It comes down to microeconomics and public choice theory, really. Individuals in any given group have an incentive to "free ride" on the actions of others, and the free-rider problem grows bigger as the group gets bigger. Concentrated benefits, diffuse costs. I'll explain.
Let's say there are 5 self-interested (utility-maximizing) richcels in a hypothetical society. Each of them can change the status quo to a certain degree via their efforts. Each of them can put forth between 0 to 10 points of effort. However, putting forth each point of effort will cost each of those incels 2 happiness points. The benefits, however, are as follows: the total sum of all effort points will result in the equivalent number of happiness points for each individual richcel. If each of those richcels put forth all 10 points of effort, then they'll receive 50 points of happiness for living in a better society, minus the 20 point cost of effort, and therefore each of them will end up with 30 points.
If you've studied a bit of game theory, you'll realize that the Nash equilibrium of this game is that all the richcels sit around doing nothing, because for each point of effort they put in, they lose 2 points of happiness. Even though the best (Pareto optimal) situation is for the richcels and politicalcels to all rise up, they'll all attempt to free ride on the efforts of others.
They'll naturally decide that they're better off settling for betabuxxing and to escortcel than to risk any "rise up".
We're doomed.
