受着高级中产阶级的良好物质生活条件和他人的尊重，不知道这算不算是梦想成真。老自由派对金钱的渴望似乎超越了通过知识付费攫取暴利的冲动，老自由派还寄希望于赌博般的加密货币。几乎是同一时刻，我们发现与西方帝国主义勾结的亲殖民主义牛鬼蛇神集体购买加密货币。我们不知道这两件事情是否存在联系。如果老自由派真的大发横财，那也多半是因为加密货币。毕竟老自由派在知识付费方面的运营模式极不成熟，难以在残酷的市场竞争中取得胜利。绝大多数人之所以关注老自由派，是为了娱乐，是为了身份认同，是为了宣泄不满情绪，而不是为了探讨晦涩难懂的哲学细节。当然，良好的受教育水平能够为老自由派的发言增添权威性，有助于树立意见领袖的高大形象，但互联网的聒噪通常忠诚性极低，再加上自由主义是一种较为常见的意识形态，不是能够轻易掏出数千元的高级中产阶级的小众爱好，而是受到了许多普通中产阶级的欢迎，虽然他们的社会地位也显著高于工人阶级，但他们也常常感到囊中羞涩，感到自己的私有财产不足以维护体面的生活水准，因此他们很难掏出数千元购买老自由派的哲学课程。虽然他们常常在互联网上寻死觅活地宣布自己是大公无私、不求回报的圣徒，是具有殉道精神的理想主义者，甚至鼓吹什么自由比生命更加重要，但他们愿意为一场并不出彩的旅行花费数千元，甚至愿意为了嫖娼花费数千元，而不愿意为了支持老自由派的事业花费数千元。其实，他们的动机是索取，而不是献身。这怨不得别人，老自由派自己也没有以身作则。在畅想财富自由后的生活时，老自由派表示自己要远离学术圈，专心做学术，并且带着女朋友游山玩水，哪怕只是嘴上说说，老自由派都不小心忘记了秦晖的循循善诱，以至于老自由派甚至没有把1%的财富分配给他们共同的事业。按照自由主义教条，他们必须帮助我们这帮被迫为奴的前现代底层暴民转变为自愿为奴的现代公民，且不说他们的理想有多么残酷，具有多么恐怖的强制性，能够对我们造成多么严重的伤害，他们公开鼓吹流血斗争，他们坚定不移地表示自己愿意为他们共同的事业殉道千百万次，却忘记在财富自由后为此付出一分钱。其实，纳粹主义者、罗尔斯主义者、托洛茨基主义者或者随便什么意识形态的狂热支持者，都有着类似的财富自由梦想。首先是心怀不满的中产阶级，然后才是不同意识形态阵营的成员。他们内部互相竞争，并且与外部世界具有冲突，因此他们披上不同的意识形态外衣包装自己的野心，因此我们就会看到像彩虹一样迷人的意识形态。除了口号不同以外，他们白天的行为高度相似，他们住在中产阶级社区，有着一份中产阶级工作，心里装满了中产阶级的特征化喜怒哀乐；他们晚上做着同一个与他们白天高呼的社会正义口号毫无关联的财富自由梦想。他们的表面诉求都是为民请命，替社会底层发声，区别仅在于改革方案，这群最亲爱的小耶稣们为了帮助我们这些穷苦大众而互相诋毁，甚至威胁要杀死对方。比如说，当民主社会主义者在解释暴力手段和社会进化的关系时，就受到死亡威胁。但他们的实际诉求却是对社会底层不仅无益而且有害的自私算计。他们与我们的杰克·伦敦具有不可调和的阶级差别。老自由派的理财经验十分欠缺，这也说明了老自由派的社会地位不会太低，以至于可以在漫长的学业生涯中，几乎将钱的问题抛在一边，安心地研究学问。老自由派没有能力直接跟具有商业性的新左翼势力抢夺市场。

相较于老自由派，民主社会主义者更年轻，并且拥有更加深厚的中产阶级背景。年轻和富裕的完美结合，形成了新左翼亚文化的个性特征和社会基础。我们知道，老自由派企图通过卖书和卖课获得利润，民主社会主义者获取利润的手段则具有更加纯粹的后物质主义色彩。两种截然不同的运营模式，像镜子一样反映了泾渭分明的等级秩序。老自由派缺钱，迫切地想要大发横财。老自由派对自己的商业化哲学课程采取另辟蹊径的漫天要价，将其渴望成为暴发富的梦想赫然呈现于世人的眼前。与之相比，民主社会主义者在将文化资本转化为经济利益的过程中展现出较低的逐利冲动。当然，在这里，除了考虑到社会地位的悬殊差距之外，我们也不应该忽视年龄对运营模式的影响。卡尔·考茨基告诉我们，无法通过富裕大学生的崇高措辞预测他们的未来行为，无数少年的梦只是青春的狂热，而不是一生的事业。大学生，更准确地说是中产阶级和资产阶级大学生，能够依靠较好的家庭背景，暂时绘制出一幅瑰丽的后物质主义愿景。我们记得在我们刚刚进入大学生活时，大学老师曾经在课堂上表示，不论在念大学时觉得多么痛苦，在离开大学后，就会觉得大学时光是多么快乐。教辅书籍堆成小山的考公考研教室有力地质疑了这个观点，虽然人们有时甚至会异想天开地认为那种宛如剥夺睡眠的审讯般的高三时光充满了美好的回忆。这种观点也有一定道理，至少在大学老师所处的中产阶级内部具有不错的说服力。社会地位较高的大学生暂时不需要思考如何挣钱，也不会受到阶级歧视，经济压力较小，享受生活较多。随着他们离开校门，经济压力增大，他们的后物质主义倾向就会遭到削弱，对通过增加私有财产来维护和提升自己社会地位的渴望将纯真的稚气冲刷得干干净净。老自由派也不是一开始就卖书和卖课的。在卖书和卖课之前，老自由派进行了大量志愿性活动，热情洋溢地宣传自由主义意识形态，有时甚至展现出亲殖民主义倾向，并且还像许多具有影响力的互联网账号那样顺便开设了付费问答。在攫取利润方面，人们对付费问答的期待普遍很低，因此，付费问答通常代表着较低的逐利冲动。老自由派应该是在学业生涯中开设付费问答的，卖书和卖课标志着中产阶级青年步入社会后陡增的经济压力。如果我们把民主社会主义者的后物质主义商品与老自由派的付费问答相比较，那么两者的逐利冲动似乎都处于较低的水平。此外，在大学里，一部分人住在中产阶级社区里夜夜笙歌，另一部分人在工人阶级社区里一边辛苦挣钱一边阅读杰克·伦敦的书。这是两个世界的大学。我们的大学和他们的大学是不同的。但是，绝大多数工人阶级的孩子没有机会上大学，尤其没有机会去社会影响力较大的贵族大学念书，而占总人数比例较少的天资过人的工人阶级的孩子终于有了念大学的机会，社会结构的奖惩机制会发挥作用，促使他们将大学视为实现阶级上升的渠道，他们毫不犹豫地选择了容易给自己带来高薪工作的专业，而不是研究如何改善工人阶级的状况，乃至消灭阶级，他们很快摆脱了原有的阶级属性，被中产阶级所吸收，因此，具有阶级特权的意识形态不会放过大学。我们知道，大学是公子哥儿的后物质主义天堂，大学，尤其是贵族大学，没能释放阶级特权的全部潜力，这意味着大学让擅长社交的公子哥儿成为璀璨的明珠，让小家碧玉尽情释放自己的青春靓丽，并且使边缘化中产阶级男性黯然失色了。在几乎没有等级秩序的班级里，在一堆富家子弟里，边缘化中产阶级男性无法施展自己的威风凛凛，感觉自己是那么孤独无助。在这种情况下，性格外向但又缺少朋友的边缘化中产阶级男青年就会倾向于通过互联网社交平台建立补偿机制，他们的当务之急是寻找同类，寻找一个没有被“现充”玷污的绅士家园。在西方世界，希特勒是禁忌，于是他们找到了互联网小旮旯里的极右翼社区。在另一个世界，社会结构的利益分配更加稳定，这要求中产阶级在享受特权的同时保持忠诚性，因此主流中产阶级具有较强的去意识形态化倾向，这样一来，五彩缤纷的意识形态斗争就光荣地成为边缘化中产阶级男青年互相安慰的互联网社交场所。在组建亲密关系的三个核心维度方面，他们的缺陷是性格和长相，优势是金钱。随着他们步入社会，他们的钱包闪闪发光，那些门当户对的小贵妇们多半还是看不上他们，她们由于难以上嫁甚至不得不搞起同性恋，但有大量长相姣好的工人阶级女性愿意为了金钱而委身于他们。漂亮而又相对贫穷的女孩太多，私有财产是更加稀缺的资源。她们排起长队想要嫁给他们。她们为他们争风吃醋，出嫁时又会忍不住偷偷流下伤心的眼泪，想起属于另一个世界的青春。因此，他们的择偶范围大大增加，催婚的压力又会进一步增加他们组建亲密关系的可能性，而一旦组建亲密关系，孤独感就会有所缓解，不再需要具有社交补偿职能的意识形态斗争。对他们来说，意识形态斗争定格在那个物质富足却精神孤独的青春年华。至少在新左翼亚文化内部，大多数成员在十五六岁时加入，在二十五岁前淡出。也就是说，他们差不多是在大学毕业后一两年，找到稳定的中产阶级工作，同时也达到适婚年龄，他们差不多是在这个时间段淡出全人类共同的伟大事业。还没淡出意识形态斗争的边缘化中产阶级男性，要么是在择偶方面有着更大的挑战，要么是家庭和社会地位达到了很高的水平，以至于能够继续拥有大量自由支配的闲暇时间，将用来补偿社交缺失的意识形态斗争，转化为更加悠闲的智力游戏，将孤独的灵魂转化为有趣的灵魂，将雪中送炭转化为锦上添花。还存在着少数案例是在社会问题讨论领域有所建树，打算或已经靠这一行吃饭。正如工人阶级的大学和中产阶级的大学不同，不同阶级的高中生涯也极为不同。有一半的初中生无法上高中，中产阶级的孩子接受良好的教育，他们不太可能被淘汰，绝大多数被隔离开来的孩子，都是缺乏优质教育资源的工人阶级的孩子。也就是说，绝大多数工人阶级的孩子无法念高中。有一小部分工人阶级的孩子进入高中校门，对于这部分工人阶级的孩子来说，高中阶段往往异常艰苦，充满了题海战术和睡眠剥夺，没有足够的闲暇和意愿参与对具有浓郁后物质主义色彩的新左翼亚文化的建设。就以我们自己为例，我们在念高中时根本就没有听说过后物质主义和新左翼亚文化，我们性格叛逆，努力寻找异端知识，但只能接触到自由主义思想。我们好不容易发现了乔治·奥威尔的《1984》，却误以为这是一部宣传自由主义的经典小说。中产阶级青少年的高中阶段轻松愉快，生活体验丰富多彩，授课老师海纳百川，更容易接触和拥抱各种特权化小众爱好，其中包括新左翼亚文化。在某种程度上，大学是高中的延伸，但即使在考公考研盛行的时代，大学生活还是会比高中轻松一些，因此大学是新左翼亚文化浪潮的高峰。由于高等教育普及化，中产阶级逐渐不满足于学士学位，他们在本科毕业以后，可能会进一步扩展自己的学业生涯，在这种情况下，从公子哥儿到工人贵族的社会角色切换将延后数年。在西方世界，也存在类似的迹象，虽然新左翼始终属于中产阶级青年，但相较于1968年的五月风暴，2011年的占领华尔街参与者的年龄则稍大一些。但是，西方世界的新左翼运动自诞生以来就是在大街上撒泼打滚的“现充”的天下，他们的动机倾向于代际问题。另一个世界的新左翼亚文化则具有补偿社交缺失的职能。代际问题需要等到上一代人退休以后才能完美解决，至少要等到在中产阶级工作中获得资历才能够有所缓解，例如升职加薪。社交问题则不用那么麻烦，只要在毕业后凭借中产阶级社会地位谈婚论嫁就行。因此，另一个世界的新左翼亚文化更加年轻。相较于那些在大学毕业后摆脱了孤独的新左翼亚文化步入“现充”生活甚至在讨论社会问题领域有所建树的前边缘化中产阶级男性，那些停滞在孤独无助的心理状态中的边缘化中产阶级男性无疑处于更加弱势的地位，后者的社会地位通常较低，也许金钱的优势依然存在，但金钱的优势不是很大，无法弥补性格和长相的缺陷，他们也许是一个工资较高的程序员，但还没有富裕到会被美女重重包围的地步，因此他们无法像白天拥有高薪中产阶级闲职的男性畅销书作家那样在晚上绘声绘色地讨论着跨国嫖娼的权力与快感，宛如都市题材爽文里的男主角，他们只能继续依靠二次元美少女的绵绵情话和全人类共同的事业进行社交补偿。在这里，我们又发现了一道中产阶级内部的裂痕。正如维多利亚时代向西格蒙德·弗洛伊德求助的贵妇人，她们的痛苦不能与每日工作十六小时的纺织女工相比，哪怕是最弱势的边缘化中产阶级男性，他们的社会地位依然高于工人阶级，他们享有特权的孤独感也不是社会底层的孤独感，他们的孤独感不是具有商业性的新左翼势力表示应该被化学阉割的美国男性流浪者的孤独感，他们的孤独感不是《马丁·伊登》的孤独感。杰克·伦敦的小说充满深入骨髓的孤独感。《有麻风病的顾劳》是孤独的，但那是一种坚持抵抗的孤独。《野性的呼唤》是孤独的，但那是一种追求自由的孤独。我们永远无法忘记《星游人》一书中的孤独情感，那是孤独的英雄主义，即使身陷囹圄和遭受酷刑，也不能忘记我们的承诺。

永远不要忘记，

永远不要放弃。

民主社会主义者的运营模式具有很高的创新性。在低烈度逐利活动方面，老自由派的付费问答几乎是一种路人皆知的运营模式，民主社会主义者的运营模式则相对不为人所知。民主社会主义者的运营模式是提供定制科幻小说和诗歌的服务。正如绝大多数人一样，我们也很少听说过这种服务。当我们了解到民主社会主义者的运营模式时，我们才逐渐回想起数年前的一场对网络文学未来的讨论。当时，网络文学进入寒冬期，网站纷纷倒闭，编辑提桶跑路，为了适应手机流量廉价化和短视频的兴起，以网络文学免费化和广告收益为基础的下沉市场被广泛认为是一条出路，但有些写手认为免费渠道会导致恶性竞争，不仅会稀释付费网站的利润，而且会压低整个网络文学的写作质量。在这场讨论中，有些写手提出了一条与下沉市场截然相反的出路，那就是根据大老板们的需求，写定制小说。我们认为定制小说充其量只能成为奢侈性的小众市场，而不可能普及化。因为定制小说的成本太高了。例如，同时给一百个人写小说，每个人只要支付一块钱，作者就可以获得一百块钱的稿费。为了方便讨论，我们不讨论利润分成，假定读者为了阅读小说而支付的金钱全部转化为作者的稿费。现在，要搞定制小说了，要搞一对一的精品服务，这意味着众人拾柴火焰高的可能性不复存在，读者必须独自承担一切阅读费用，如果只给一个人写小说，并且需要得到与同时给一百个人相同的稿费，那么这个孤独的读者必须自己支付一百块钱。毫无疑问，相较于传统付费阅读，定制小说对读者的消费能力提出更高的要求。这是一块钱和一百块钱的区别，整整一百倍的区别，真正的反紧缩凯恩斯主义经济政策。既然传统付费阅读都超出了绝大多数人的消费能力，那么定制小说就更是将绝大多数人排除在外，转而为最富裕的群体提供最个性化的优质服务。在了解到民主社会主义者的运营模式之前，这场讨论是我们唯一一次接触到定制文学。也就是说，或许我们孤陋寡闻，民主社会主义者的运营模式是我们第一次见到的对定制文学的实践。这种实践依靠着极高的富裕水平，却又有着仿佛不喜欢谈钱的后物质主义倾向。民主社会主义者提供定制科幻小说和诗歌的服务，主要动机不是攫取利润，而是一种兴趣，一种理想，一种对伯牙钟子期的期待。工人阶级阅读着运用写作公式和疯狂灌水批量生产的免费小说，其中有些免费小说甚至是人工智能的粗制滥造之物。当时，ChatGPT刚刚崛起，我们遇到了一个运用人工智能混稿费的写手。她在免费渠道写末世小说，但不擅长写打斗情节，于是她寻求人工智能的帮助。她从外地嫁过来，她说她在家里带孩子，需要通过写小说补贴家用。在跟我们聊天之后，她才听说了ChatGPT。在此之前，她不知道ChatGPT是什么，并且缺乏使用ChatGPT所需要的上网工具，她的硅基枪手不是ChatGPT，而是一款付费的国产人工智能写作软件。工人阶级阅读的免费小说是冷漠的、劣质的、批量生产的可悲到甚至不能用媚俗来形容的工业化流水线产品。民主社会主义者则在另一个世界打造了真实的乌托邦。

民主社会主义者提供的定制科幻小说和诗歌充满了人性的光辉。民主社会主义者把读者视为一个个有面孔、有梦想、有灵魂的人，而不是一大群三心二意地追逐着“爽点”的抽象物。在作者方面，为钱而干的诗人不得不放弃自己喜欢的创作领域，转向热门领域。一位网络文学编辑的经典名言高度凝练地体现了市场经济对写手的异化：狗饿了会回来的。民主社会主义者则不存在这种问题，不存在异化，不存在艺术自杀。民主社会主义者在网络文学领域的新左翼后物质主义创新之路将作者和读者的文学体验提升到了很高的层次，促成了一种温馨美好的人际关系。民主社会主义者将残酷的市场经济，改造成慷慨的福利国家。民主社会主义者坚决反对人类在追逐利润的过程中丧失自我。要白雪皑皑的红色圣地斯堪的纳维亚，不要丑陋的、腐烂的、物欲横流的美帝国主义。在新左翼网店里，民主社会主义者列举了自己喜爱的科幻小说家，并表示自己偏向于软科幻。此外，民主社会主义者还表示，自己深深地热爱着科幻小说，欢迎关于科幻小说的亲密讨论。民主社会主义者的静静摆放着科幻小说和诗歌的新左翼网店，让我们想到了在许多年前的春天流行过的民谣歌曲。贰佰的《玫瑰》：

你说你想在海边买一所房子

和你可爱的松狮一起住在那里

你会当一个心情杂货铺的老板娘

随着心情卖着自己喜欢的东西

如果民主社会主义者成功地建设了他们的中产阶级乌托邦，那么具有工人阶级背景的编辑和写手被排挤出网络文学领域的劳动力市场的可能性将大大增加。我们没能很好地服务于拥有足够的私有财产订阅网络小说的普通中产阶级，我们甚至没能很好地服务于阅读免费网络小说的工人阶级，对于向距离我们十万八千里的高级中产阶级提供定制文学服务，我们可能更加没有信心。他们平等对话，共同创作，好一幅其乐融融的新左翼蓝图。我们被动退休以后，就只能给他们端茶送水了。当然，在将我们驱逐到社会边缘的黑暗角落的同时，不要忘记把托洛茨基的肖像挂在床头，郑重其事地为托洛茨基的大开杀戒辩护，光明磊落地批判考茨基和布兰亭的和平修正主义倾向，并凭借反对枪支暴力的崇高措辞，呼吁进行更加严格的枪支管制，避免我们忍无可忍进行最后的斗争。如果我们聪明过人，在犯罪丛生的祖安城努力专研了皮尔特沃夫现代公民的审美趣味，知道了他们喜欢什么样的政治正确，什么样的社会正义，什么样的象征性口号，什么样的新左翼叙事，并且，我们抓住机会，那么我们就有可能扮演安分守己的服务对象，获得至少比祖安城好得多的物质生活条件，从一个时而被资本主义意识形态蒙蔽双眼时而又充满暴力革命幻想的恐怖分子，上升为证明他们具有人道主义精神的无产阶级自由战士。运用老左派语言但不可避免地抹上了新左翼色彩的网络骗子，拙劣地裁剪和拼接了一系列笑话般的左翼八股文，轻而易举地骗取数万元钱财。由此可见，在追逐利润的领域，曾有一片蓝海。值得注意的是，网络骗子的真实学历是大专。相对而言，大专学历具有工人阶级的色彩。如果工人阶级的声音真的能够得到尊重，那么网络骗子应该诚实地宣布自己的学历，甚至低报自己的学历，但网络骗子没有这样做。也许是根据自己的商业敏感性，网络骗子将自己包装成研究生学历。直到今天，研究生学历的人口占比低于1%。网络骗子还补充了一条虚构的信息，将高学历和低工资联系起来，夸大中产阶级的苦难，假装自己是脱不下长衫的孔乙己而不是根本就没有长衫的工人阶级。网络骗子迎合了经济下行时期的中产阶级焦虑情绪。

总体而言，到目前为止，在直接性市场争夺方面，老自由派和民主社会主义者都没有对具有商业性的新左翼势力构成威胁。老自由派的逐利冲动极高，但运营模式不佳。民主社会主义者虽然探索到了具有创新性的运营模式，但其逐利冲动较低，因而没有深挖攫取利润的技巧，呈现出浅尝辄止的倾向。我们估计，老自由派和民主社会主义者所攫取的利润应该都在十万元以内。此外，无论是老自由派，还是民主社会主义者，与具有商业性的新左翼势力产生的冲突都集中于2023年。老自由派和民主社会主义者的与讨论社会问题有关的逐利行为集中于2024年。这里的时间差并不能说明具有商业性的新左翼势力发起进攻的动机不是压缩和毁灭竞争对手的逐利空间。在老自由派和民主社会主义者的逐利行为发生之前，作为神经兮兮的小资产者，具有商业性的新左翼势力就可能未雨绸缪地对未来的逐利行为产生焦虑性预期。但不管怎样，在冲突爆发时期，老自由派和民主社会主义者都展现出了在吸引流量维度上的强大竞争能力。其中，老自由派已经是互联网平台社会问题讨论领域首屈一指的亲西方自由主义意见领袖，被广泛视为秦晖的继承者。民主社会主义者的影响力相对较小，但具有良好的受教育水平、渊博的知识体系和较高的社会地位，频频写出能够与中产阶级意识形态相呼应的热门新左翼文章，因而上升空间大。尤其是在新左翼领域，年轻是一个不容忽视的变量。鉴于二十五岁是淡出新左翼亚文化的临界点，如果有人在二十五岁的时候通过新左翼术语吸引流量的技巧有所起色，那么很可能只是强弩之末，不必对此如临大敌。如果有人在二十岁甚至是十五岁写出一系列在新左翼亚文化内部广泛流传的热门文章，那就前途不可限量了。也许具有商业性的新左翼势力羡慕民主社会主义者没有沾染二十世纪的历史的尘埃，属于完整的二十一世纪现代公民。老自由派和民主社会主义者几乎没有直接夺走具有商业性的新左翼势力的利润，但吸引了许多流量，成为社会问题讨论领域的免费替代品。不是一家饭店抢走了另一家饭店的顾客，而是免费食堂的存在，减少了人们关顾饭店的次数。冲突也不是单向的，不是具有商业性的新左翼势力自导自演地发起和结束冲突，而是具有互动性的冲突。在具有商业性的新左翼势力企图召唤达摩克利斯之剑狐假虎威地对付老自由派之前，老自由派就曾多次嘲笑具有商业性的新左翼势力。有时，老自由派嘲笑具有商业性的新左翼势力缺乏工人阶级的支持，老自由派借力使力地指出，新左翼视频冗长无比，只能吸引那些具有闲情逸致的小资产阶级，而无法吸引工人阶级，毕竟工人阶级倾向于欣赏短视频。有时，老自由派又不可一世地问责网络世界，要求总结新左翼视频，因为老自由派的时间很宝贵，不想为新左翼视频花费太长时间。民主社会主义者发表了十几篇关于具有商业性的新左翼势力的文章，每一篇文章都具有极强的批判性。民主社会主义者表示，自己曾经通过对方的新左翼视频学到了知识，但对方的错误在于，以居高临下的方式教育启蒙的对象，那么启蒙的本身必然走向方面。与此同时，民主社会主义者喜欢给自己的读者封官加爵，宣布自己的读者是苏联创立者的《怎么办？》一书中的主角。也许民主社会主义者认为自己的新左翼文章具有可以使读者大脑升级的黑魔法。老自由派和民主社会主义者的免费食堂不仅提供食物，还分发反对饭店的传单。这两种行为都会侵犯饭店老板的私有财产。断人财路，如同杀人父母。随着冲突激烈化，老自由派和民主社会主义者采取了截然相反的策略。

 

[Trident]

 

[Caichan]

Verbal

 

[Acorn]

Yeah I'm not reading allat bro

 

[retributor]

VERBATIM ENGLISH TRANSLATION USING CHATGPT

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East Asian Involuntarily Single Elites’ New Left Subculture (Chapter Four)

Soon, the old liberals and the democratic socialists were also drawn into conflicts connected with the commercially oriented New Left forces. Unlike anarchists engaged in purely voluntary activities, the old liberals and democratic socialists were, to varying degrees, inclined toward commercialization. Among them, the operational model of the old liberals roughly revolved around two aspects: selling philosophy books and selling philosophy courses. Book sales apparently did not allow the old liberals to feast to their heart’s content, so they then launched expensive philosophy courses, shifting from casting a wide net to precision harvesting, intending to make a fortune by relying on the wallets of a small number of highly loyal fans.

The old liberals had once angrily denounced the commercialized philosophy courses offered by celebrity philosophy professors at elite universities. They furiously exposed the nature of such commercialized philosophy courses, claiming that their main audience was not philosophy enthusiasts or professionals in the field, but rather capitalists who affected refined tastes. The old liberals also said that such commercialized philosophy courses were similar to success studies. They angrily condemned them as money scams.

It is difficult to say whether the main audience of such commercialized philosophy courses truly consists of capitalists, as the old liberals claim, or rather a healthy middle class that longs for light luxury consumption and self-improvement. When we were in university, we heard that some psychologists tended to earn extra income by lecturing capitalists on what was packaged as so-called positive psychology but was in fact success studies; reportedly, this was a lucrative line of work. Capitalists like having university professors hover around them, politely deploying a string of ornate professional terms to shower them with flattery, repackaging the surplus value they extracted from the working class as their own effort and talent, and repackaging their private property soaked in the blood of the working class as an embodiment of social justice. On the other hand, psychologists pinch their noses and say they have no way to communicate with the working class.

However, the commercialized philosophy courses that inspired the old liberals’ outrage were probably not aimed primarily at capitalists, but at the old liberals’ own class brothers. After all, this series of philosophy courses was released on the “Bilibili” platform, which is dominated by middle-class youth. Capitalists may indeed occasionally buy online courses on a whim, especially petty bourgeois individuals whose social status is not much higher than that of the old liberals. They cannot, like wealthier capitalists, sit face-to-face with eminent monks, philosophers, or psychologists for discussion, and thus settle for relatively inexpensive light luxury consumption for psychological massage, taking online courses together with other members of the top 20 percent of the income distribution.

Here, we can see the extreme anti-rich sentiment displayed by the old liberals. In theory, the old liberals lean toward Hayek and the center-right; at times, they even tend to downplay the crimes of the far right, for example by claiming that the atrocities of Nazi Germany were mainly directed at other ethnic groups and at least not at the dominant ethnicity, while the Soviet Union was even more terrifying and inclined toward internal repression. In theory, the old liberals unwaveringly defend the market economy and capitalist private ownership. To this end, the erudite old liberals do not hesitate to fabricate outright falsehoods, such as misrepresenting Swedish functional socialism—which advocates ending bourgeois power over the course of several decades—as a form of welfare-capitalist reform premised on not infringing upon the foundations of private ownership.

Yet the commercialized philosophy courses of celebrity professors at elite universities—who are in competition with the old liberals—are an exception. When they find themselves in a relatively weak position in market competition, the old liberals, like their American class brothers in Occupy Wall Street, exhibit hatred-filled anti-market tendencies. Here, the old liberals toss aside liberal dogmas such as the invisible hand and respect for market subjectivity. They suddenly resemble judges at the side of Yama, attempting to intervene in market prices like far-left terrorists. With iron-faced impartiality, the old liberals declare that others’ commercialized philosophy courses are overpriced, that those success studies packaged as philosophy are not worth hundreds of yuan—despite the fact that the old liberals themselves charge exorbitant prices, pricing their own philosophy courses at several thousand yuan, more than ten times the price of the elite-university celebrity professors.

Not only that, the old liberals even proclaim that others’ commercialized philosophy courses are scams, which is undeniably defamatory. There is no evidence whatsoever that the celebrity professors are falsely advertising and selling products consumers do not want; on the contrary, these professors keenly capture market demand, accurately target the interests of the bourgeoisie and the middle class with strong purchasing power, and keep course content within the bounds acceptable to internet platforms, perfectly catering to the classic market-economy consensus system and thereby reaping enormous profits. Consumers want to affect refinement; the commodified philosophy courses provided by the celebrity professors meet that demand. There is no scam, no coercion—only one willing buyer and one willing seller.

What we see is that the old liberals, as members of the middle class who are dissatisfied with their own property-based social status, generate anti-rich sentiment far more exaggerated than that of proletarian ideology. We will not use rose-tinted language to beautify proletarian ideology. To be honest, we ourselves have some anti-rich tendencies. We find that Jack London also had anti-rich tendencies. When we discover such tendencies in Jack London’s novels, we experience pleasure and resonance, as well as guilt—the latter emotion always arising when reading vengeful plotlines. We believe that it is immoral for the proletariat, after gaining power, to take revenge on its former oppressors.

Jack London tells us that formulaic commercial literature is simply disgusting, yet he did not, as the old liberals do when slandering the celebrity professors’ commercialized philosophy courses, claim that commercial literature is a money scam. Nor do we believe commercial literature is a scam. We rarely see the proletariat display anti-rich sentiment at the same level as the old liberals. We frequently see the middle class—fearful of proletarianization and eager to climb higher—display such intense anti-rich sentiment, accompanied by equally intense contempt for the poor. Against the backdrop of economic depression, this dual sentiment of hating both poverty and wealth intensifies, forming a chilling, cyclical, middle-class radical anti-establishment ideology.

The proletariat opposes wealth disparity for the sake of equality. The middle class opposes wealth disparity to avoid proletarianization—to mobilize the lower strata, hijack and exploit their voices, increase bargaining chips vis-à-vis the social elite, and even satisfy ambitions of usurpation. The middle class has never been sincere egalitarians.

When angrily attacking their left-wing competitors, the old liberals claim that capitalists are indispensable to the healthy functioning of human society. But when capitalists funnel large sums of money to the old liberals’ fathers’ generation and to philosophy professors with higher social status than the old liberals; when capitalists lavish money on psychologists and philosophers who carefully brew flattering chicken soup for their souls; when capitalists fail to grant the old liberals tenure or medals of freedom, and fail to humbly seek their guidance on profound liberal philosophy—the old liberals suddenly forget the importance of capitalist innovation to the healthy functioning of the market economy.

The old liberals do not say that, as consumers, capitalists have freedom of consumption; capitalists can buy whatever they want, and only a far-left hell like the Soviet Union would possess naked authoritarian consciousness, arrogantly dictating what others should or should not buy. Moreover, only with freedom of consumption can capitalists fully develop their innovative capacity, because capitalists themselves know best which philosophy courses help them succeed commercially; they do not need self-styled philosopher-kings to think on their behalf. Instead, the old liberals may, on some lonely night, dream of Bernie Sanders—who echoes middle-class anti-rich sentiment—returning as a great sage.

Within the middle class, the social status of the old liberals is not particularly high. The old liberals not only crave money but also use money to measure the value of philosophy. In their self-interest-centered fantasy world, philosophical value is a monotonically increasing function of monetary value: the higher the philosophical value, the more expensive it should be. The commercialized philosophy courses of elite-university celebrity professors package affectation and chicken soup as philosophy, which the old liberals see as an insult to philosophy; such courses have no philosophical value and are therefore worthless, so pricing them at hundreds of yuan is a scam, as if they contained profound philosophical truths.

On the other hand, the old liberals price their own philosophy courses at jaw-dropping thousands of yuan, not only because they crave money like desert dwellers crave water, but also as an affirmation of their own talent. They believe themselves extraordinarily gifted, and therefore that their philosophy courses are priceless. They believe they possess groundbreaking philosophical value and imagine a monotonic function in which money increases alongside philosophical value. In the fantasy world constructed by this ideology of the underappreciated middle class, the old liberals should be philosophy professors enjoying lifelong happiness in luxury mansions, not marginalized middle-class young men anxious about their futures.

Perhaps the celebrity professors’ money, power, and fame should increase tenfold and then be swapped with those of the old liberals. After all, the elite-university celebrity professors babble vulgarities devoid of philosophical value, while the old liberals present pure philosophy to the world, filling important theoretical gaps. The old liberals—buried geniuses—set exorbitant prices for their philosophy courses, thereby excluding the working class. Clearly, they have no intention of explaining philosophy to workers who cannot afford the high tuition. This is pure philosophy that does not welcome the working class; this is a paradise for refined literati who are “gentlemen not tools,” free from the contamination of the working class. Without doubt, the poor are not qualified to receive the aristocratic education of the old liberals.

Of course, the old liberals can selectively invoke the laws and morals of the market economy to justify the class segregation they produce, claiming that helping the working class is a favor rather than an obligation, that not helping is their right, and that mandatory knowledge sharing constitutes an invasion of the private sphere. This does not prevent them, like many frustrated class brothers, from exploiting and hijacking the voices of the lower strata. Like ambitious figures of all stripes, the old liberals are eager to present themselves as speaking for the people, even publishing images that document and exaggerate the low wages of cleaners. In the comment sections beneath these images, the old liberals’ readers—also their class brothers—unanimously leave sympathetic emojis and messages.

If the old liberals truly succeed in mobilizing the lower strata, or if pro-Western bourgeois forces seize power and require the old liberals’ eloquence to provide legitimacy, then the old liberals may receive medals of freedom. In that case, their philosophical value would be recognized by money, and they could enjoy a lifetime of upper-middle-class material conditions and social respect—whether that counts as a dream fulfilled is unclear.

The old liberals’ craving for money seems to go beyond profiteering from paid knowledge; they also pin hopes on gambling-like cryptocurrencies. Almost simultaneously, we observed pro-colonialist demons colluding with Western imperialism collectively purchasing cryptocurrencies. We do not know whether there is a connection. If the old liberals do strike it rich, it will likely be through cryptocurrency. Their knowledge-payment business model is extremely immature and unlikely to succeed in fierce market competition. Most people follow the old liberals for entertainment, identity affirmation, and emotional venting—not to explore abstruse philosophical details.

Of course, a good educational background adds authority to the old liberals’ statements and helps establish their image as opinion leaders. But internet noise is typically low in loyalty. Moreover, liberalism is a relatively common ideology—not a niche hobby for upper-middle-class consumers willing to pay thousands of yuan, but one welcomed by many ordinary middle-class people. Although their social status is significantly higher than that of the working class, they often feel cash-strapped and worry that their private property is insufficient to sustain a respectable standard of living, making it difficult for them to spend thousands on the old liberals’ philosophy courses.

Although they often theatrically proclaim themselves altruistic saints with martyrdom spirit—declaring that freedom is more important than life—they are willing to spend thousands on unremarkable travel or even on prostitution, but unwilling to spend thousands to support the old liberals’ cause. Their motivation is extraction, not sacrifice. This is no one else’s fault; the old liberals themselves fail to lead by example. When fantasizing about life after financial freedom, the old liberals say they will withdraw from academia to focus on scholarship and travel with their girlfriends—even if only verbally—and in doing so forget Qin Hui’s earnest admonitions, failing to allocate even 1 percent of their wealth to their common cause.

According to liberal doctrine, they must help us—the premodern lower-class mobs forced into servitude—transform into modern citizens who voluntarily accept servitude. Leaving aside how cruel and coercive this ideal is, and how much harm it could inflict on us, they openly advocate bloody struggle and repeatedly declare their willingness to martyr themselves millions of times, yet forget to contribute a single cent after achieving financial freedom. In fact, Nazi supporters, Rawlsians, Trotskyists, or any other ideological zealots share similar dreams of financial freedom. First come the dissatisfied middle class, then members of various ideological camps. They compete internally and clash with the outside world, donning different ideological garments to package their ambitions, producing an ideologically rainbow-colored spectacle.

Apart from differing slogans, their daytime behaviors are highly similar: they live in middle-class neighborhoods, hold middle-class jobs, and harbor quintessential middle-class joys and sorrows. At night, they dream the same dream of financial freedom that bears no relation to their daytime cries for social justice. Their stated demands all claim to speak for the people, differing only in reform schemes. These beloved little Jesuses vilify one another in the name of helping the poor masses, even threatening to kill each other. For instance, when democratic socialists explained the relationship between violence and social evolution, they received death threats. Yet their real demands are selfish calculations that are not only useless but harmful to the lower strata. They have an irreconcilable class difference with our Jack London.

The old liberals’ financial management skills are extremely lacking, which also indicates that their social status is not low enough to have forced them to worry about money during long academic careers, allowing them to focus on scholarship. They lack the ability to directly compete with commercially oriented New Left forces for market share.

Compared with the old liberals, democratic socialists are younger and possess deeper middle-class backgrounds. The perfect combination of youth and wealth forms the personality traits and social foundation of New Left subculture. We know that the old liberals attempt to profit by selling books and courses, while democratic socialists’ profit-seeking methods exhibit a purer post-materialist character. These two radically different operational models mirror a clearly stratified hierarchy. The old liberals lack money and desperately want to strike it rich. Their alternative, exorbitant pricing strategy for philosophy courses openly displays dreams of becoming nouveau riche. In contrast, democratic socialists show lower profit-seeking impulse in converting cultural capital into economic gain.

Of course, besides class differences, age also affects operational models. Karl Kautsky tells us that one cannot predict future behavior from the lofty rhetoric of wealthy university students; countless youthful dreams are merely youthful fervor, not lifelong pursuits. University students—more precisely, middle-class and bourgeois students—can rely on favorable family backgrounds to temporarily sketch splendid post-materialist visions. We recall that when we first entered university, a professor said that no matter how painful university feels, one will later regard it as joyful. The mountains of exam prep books in civil-service and graduate-exam classrooms strongly challenge this view, though some even nostalgically imagine sleep-deprivation torture of senior high school as beautiful memories. This view has some validity, at least within the middle class inhabited by university professors.

Students of higher social status need not yet worry about earning money or face class discrimination; their economic pressure is lower and enjoyment greater. Once they leave campus and pressure mounts, their post-materialist tendencies weaken, and the desire to maintain or enhance social status through private property washes away youthful innocence. The old liberals did not initially sell books and courses. Before that, they engaged in extensive volunteer activities, passionately promoting liberal ideology, sometimes even showing pro-colonialist tendencies, and like many influential internet accounts, also offered paid Q&A. Expectations for profit from paid Q&A are generally low, reflecting weak profit motive. The old liberals likely offered paid Q&A during academic years; selling books and courses marked the sharp rise in economic pressure after entering society.

If we compare democratic socialists’ post-materialist commodities with the old liberals’ paid Q&A, both show relatively low profit motive. Additionally, at university, some live in middle-class neighborhoods partying nightly, while others labor in working-class neighborhoods while reading Jack London. These are two different universities. Our university and theirs are not the same.

Most working-class children do not attend university, especially elite universities with social influence. A small number of exceptionally gifted working-class children do gain access, but structural reward mechanisms encourage them to view university as a path to class ascent; they choose high-paying majors rather than studying how to improve or abolish class, quickly shedding original class attributes and being absorbed by the middle class. Ideologies of class privilege therefore do not spare universities. Universities—especially elite ones—are post-materialist paradises for privileged sons, enabling socially adept heirs to shine, allowing well-bred young women to display youthful charm, and rendering marginalized middle-class men invisible.

In classrooms with minimal hierarchy, surrounded by wealthy students, marginalized middle-class men cannot assert dominance and feel lonely and helpless. Outgoing yet friendless marginalized middle-class young men thus gravitate toward online platforms to build compensatory mechanisms, urgently seeking peers and a gentleman’s home untainted by “normies.” In the West, Hitler is taboo, so they find far-right communities in obscure internet corners. In another world, stable interest distribution demands middle-class loyalty, leading mainstream middle classes toward de-ideologization, leaving ideological struggle as an online consolation space for marginalized middle-class men.

In mate selection, their disadvantages are personality and appearance; their advantage is money. Upon entering society, their wallets shine. Upper-middle-class women often still reject them; unable to marry upward, some turn to homosexuality. Meanwhile, many attractive working-class women are willing to marry them for money. Beautiful but poorer women are plentiful; private property is scarcer. They line up to marry them, competing for affection, then shedding tears at marriage, recalling youth from another world. Their mate selection range expands, and marriage pressure further increases relationship formation, easing loneliness and reducing need for ideological compensation. For them, ideological struggle freezes in youth marked by material abundance and spiritual loneliness.

Within New Left subculture, most join at fifteen or sixteen and exit before twenty-five—around graduation, stable middle-class employment, and marriageable age. Those who do not exit either face greater mating challenges or possess such high status that they retain abundant leisure, transforming compensatory ideological struggle into leisurely intellectual games. A few make careers in social commentary.

As working-class and middle-class universities differ, so do high school experiences. Half of middle school students cannot enter high school; most excluded are working-class children lacking quality education. A small number of working-class students enter high school, where life is grueling—drill-based learning and sleep deprivation—leaving no leisure for post-materialist New Left subculture. We ourselves had never heard of post-materialism or New Left subculture in high school. We sought heterodox knowledge but encountered only liberalism. We discovered Orwell’s 1984 and mistakenly thought it a liberal manifesto.

Middle-class teenagers enjoy relaxed high school lives, diverse experiences, open-minded teachers, and exposure to privileged niche hobbies, including New Left subculture. University extends high school; even in exam-obsessed times, it remains easier, making it the peak of New Left waves. With higher education expansion, middle-class students pursue further study, delaying role shifts. In the West, similar patterns appear; New Left remains middle-class youth-based, though participants aged from 1968 to 2011. Western New Left has always belonged to street-occupying “normies,” driven by generational issues. In another world, New Left subculture compensates for social deficits. Generational issues require time; social issues resolve via marriage. Thus, this New Left is younger.

Those who exit into “normie” life or careers differ from those stuck in loneliness. The latter usually have lower status; money advantages insufficient to offset personality or appearance. They may be high-paid programmers but not rich enough to be surrounded by beauties; they rely on anime girls and universal causes for compensation. Here lies another middle-class fissure. Like Victorian ladies seeking Freud, their suffering cannot compare to textile workers’ sixteen-hour days. Even the weakest marginalized middle-class men outrank workers; their privileged loneliness is not the loneliness of the homeless or of Martin Eden.

Jack London’s novels brim with bone-deep loneliness. A Relic of the Pliocene is lonely but defiant. The Call of the Wild is lonely but free. We cannot forget The Star Rover—heroic loneliness that remembers promises even amid torture.

Never forget.
Never give up.

Democratic socialists’ operational model is highly innovative. Whereas paid Q&A is well-known, their model is not: customized science-fiction and poetry services. We rarely hear of such services. Learning of this recalled debates on the future of online literature. As platforms collapsed, some proposed free, ad-based models; others warned of quality decline and proposed customized fiction for wealthy patrons. We believe customization remains niche luxury. One-to-one service multiplies cost; readers must bear full expense. If writing for one hundred readers at one yuan yields one hundred yuan, writing for one reader requires one hundred yuan. This is the difference between one and one hundred yuan—true anti-austerity Keynesianism. Since traditional paid reading already exceeds most people’s capacity, customization excludes most, serving the richest with personalized quality.

This was our first encounter with customized literature in practice. It relies on extreme affluence yet shows post-materialist reluctance to discuss money. Democratic socialists provide customized sci-fi and poetry not mainly for profit, but for interest, ideals, and the hope of finding kindred spirits. Workers read formulaic, mass-produced free fiction—sometimes AI-generated junk. When ChatGPT emerged, we met a writer using AI to earn fees. She wrote apocalyptic fiction on free platforms, lacked combat writing skills, sought AI help, had married in from elsewhere, cared for children, and wrote to supplement income. She used a domestic paid AI, not ChatGPT. Working-class free fiction is cold, low-quality, industrial sludge beyond kitsch. Democratic socialists build a real utopia elsewhere.

Their customized works glow with humanity. Readers are treated as individuals with faces and souls, not abstract crowds chasing “thrills.” Writers forced by money abandon passions for trends; editors say, “A starving dog will return.” Democratic socialists avoid alienation and artistic suicide. Their post-materialist innovation elevates literary experience and fosters warm relationships, turning brutal markets into welfare states. They oppose losing humanity in profit pursuit—choosing snowy Scandinavian red sanctuaries over decaying American imperialism. Their New Left shop lists favorite sci-fi authors and invites intimate discussion, recalling folk songs like 200’s Rose.

If democratic socialists build their middle-class utopia, working-class editors and writers may be excluded from literary labor markets. We failed to serve ordinary middle-class subscribers or working-class free readers; serving distant upper-middle-class patrons may be even harder. They converse as equals, co-creating—a harmonious New Left vision. After our forced retirement, we may only serve tea. While banishing us to dark corners, remember to hang Trotsky’s portrait, justify mass killing, denounce reformism, and advocate gun control to prevent our final struggle. If we master their tastes and narratives, we might become compliant service objects, upgrading from terrorists to proof of their humanitarianism.

A network scammer using old left language tinged with New Left easily defrauded tens of thousands. The scammer’s true education was vocational—working-class. If working-class voices were respected, honesty would suffice, but the scammer claimed graduate status. Even today, graduate degree holders are under 1 percent. The scammer linked high education to low pay, exaggerating middle-class suffering, posing as Kong Yiji rather than a shirtless worker, catering to middle-class anxiety in downturns.

Overall, neither old liberals nor democratic socialists threaten commercially oriented New Left forces in direct market competition. Old liberals have high profit motive but poor models; democratic socialists have innovative models but low profit motive, stopping short. We estimate both earned under 100,000 yuan. Conflicts peaked in 2023; profit-oriented activities in 2024. The time gap does not prove commercial New Left lacked preemptive anxiety. During conflicts, both attracted strong traffic. Old liberals became leading pro-Western liberal opinion leaders, seen as Qin Hui’s heirs. Democratic socialists had less influence but high education, knowledge, and status, writing popular New Left articles with growth potential—especially given youth. If someone gains traction at twenty-five, it is likely a last gasp; at twenty or fifteen, the future is boundless. Commercial New Left may envy democratic socialists’ lack of twentieth-century baggage.

Old liberals and democratic socialists did not directly take profits but diverted traffic, becoming free substitutes—like free cafeterias reducing restaurant visits. Conflict was interactive. Old liberals mocked commercial New Left for lacking worker support, for long videos unsuitable for workers who prefer shorts, or demanded summaries due to their precious time. Democratic socialists wrote dozens of critical articles, accusing them of top-down enlightenment and courting readers as revolutionary protagonists. Free cafeterias also distribute anti-restaurant flyers—both infringe on owners’ property. As conflict escalated, old liberals and democratic socialists adopted sharply divergent strategies.