Free will is a myth(in raw sense).

[pedrolopezwasright]

What we are calling "free will" is abstinence from biological urges; Every action both positive and negative, moral and immoral etc. is ruled by our brain. Brain is part of a human biology. Divine things by which believers so urgently cope are nothing else as biologically driven coping mechanism.
Therefore arises the question: how foid imperative towards hypergamy is different from our biological urges. Foids have imperative, something they can't control willingly or unwillingly. Men don't have hypergamy imperative and can decide accordingly to situation. (low hybristophilia rates among males are proof of thereof).
Imperative = biological limit which is placed and can't be ruled by self. Femoid inferiority comes furthermore from the drive towards imperative, they not only cannot resist such urge nor apply any direct influence on it; It is their standard way of behaving and can be influenced only by the will of external person.
Model of human female and male can be presented as:
H = hypergamy
B = biologically binded urges
F = human female
M = human male
E = external influence
>, < = representing control possibility markers
E > M < (B - H), M > H
E > F < H, F < B
@Flagellum_Dei @Horatio Alger

 

[Emba]

E>M<B>A

 

[pedrolopezwasright]

E>M<B>A

Whats A

 

[Emba]

Whats A

Affirmative action

 

[Flagellum_Dei]

Every action both positive and negative, moral and immoral etc. is ruled by our brain. Brain is part of a human biology

It cannot be proven; for you assume every thing has it cause. Causality is just a priori form of seeing reality (as Kant proved), a way to see phenomenons; therefore you can't assume that thing-in-itself (in this case human motivations) have any cause. Development of the human wants is development of self-knowledge of the absolute, thus it's free ex definitione.

Besides that I of course agree at foids.

 

[AtrociousCitizen]

It cannot be proven; for you assume every thing has it cause. Causality is just a priori form of seeing reality (as Kant proved), a way to see phenomenons; therefore you can't assume that thing-in-itself (in this case human motivations) have any cause. Development of the human wants is development of self-knowledge of the absolute, thus it's free ex definitione.

Doesn’t Kant also forbid knowledge of the noumenon? And defining human freedom as self knowledge of the absolute is not a demonstration but a presupposition, and there's plenty of empirical evidence that supports causal explanations of human behavior.

 

[Flagellum_Dei]

Doesn’t Kant also forbid knowledge of the noumenon?

He did.

And defining human freedom as self knowledge of the absolute is not a demonstration but a presupposition

Not exactly. Postkantian philosophers proved, that only I, that's thought, can be proven (see Fichte absolute ego), thus it's valid to build entire world on such concept, for other ones are unsure. Kant opposed such idealism, but his arguments can be easily countered with proof, that thought can be noumenon itself, which is source of phenomenons to-itslef, that's through man.

and there's plenty of empirical evidence that supports causal explanations of human behavior.

Such as? Even if so, they would still remain phenomenons, therefore they have no connection to thing in itself other than merely being our illusion of it perceived with apriorical forms of our possible experience.

 

[AtrociousCitizen]

Not exactly. Postkantian philosophers proved, that only I, that's thought, can be proven (see Fichte absolute ego), thus it's valid to build entire world on such concept, for other ones are unsure. Kant opposed such idealism, but his arguments can be easily countered with proof, that thought can be noumenon itself, which is source of phenomenons to-itslef, that's through man.

I think the problem is that positing thought as noumenon itself is still a metaphysical move beyond what can be demonstrated. Kant's critical project wasn’t just to oppose idealism arbitrarily but to show the limits of what we can know, and even if thought were noumenal, that doesn’t grant us epistemic access to it beyond our own self-consciousness. We’re still limited to phenomena shaped by our cognitive faculties.

Such as?

Experiments show brain activity predicting decisions before conscious awareness, and behavioral studies link stimuli to responses in ways consistent with causal explanation.

Here's one I found:

Decoding the contents and strength of imagery before volitional engagement - Scientific Reports

Is it possible to predict the freely chosen content of voluntary imagery from prior neural signals? Here we show that the content and strength of future voluntary imagery can be decoded from activity patterns in visual and frontal areas well before participants engage in voluntary imagery...

www.nature.com

By the way, I generally align with the block universe theory, which is problematic for libertarian free will. However, I still think some version of free will can exist (compatibilism).

Even if so, they would still remain phenomenons, therefore they have no connection to thing in itself other than merely being our illusion of it perceived with apriorical forms of our possible experience.

That's true, but the way I see it is if freedom is to have meaningful impact on our understanding of human behavior, it needs to be connected to what we can observe and verify, not just what we define or imagine.

 

[Flagellum_Dei]

I think the problem is that positing thought as noumenon itself is still a metaphysical move beyond what can be demonstrated. Kant's critical project wasn’t just to oppose idealism arbitrarily but to show the limits of what we can know, and even if thought were noumenal, that doesn’t grant us epistemic access to it beyond our own self-consciousness. We’re still limited to phenomena shaped by our cognitive faculties.

it is indeed a problem. But it's the most certain thing we can do, as I said. Basing ontological existence on thought is the only way to do this with Kant's system, which is why Hegel and Fichte did it (successfully so). If we want any view into onthology, this is necessary. If we want to discard such system, we are left to materialism: then we are at the beginning point, where we're basing entirety of being on uncertain (since only thought is certain) basis, what Kant opposed the most.

Experiments show brain activity predicting decisions before conscious awareness, and behavioral studies link stimuli to responses in ways consistent with causal explanation.

Here's one I found:

Decoding the contents and strength of imagery before volitional engagement - Scientific Reports

Is it possible to predict the freely chosen content of voluntary imagery from prior neural signals? Here we show that the content and strength of future voluntary imagery can be decoded from activity patterns in visual and frontal areas well before participants engage in voluntary imagery...

www.nature.com

By the way, I generally align with the block universe theory, which is problematic for libertarian free will. However, I still think some version of free will can exist (compatibilism).

That's true, but the way I see it is if freedom is to have meaningful impact on our understanding of human behavior, it needs to be connected to what we can observe and verify, not just what we define or imagine.

Still, these are just phenomenons. Even if we would be given full knowledge on human behavior, which would perfectly can predict any (we suppose so) action, this still could not disprove free will shaped by dialectical development of self-knowledge of the absolute and thus absolutely free will. These patterns a r e n ' t sure, nor they cannot ever be; that's immortal legacy of Hume philosophy. Phenomenal pattern, even the most perfect one, can never disprove idealism. There is immortal and everlasting possibility, that thought is just dreaming of this pattern or it's just random (not perfect).

 

[lnceI]

yes of course

 

[AtrociousCitizen]

it is indeed a problem. But it's the most certain thing we can do, as I said. Basing ontological existence on thought is the only way to do this with Kant's system, which is why Hegel and Fichte did it (successfully so). If we want any view into onthology, this is necessary. If we want to discard such system, we are left to materialism: then we are at the beginning point, where we're basing entirety of being on uncertain (since only thought is certain) basis, what Kant opposed the most.

Epistemic certainty does not entail ontological priority. Kant agreed that self-consciousness is foundational for experience (through the “I think” accompanying representations), but he refused to infer from that any substantive ontological claims about the noumenon. As of materialism: what I like about is that it doesn't pretend to know the unknowable. I would rather work with a framework that acknowledges its epistemic limits than one that bypasses them through speculative metaphysics.

Still, these are just phenomenons. Even if we would be given full knowledge on human behavior, which would perfectly can predict any (we suppose so) action, this still could not disprove free will shaped by dialectical development of self-knowledge of the absolute and thus absolutely free will. These patterns a r e n ' t sure, nor they cannot ever be; that's immortal legacy of Hume philosophy. Phenomenal pattern, even the most perfect one, can never disprove idealism. There is immortal and everlasting possibility, that thought is just dreaming of this pattern or it's just random (not perfect).

That's true, but the fact that something cannot be disproven does not make it rational to believe, especially if it lacks explanatory power in the world we actually interact with.

I'd also add that I don't believe thought is separate from sensory intuition; the two are inseparable in constituting experience. Since our cognition is based on the synthesis of sensory data organized by the categories in our minds, pure "thought" cannot exist independently. And since they are interconnected, basing ontology solely on 'thought' without recognizing its entanglement with sensory experience is against Kant’s critical insights and is very speculative.

 

[poorenglishcel]

I had no choice but to post this comment

 

[Flagellum_Dei]

Epistemic certainty does not entail ontological priority. Kant agreed that self-consciousness is foundational for experience (through the “I think” accompanying representations), but he refused to infer from that any substantive ontological claims about the noumenon.

Yeah, his successors did it. But his system was the main (if not the only) reason for this. Also mind that he helped Fichte publish his idealistic work. He could not himself make such idealistic system as he did, because of his academic positions would be damaged by this. I'm not trying to say, that he self-censored, but his sytem had to led in such way, as I wrote earlier.

As of materialism: what I like about is that it doesn't pretend to know the unknowable. I would rather work with a framework that acknowledges its epistemic limits than one that bypasses them through speculative metaphysics.

The problem is it does not recognize such limits. Dialectial materialism claims to be be demiurge-given tool, which can predict everything from the base, that is material conditions. Historical necessity also applies to it. If I have to base a system on a certain thought (spirit) or uncertain matter, the first one appears to me as a better foundation.

That's true, but the fact that something cannot be disproven does not make it rational to believe, especially if it lacks explanatory power in the world we actually interact with.

Prior paragraph can also be applied to this: the certainty is a better foundation than uncertainty.

I'd also add that I don't believe thought is separate from sensory intuition; the two are inseparable in constituting experience.

They're not completely separated; the object and the subject are connected in the absolute.

Since our cognition is based on the synthesis of sensory data organized by the categories in our minds, pure "thought" cannot exist independently.

I suppose that a priori experience disprove inability of pure thought. Although it's a very marshy ground: does, for example, mathematics exist before experience? Kant said that the fact of inability to put more than one straight line between two points is based on a posteriori knowledge; but non-geometrical math is apriorical.

And since they are interconnected, basing ontology solely on 'thought' without recognizing its entanglement with sensory experience is against Kant’s critical insights and is very speculative.

See what I said higher: they're connected in the absolute. But your whole point without it would be valid; Hegel sees that and he counters it in such way: the absolute being the only one, indeed cannot experience himself as a whole, for he cannot distinguish himself from anything, since he is all things; therefore he has to create the limited consciousness, man, to achieve self-knowledge.

Also I see you're referring the pure though to man, what Fichte do. But I can only defend possibility of thought purity from absolute position, because I'm not very familiar with his works. In near future i plan to read him.