PPEcel
cope and seethe
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Given that Redditcucks frequently levy accusations that incels are "inciting violence" and consequently deserve arrest and censorship by the FBI in particular (yikerinos!), from time to time I like to write threads exploring First Amendment jurisprudence. This thread is about whether the mere advocacy of violence is “free speech” in the U.S. The answer is yes.
Background
Title X of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, more commonly known as the "Anti-Riot Act" or the "Civil Obedience Act", was passed amidst the unrest after MLK’s assassination. Its objective was simple: to allow the federal government to pursue charges against rioters in cases that would usually be left to state authorities. Notably, the Act also criminalizes speech that constitutes “incitement”, “urge”, or “encouragement” to riot. 18 U.S.C. §2102(b) expands the definition of “inciting a riot” to include “advocacy of acts of violence” or “assertion of the rightness of [acts of violence]”.
Given the racially charged nature of the Act, federal prosecutions under these provisions (18 U.S.C. §2101 and §2102) have been extremely rare, until the mid-2010s, where the Department of Justice began pursuing federal rioting charges against white supremacists, Black Lives Matter rioters, and Capitol insurrectionists alike.
Imminent lawless action
In the first half of the 20th century, the Supreme Court took a dim view of the First Amendment, holding that federal and state governments could criminalize speech that posed a “clear and present danger” (Schenck v. United States), or a “bad tendency” (Abrams v. United States and Whitney v. California).
This changed with Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969). Under Brandenburg, inflammatory expression was protected unless it was directed to incite imminent lawless action. In Hess v. Indiana (1973), the Supreme Court clarified that for speech to be unprotected under this particular narrow exception to the First Amendment, it had to satisfy a two-prong test: the likelihood requirement and the imminence requirement. In other words, Brandenburg proscribes the state from criminalizing speech that isn’t likely to produce violence, or speech that merely advocates violence at an indefinite future time.
To this day, Brandenburg sets the United States apart from other liberal democracies in upholding freedom of expression, protecting speech that could be considered criminal in, say, Canada or Germany. And fifty years later, the federal judiciary continues to apply Brandenburg and Hess in deciding the boundaries of protected speech.
Fourth Circuit: United States v. Miselis (2020)
Here’s a Harvard Law Review article on this case that goes into greater detail.
In 2018, two men belonging to the Rise Above Movement, a white supremacist fight club, were charged with conspiracy in the Western District of Virginia under the Anti-Riot Act; they entered a conditional guilty plea. On appeal, they argued that the Act violated the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
The 4th Circuit unanimously let stand the provisions of the Act that did not involve First Amendment-protected activity -- namely, the physical act of rioting -- and upheld their convictions. However, applying Brandenburg, they declared the Act partially overbroad and unconstitutional, and severed the provisions that criminalized “promoting”, “encouraging”, “urging”, “advocacy of”, and “assertion of the rightness of” a riot.
In February 2021, Acting Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar notified Congress of her intent to not pursue a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, letting the 4th Circuit’s ruling stand.
Ninth Circuit: United States v. Rundo (2021)
Just one month later, in March 2021, the 9th Circuit reached the exact same conclusion as the Fourth Amendment: that the Anti-Riot Act was partially unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
Four men also belonging to the Rise Above Movement were charged under similar provisions in the Anti-Riot Act in the Central District of California. The district court judge dismissed the indictment and ruled the entirety of the Act unconstitutional. On appeal, however, the 9th Circuit conducted a severability test and ruled 2-1 that the unconstitutional provisions could be excised, reversing the district court.
Commentary
If you are a blackpilled incel, you've inevitably come across some version or another of these cliches, directed at you.
Normies, in my experience, have trouble distinguishing between normative and descriptive statements. They confuse what they think the law should be with what the law is.
The truth is U.S. law does not recognize the phrase "hate speech", nor does it recognize "stochastic terrorism". And with regards to threats and incitement, over decades of precedent, the courts have shaped narrowly tailored definitions of such. The mere advocacy of violence (i.e. "Stacies should be raped") is protected speech, as opposed to true threats or incitement to imminent lawless action.
This forum may not have survived without Brandenburg. That the federal judiciary continues to reaffirm the principles behind this landmark First Amendment case, in Miselis and Rundo and a multitude of other cases, is extremely based.
Background
Title X of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, more commonly known as the "Anti-Riot Act" or the "Civil Obedience Act", was passed amidst the unrest after MLK’s assassination. Its objective was simple: to allow the federal government to pursue charges against rioters in cases that would usually be left to state authorities. Notably, the Act also criminalizes speech that constitutes “incitement”, “urge”, or “encouragement” to riot. 18 U.S.C. §2102(b) expands the definition of “inciting a riot” to include “advocacy of acts of violence” or “assertion of the rightness of [acts of violence]”.
Given the racially charged nature of the Act, federal prosecutions under these provisions (18 U.S.C. §2101 and §2102) have been extremely rare, until the mid-2010s, where the Department of Justice began pursuing federal rioting charges against white supremacists, Black Lives Matter rioters, and Capitol insurrectionists alike.
Imminent lawless action
In the first half of the 20th century, the Supreme Court took a dim view of the First Amendment, holding that federal and state governments could criminalize speech that posed a “clear and present danger” (Schenck v. United States), or a “bad tendency” (Abrams v. United States and Whitney v. California).
This changed with Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969). Under Brandenburg, inflammatory expression was protected unless it was directed to incite imminent lawless action. In Hess v. Indiana (1973), the Supreme Court clarified that for speech to be unprotected under this particular narrow exception to the First Amendment, it had to satisfy a two-prong test: the likelihood requirement and the imminence requirement. In other words, Brandenburg proscribes the state from criminalizing speech that isn’t likely to produce violence, or speech that merely advocates violence at an indefinite future time.
To this day, Brandenburg sets the United States apart from other liberal democracies in upholding freedom of expression, protecting speech that could be considered criminal in, say, Canada or Germany. And fifty years later, the federal judiciary continues to apply Brandenburg and Hess in deciding the boundaries of protected speech.
Fourth Circuit: United States v. Miselis (2020)
Here’s a Harvard Law Review article on this case that goes into greater detail.
In 2018, two men belonging to the Rise Above Movement, a white supremacist fight club, were charged with conspiracy in the Western District of Virginia under the Anti-Riot Act; they entered a conditional guilty plea. On appeal, they argued that the Act violated the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
The 4th Circuit unanimously let stand the provisions of the Act that did not involve First Amendment-protected activity -- namely, the physical act of rioting -- and upheld their convictions. However, applying Brandenburg, they declared the Act partially overbroad and unconstitutional, and severed the provisions that criminalized “promoting”, “encouraging”, “urging”, “advocacy of”, and “assertion of the rightness of” a riot.
In February 2021, Acting Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar notified Congress of her intent to not pursue a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, letting the 4th Circuit’s ruling stand.
Ninth Circuit: United States v. Rundo (2021)
Just one month later, in March 2021, the 9th Circuit reached the exact same conclusion as the Fourth Amendment: that the Anti-Riot Act was partially unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
Four men also belonging to the Rise Above Movement were charged under similar provisions in the Anti-Riot Act in the Central District of California. The district court judge dismissed the indictment and ruled the entirety of the Act unconstitutional. On appeal, however, the 9th Circuit conducted a severability test and ruled 2-1 that the unconstitutional provisions could be excised, reversing the district court.
Commentary
If you are a blackpilled incel, you've inevitably come across some version or another of these cliches, directed at you.
Stochastic terrorism is not free speech. You are a terrorist.
Hate speech is not free speech. You should all be raped in prison.
Threats/incitement/etc. are not free speech. Where is the FBI tip line?
Normies, in my experience, have trouble distinguishing between normative and descriptive statements. They confuse what they think the law should be with what the law is.
The truth is U.S. law does not recognize the phrase "hate speech", nor does it recognize "stochastic terrorism". And with regards to threats and incitement, over decades of precedent, the courts have shaped narrowly tailored definitions of such. The mere advocacy of violence (i.e. "Stacies should be raped") is protected speech, as opposed to true threats or incitement to imminent lawless action.
This forum may not have survived without Brandenburg. That the federal judiciary continues to reaffirm the principles behind this landmark First Amendment case, in Miselis and Rundo and a multitude of other cases, is extremely based.
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