The scientist’s aim is to formulate theories that correctly predict observable results. Devising a theory that stands up under empirical testing satisfies the scientist’s personal needs in various ways, as by giving him a sense of accomplishment, winning the approval of his colleagues, and advancing his career. What distinguishes pseudoscience from science (and I’m referring here to sincere pseudoscience, not to conscious charlatanism) is that the pseudoscientist satisfies his personal needs through belief in a theory rather than through empirical testing of theories. It is the psychological potency of the theory itself that attracts the pseudoscientist, not its capacity to predict experimental results. Thus the pseudoscientist’s commitment to a theory is determined largely by his psychological needs rather than by empirical observation. In this respect pseudoscience resembles religion and much of philosophy, and differs from them only in that it tries to clothe itself in the trappings of empirical science.
