“Aristotle, therefore, lays down that a man who is fifty-four years of age should not have any more children, though he may still continue cohabitation for the sake of his health or for any other reason. He does not say how this is to be carried into effect, but he is obviously of the opinion that children conceived when their parents are of such an age should be disposed of by abortion, for he had recommended this a few lines previously. Now nature on her part cannot dispute the fact that forms the basis of Aristotle’s precept, nor can she eliminate it. For, in consequence of her principle that natura non facit saltus, she could not suddenly stop a man’s secretion of semen, but here, as in every case of mortification and decay, a gradual deterioration had to precede it. But procreation during this deterioration would bring into the world human beings who would be weak, dull, sickly, wretched, and short-lived. In fact, only too often this does happen; children conceived by elderly parents frequently die off at an early age; in any case, they never reach a great age. They are more or less frail, sickly, feeble, and their offspring are similarly constituted. What is said here about procreation during the years of decline applies just as much to procreation at an immature age. But there is nothing so dear to the heart of nature as the maintenance and preservation of the species and of its genuine type. The means to this end are strong and vigorous individuals of sound constitution; nature desires these alone. In fact, at bottom she regards and treats individuals only as means, and the species alone as the end (as was shown in chapter 41). Accordingly, in consequence of nature’s own laws and aims, we here see her in a critical situation and actually in great straits. As a result of her essential condition, she could not possibly count on a high-handed expedient, depending on the arbitrary will of some person, such as that suggested by Aristotle; and just as little could she rely on men’s being taught by experience to recognize the disadvantages of too early or too late procreation, and accordingly curbing their desires as a result of cold and rational deliberation. Therefore, in so important a matter, nature could not risk either of these expedients. There was then nothing left for her but to choose the lesser of two evils. But for this purpose she had to make use here in her own interests of her favourite instrument, instinct. As was shown in the preceding chapter, this everywhere guides and directs so important a business as procreation, and creates such strange illusions. But this could happen here only by her misdirecting the instinct (lui donna le change). Thus nature knows only the physical, not the moral; in fact, there is even a decided antagonism between her and morality. Her sole aim is the preservation of the individual, and especially of the species, in the greatest possible perfection. Now it is true that pederasty is detrimental to those youths who have been seduced into practising it, yet not so much so that it would not be the lesser of two evils. Nature accordingly chooses this, in order to avoid by a wide margin the far greater evil, depravation of the species, and so to avert a lasting and growing misfortune.”
Excerpt From: Arthur Schopenhauer. “The World as Will and Representation, Vol. 2”. Apple Books.
