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Venting The logical argument for nothing ever happens

brutalist

brutalist

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There was a philosopher called Parminides who argued that:

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NOTHING EVER HAPPENS REMAINS UNDEFEATED!
 
Solved by the concept of potential. GOML, dead dude.
 
Nothing comes from nothing.
How do you define nothing? Also, quantum physics kind of disproves this argument.

Something beginning is something coming from nothing
Many beginnings are transformations, not creation ex nihilo. For example, a seed becoming a tree isn't “something from nothing,” but change in form.
 
How do you define nothing? Also, quantum physics kind of disproves this argument.


Many beginnings are transformations, not creation ex nihilo. For example, a seed becoming a tree isn't “something from nothing,” but change in form.
Yes you TOOK YOUR ERENYEAGER PILLS


GET THESE NATURE COCK SUCKING FAGGOTS OUT OF HERE
 
There is only what there is, whatever wasn't can never have been.
Yh thats what he believed there's only the unchanging monad
How do you define nothing? Also, quantum physics kind of disproves this argument.
Absence of any properties. Vacuums still have properties.
Many beginnings are transformations, not creation ex nihilo. For example, a seed becoming a tree isn't “something from nothing,” but change in form.
Change = to become what is not. What is not is impossible.
 
Absence of any properties. Vacuums still have properties.

Change = to become what is not. What is not is impossible.
Even if we accept that definition of 'nothing', your leap from "change = to become what is not" to "what is not is impossible" is a semantic trick.

You're treating "what is not" as if it must refer to absolute non-being, but that is rigid and, quite frankly, flawed. The truth is, change can refer to relative non-being; as in, something that is not a certain way  yet. When a tree grows from a seed, it "was not" a tree, but it was a seed. The transformation doesn't require absolute non-being, just a transition from one state to another.

Also, according to quantum physics: particles can emerge from vacuum fluctuations in spontaneous changes governed by uncertainty principles, which is not classical cause-and-effect. So “something from nothing” isn’t purely metaphysical anymore; it’s observable.
 
Even if we accept that definition of 'nothing', your leap from "change = to become what is not" to "what is not is impossible" is a semantic trick.

You're treating "what is not" as if it must refer to absolute non-being, but that is rigid and, quite frankly, flawed.
This isn't my argument. I simply co-opted it for a nothing ever happens shitpost hence why this is in lounge.

But I'll bite.

The truth is, change can refer to relative non-being; as in, something that is not a certain way  yet. When a tree grows from a seed, it "was not" a tree, but it was a seed. The transformation doesn't require absolute non-being, just a transition from one state to another
Again, potentiality can only exist if change is possible so invoking it begs the question. All your arguments are doing is sidestepping the problem while assuming the standard perception of reality is true.


Also, according to quantum physics: particles can emerge from vacuum fluctuations in spontaneous changes governed by uncertainty principles, which is not classical cause-and-effect. So “something from nothing” isn’t purely metaphysical anymore; it’s observable.
Those particles emerge from energy not from nothing.
 
This isn't my argument. I simply co-opted it for a nothing ever happens shitpost hence why this is in lounge.
Yeah, I know—I was just playing devil's advocate :feelskek:

Again, potentiality can only exist if change is possible so invoking it begs the question. All your arguments are doing is sidestepping the problem while assuming the standard perception of reality is true.
That's fair, but the core point is I'm not assuming the standard perception of reality is true; I'm pointing out that the framework herein defines change in a way that rigidly excludes what we empirically observe and what logically follows from less dogmatic definitions. What I’m saying is that your argument hinges on an artificial constraint, where “what is not” must mean absolute non-being, rather than not-yet-being or alternate-state-being.

Those particles emerge from energy not from nothing.
So “nothing” means “literally no potential, no field, no law, no structure,”? That is something not even physics recognize.
 
Yeah, I know—I was just playing devil's advocate :feelskek:


That's fair, but the core point is I'm not assuming the standard perception of reality is true; I'm pointing out that the framework herein defines change in a way that rigidly excludes what we empirically observe and what logically follows from less dogmatic definitions. What I’m saying is that your argument hinges on an artificial constraint, where “what is not” must mean absolute non-being, rather than not-yet-being or alternate-state-being.
Empirical observation presupposes our sense data are reliable (this actually defeats parminedes argument since he depends on it to form the idea of something and nothing to start with but denies it immediately after).

Empiricism just tells us something has moved from one state to another. It doesn't really disprove the argument. Parminedes calls everything outside the monad illusory. It seeming internally coherent doesn't necessarily make it real.
So “nothing” means “literally no potential, no field, no law, no structure,”? That is something not even physics recognize.
Yes nothing is the absence of everything. To concieve of it is impossible. Hence his argument.
 
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Empirical observation presupposes our sense data are reliable (this actually defeats parminedes argument since he depends on it to form the idea of something and nothing to start with).
It is quite ironic.

Empiricism just tells us something has moved from one state to another. It doesn't really disprove the argument. Parminedes calls everything outside the monad illusory. It seeming internally coherent doesn't necessarily make it real.
That does sound neat, but it renders the distinction between illusion and reality incoherent—who or what is being misled, and by what mechanism? If change is an illusion, then so is stasis, because they’re part of the same cognitive framework.

Yes nothing is the absence of everything. To concieve of it is impossible. Hence his argument.
That’s exactly why building a logical system upon it (as he does) is self-defeating. You can’t found a metaphysics on what you admit is inconceivable.
 
It is quite ironic.


That does sound neat, but it renders the distinction between illusion and reality incoherent—who or what is being misled, and by what mechanism? If change is an illusion, then so is stasis, because they’re part of the same cognitive framework.
He argues they're fundamentally different products. Just hard to understand absolutely. Stasis (being or consciousness) comes from reason while change comes from sense perception. The problem is pure reason doesn't exist and depends at some level on sensory inputs. Ultimately nothing is knowable not even cogito ergo sum. But if you accept the world as its presented through the senses his arguments are sound.

That’s exactly why building a logical system upon it (as he does) is self-defeating. You can’t found a metaphysics on what you admit is inconceivable.

He's metaphysics are built on what is conceivable. If something cannot be yet we percieve it to be so then our perception is false.
 
He argues they're fundamentally different products. Just hard to understand absolutely. Stasis (being or consciousness) comes from reason while change comes from sense perception. The problem is pure reason doesn't exist and depends at some level on sensory inputs. Ultimately nothing is knowable not even cogito ergo sum. But if you accept the world as its presented through the senses his arguments are sound.
If pure reason depends on sensory input even minutely, then you can’t elevate it above perception as a more reliable path to truth. The distinction he makes between reason (linked to being/stasis) and perception (linked to change/becoming) is undermined if reason is parasitic on perception in the first place.

And if nothing is knowable, not even cogito ergo sum, then not even Parmenides’ premises are knowable. His whole metaphysics becomes a self-referential loop: claiming to discard the senses while needing them to bootstrap the very concepts of "being" and "nothing."

He's metaphysics are built on what is conceivable. If something cannot be yet we percieve it to be so then our perception is false.
This presumes a standard of what can be, which must itself be derived from either logic or experience. But if that standard is based on what’s conceivable, and what’s conceivable is limited by human cognition (which is fallible and sense-bound), then the bar for truth is not objectivity.

To me, the framework seems like a closed and unfalsifiable system.
 
If pure reason depends on sensory input even minutely, then you can’t elevate it above perception as a more reliable path to truth. The distinction he makes between reason (linked to being/stasis) and perception (linked to change/becoming) is undermined if reason is parasitic on perception in the first place.

And if nothing is knowable, not even cogito ergo sum, then not even Parmenides’ premises are knowable. His whole metaphysics becomes a self-referential loop: claiming to discard the senses while needing them to bootstrap the very concepts of "being" and "nothing."
Why do you keep repeating everything im saying back to me kek? Reason isnt necessarily dependent on perception just tainted by it.
This presumes a standard of what can be, which must itself be derived from either logic or experience.
Thats his point.. To be is to think. If you're thinking, something exists. That comes from reason.
But if that standard is based on what’s conceivable, and what’s conceivable is limited by human cognition (which is fallible and sense-bound), then the bar for truth is not objectivity.

To me, the framework seems like a closed and unfalsifiable system.
Its impossible to have objectivity. My point is if you accept sense data as a basis for reality you end up confronted by his argument. Both viewpoints are self referntial. To a degree every belief is circular.
 
Its impossible to have objectivity. My point is if you accept sense data as a basis for reality you end up confronted by his argument. Both viewpoints are self referntial. To a degree every belief is circular.
True, but the difference is how tight and fruitful the circle is. Sense-based worldviews might be circular, but they’re open to correction, falsification, and intersubjective testing. I suppose I simply dislike the rigidity of 'change' according to him, since the framework is based on an inconceivable idea of nothingness, and rejects transformation, potential, etc...
 
True, but the difference is how tight and fruitful the circle is. Sense-based worldviews might be circular, but they’re open to correction, falsification, and intersubjective testing. I suppose I simply dislike the rigidity of 'change' according to him, since the framework is based on an inconceivable idea of nothingness, and rejects transformation, potential, etc...
You're again assuming internal coherency = truth. His argument is purely logical, cause he concluded perception is unreliable hence its rigidity. Its logically sound so can't be refuted outright. All you can do is point out his flawed methodology but that brings the person who accepts sense data as a credible gauge no closer to confronting it.

If nothint isnt the absence of all properties how would you define it
 
You're again assuming internal coherency = truth. His argument is purely logical, cause he concluded perception is unreliable hence its rigidity. Its logically sound so can't be refuted outright. All you can do is point out his flawed methodology but that brings the person who accepts sense data as a credible gauge no closer to confronting it.
I’m not saying internal coherence automatically equals truth, but truth without any possible bridge to verification or interaction is functionally meaningless. Parmenides’ system might be logically sound within itself, but that doesn't make it epistemically useful or ontologically persuasive.

You can build internally sound arguments on false premises. Also, the flaw isn’t just methodological; it’s foundational: if your core concept (like “nothing”) is by your own admission inconceivable and unverifiable, then the structure you're building on it is metaphysical formalism.

If nothint isnt the absence of all properties how would you define it
I'd say it's more accurate to treat “nothing” as a conceptual placeholder for absence relative to context, not an absolute absence of all properties—since that is logically inconceivable.
 
I’m not saying internal coherence automatically equals truth, but truth without any possible bridge to verification or interaction is functionally meaningless. Parmenides’ system might be logically sound within itself, but that doesn't make it epistemically useful or ontologically persuasive.
Its not meant to be useful its meant to describe reality. Ontologically it makes sense because being becomes logically necessary and not contingent as in the case of sense data. If i asked you to define being using sense data you wouldn't be able to coherently. Using reason alone has its drawbacks as mentioned but they're comparatively mitigated.

I'd say it's more accurate to treat “nothing” as a conceptual placeholder for absence relative to context, not an absolute absence of all properties—since that is logically inconceivable.

That just means nothing is something which defeats the purpose of the word.


You can build internally sound arguments on false premises. Also, the flaw isn’t just methodological; it’s foundational: if your core concept (like “nothing”) is by your own admission inconceivable and unverifiable, then the structure you're building on it is metaphysical formalism.
Its isnt because nothing isn't a positive ontological postulate its simply negation hence doesn't need to be verified. And again, no premise can really be justified, they just have to be contextually coherent. If you accept the world as understood by common sense the argument is coherent to you aswell.
 
Its not meant to be useful its meant to describe reality. Ontologically it makes sense because being becomes logically necessary and not contingent as in the case of sense data. If i asked you to define being using sense data you wouldn't be able to coherently. Using reason alone has its drawbacks as mentioned but they're comparatively mitigated.
But if a system aims to describe reality, then ontological persuasiveness matters, not just internal necessity. Saying being is “logically necessary” only works if the logic isn’t insulated from the very reality it seeks to describe. If the system doesn’t allow for interaction with the world or even self-correction then it's more tautological than revelatory.

As of defining being via sense data—sure, it's difficult. But, as was previously said, it’s also problematic to define “being” via pure reason when the very act of reasoning presupposes mental activity, cognitive faculties, and distinctions that are themselves shaped by embodied experience.

Also, if time and change are illusions, then the very act of arguing or learning is paradoxical, because it presupposes temporal development.

That just means nothing is something which defeats the purpose of the word.
Not quite. Acknowledging the concept of ‘absolute nothing’ is a boundary of thought—not a describable state—isn’t turning it into "something". It’s akin to talking about a “square circle”—we know what’s meant by the terms, but their conjunction collapses under scrutiny. In this case, I am not redefining nothing—I am simply recognizing that language breaks down when stretched beyond intelligible use.

Its isnt because nothing isn't a positive ontological postulate its simply negation hence doesn't need to be verified.
Fair point, but even as a negation, it’s still being used as a foundational concept in the argument. And if the negation itself is inconceivable, then the entire ontology is anchored in something undefined and unrepresentable, which means you're asking others to accept the consequences of a premise that cannot be engaged with, tested, or understood at all.

And again, no premise can really be justified, they just have to be contextually coherent. If you accept the world as understood by common sense the argument is coherent to you aswell.
I agree with that in the strictest epistemological sense. But that’s why degrees of justification, coherence, and openness to revision matter. A worldview that allows for experiential refinement and logical adjustment has far more epistemic resilience than one that hinges on a negation we can’t conceptualize or verify.

If we accept the world as understood through common sense, Parmenides’ argument might be coherent, but it also becomes unnecessary, because common sense already affirms change, motion, and plurality. So the moment you step back into shared experience, his framework is no longer the most economical or compelling one.
 
But if a system aims to describe reality, then ontological persuasiveness matters, not just internal necessity. Saying being is “logically necessary” only works if the logic isn’t insulated from the very reality it seeks to describe. If the system doesn’t allow for interaction with the world or even self-correction then it's more tautological than revelatory.
It is ontologically persuasive. Being is necessary. Re internalism you need to presuppose your version of reality is correct to make that argument. You're putting the cart before the horse. Its not a tautology cause it reveals our senses are deceptive. It doesnt just tell us A is A nor prevent you from functioning within the phenomenal world or building pseudo-epistemic/metaphysical structures based on it
As of defining being via sense data—sure, it's difficult. But, as was previously said, it’s also problematic to define “being” via pure reason when the very act of reasoning presupposes mental activity, cognitive faculties, and distinctions that are themselves shaped by embodied experience.
Existential certainty doesn't depend on developmental causation. Its logically necessary. If being is necessary, non being is impossible. The act of thinking necessitates a thinker. Therefore being is necessary. How rhat capacity came to be shaped whether its self referential or not are irrelevant and frankly speculative.

Also, if time and change are illusions, then the very act of arguing or learning is paradoxical, because it presupposes temporal development.
Learning and arguing take place within the illusory world. His ontological foundation isn't learned it is known by necessity.
Not quite. Acknowledging the concept of ‘absolute nothing’ is a boundary of thought—not a describable state—isn’t turning it into "something". It’s akin to talking about a “square circle”—we know what’s meant by the terms, but their conjunction collapses under scrutiny. In this case, I am not redefining nothing—I am simply recognizing that language breaks down when stretched beyond intelligible use.

Fair point, but even as a negation, it’s still being used as a foundational concept in the argument. And if the negation itself is inconceivable, then the entire ontology is anchored in something undefined and unrepresentable, which means you're asking others to accept the consequences of a premise that cannot be engaged with, tested, or understood at all.
hence his position that its impossible. He doesn't postulate nothing positively.

He says for something to change it ceases to be what it was. His definition of nothing isn't shaped by sensory experience like yours. Its logically necessary. Thats why its ontologically foundational. Hjs argument is rooted in being not non-being. Negation is still logically operative even if you can’t conceive it.
I agree with that in the strictest epistemological sense. But that’s why degrees of justification, coherence, and openness to revision matter. A worldview that allows for experiential refinement and logical adjustment has far more epistemic resilience than one that hinges on a negation we can’t conceptualize or verify.

If we accept the world as understood through common sense, Parmenides’ argument might be coherent, but it also becomes unnecessary, because common sense already affirms change, motion, and plurality. So the moment you step back into shared experience, his framework is no longer the most economical or compelling one.
people do just that - take a pragmatic approach. At the end of the day its irrelevant to how we function and he didn't intend for it to cripple us he intended to demonstrate a logical necessity. Nothing ever happens remains undefeated.
 
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It is ontologically persuasive. Being is necessary.
I agree with that, but asserting necessity isn’t the same as showing ontological persuasiveness. A system may be built on necessity within its own logic, but to claim it describes reality, it must connect to experience or offer a usable standard for distinguishing truth from tautology. Otherwise, we’re just describing what logically must be the case if certain definitions hold—not what is the case in the world we live in.

You're putting the cart before the horse. Its not a tautology cause it reveals our senses are deceptive.
But revealing deception presumes access to a contrasting, more reliable perspective. If sense perception is dismissed and reason is derivative of perception then where exactly is the “revelation” emerging from? If everything that gives rise to conceptual thought is fallible or illusory, then so is the system you're using to argue deception. That is a closed tautology, because it is defining reality through a method that invalidates its own grounding.

Existential certainty doesn't depend on developmental causation.
But reasoning still depends on cognitive structures shaped by embodied experience, and that shapes what we find intelligible. “Being is necessary” is compelling, but what kind of being? Substance? Process? Pattern? Field? These distinctions are empirically informed. Without that input, the “being” you affirm becomes abstract to the point of vacuity.

Learning and arguing take place within the illusory world. His ontological foundation isn't learned it is known by necessity.
That’s paradoxical. Even “knowing by necessity” is a temporal, developmental claim. If there is no change, then nothing can become known and the act of grasping the argument collapses into incoherence.

He says for something to change it ceases to be what it was.
That’s a very specific and narrow definition of change, and I do agree that under it, the argument makes sense. But It assumes ontological annihilation rather than transformation or persistence through difference. But modern physics and metaphysics allow for continuity through change without requiring the prior form to “not exist” absolutely. So Parmenides’ framing isn’t logically necessary, just tightly defined.

His definition of nothing isn't shaped by sensory experience like yours.
And that's exactly the issue, since it’s not shaped by anything experientially meaningful, which makes it immune to engagement or disproof. But that’s also what renders it philosophically inert outside of abstract exercises. If “nothing” is inconceivable, and “change” is ruled out by a definition of nothing that can’t even be grasped, then the whole edifice is a formalism.

people do just that - take a pragmatic approach. At the end of the day its irrelevant to how we function and he didn't intend for it to cripple us he intended to demonstrate a logical necessity. Nothing ever happens remains undefeated.
Yeah, that’s fair. As a thought experiment, it succeeds. But as a framework for understanding reality, it becomes redundant the moment we operate within the shared, intersubjective world that affirms change. "Nothing ever happens" is undefeated only if you concede that nothing can be known, verified, or interacted with, at which point, we’ve retreated so far from intelligible discourse that nothing really makes sense.
 
I agree with that, but asserting necessity isn’t the same as showing ontological persuasiveness. A system may be built on necessity within its own logic, but to claim it describes reality, it must connect to experience or offer a usable standard for distinguishing truth from tautology. Otherwise, we’re just describing what logically must be the case if certain definitions hold—not what is the case in the world we live in.
You're repeating yourself atp. Its built on necessity period. Not within its own framework. Logic isn't bound by experiential contingency
But revealing deception presumes access to a contrasting, more reliable perspective. If sense perception is dismissed and reason is derivative of perception then where exactly is the “revelation” emerging from?
reason isnt derived from sense perception, it emerges from logic. Sure beyond cartesian doubt or in parminides case "being" it can be tainted. I've reiterated this already. You're not understanding what tautology is.
If everything that gives rise to conceptual thought is fallible or illusory, then so is the system you're using to argue deception. That is a closed tautology, because it is defining reality through a method that invalidates its own grounding.
Sense perception is, not logic. Read my replies.
But reasoning still depends on cognitive structures shaped by embodied experience, and that shapes what we find intelligible. “Being is necessary” is compelling, but what kind of being? Substance? Process? Pattern? Field? These distinctions are empirically informed. Without that input, the “being” you affirm becomes abstract to the point of vacuity.
Those are just labels. You can call it what you want but being still remains necessary.. Abstraction doesn't preclude ontological or epistemic grounding. Everything at its fundamental level is abstract.
That’s paradoxical. Even “knowing by necessity” is a temporal, developmental claim. If there is no change, then nothing can become known and the act of grasping the argument collapses into incoherence.
Not true. You can know you exist without reference to time or change. You're assuming knowledge grows. Parminedes is saying its static. To be is to know and vice versa.
That’s a very specific and narrow definition of change, and I do agree that under it, the argument makes sense. But It assumes ontological annihilation rather than transformation or persistence through difference. But modern physics and metaphysics allow for continuity through change without requiring the prior form to “not exist” absolutely. So Parmenides’ framing isn’t logically necessary, just tightly defined.
ive already refuted this. Vacuums aren't "nothing". They exist.
And that's exactly the issue, since it’s not shaped by anything experientially meaningful, which makes it immune to engagement or disproof. But that’s also what renders it philosophically inert outside of abstract exercises. If “nothing” is inconceivable, and “change” is ruled out by a definition of nothing that can’t even be grasped, then the whole edifice is a formalism.
even if it is, its ontological grounding and necessity arent negated. All you're arguments seem to cycle back to "but this is useless or impractical therefore it must be false"
Yeah, that’s fair. As a thought experiment, it succeeds. But as a framework for understanding reality, it becomes redundant the moment we operate within the shared, intersubjective world that affirms change.
It doesn't because it allows for epistemology to be built off the phenomenal world. Think of how scientific explanations and religious ones coexist because they operate in seperate domains. In parminides case, you have the real and illusory. One like the divine is unapproachable, the other isn't.
"Nothing ever happens" is undefeated only if you concede that nothing can be known, verified, or interacted with, at which point, we’ve retreated so far from intelligible discourse that nothing really makes sense.
That there is the limit of knowledge and language. Wishing it were otherwise doesn't make it so.
 
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nothing happens seriously? we're literally on the way to a never before surveillance system like palantir to create a world like minority report and ai is on the rise to automate like every job. New world order is right around the corner with a social credit system and an universal basic income which will expire and renew each other and you will own nothing. Good luck getting good food the main course will be bugs
 
nothing happens seriously? we're literally on the way to a never before surveillance system like palantir to create a world like minority report and ai is on the rise to automate like every job. New world order is right around the corner with a social credit system and an universal basic income which will expire and renew each other and you will own nothing. Good luck getting good food the main course will be bugs
None of it is really happening
 
You're repeating yourself atp. Its built on necessity period. Not within its own framework. Logic isn't bound by experiential contingency
You say that, but asserting necessity “period” is still a claim that must be intelligible and applicable beyond its formal definitions if it’s meant to describe reality.

reason isnt derived from sense perception, it emerges from logic.
Even if reason “emerges from logic,” the expression and application of that logic is filtered through language, cognitive categories, and distinction-making, which are all shaped by experience. Logic might be formally pure, but its use is always mediated. The burden is on your side to show how pure logic leads to reliable ontology without smuggling in sensory or cognition-shaped scaffolding.

Sense perception is, not logic. Read my replies.
I have. But your argument treats logic as a self-contained access to reality, while dismissing perception. If perception is flawed and logic is shaped by faculties developed in relation to perception, then logic isn’t immune from scrutiny either. You’re separating them too cleanly, ignoring the interdependence that even Kant, Husserl, and others dealt with.

Those are just labels. You can call it what you want but being still remains necessary.. Abstraction doesn't preclude ontological or epistemic grounding. Everything at its fundamental level is abstract.
But again, abstraction without differentiation becomes vacuous. Saying “being is necessary” with no specification of how being appears or persists in a plural world is like defining reality as “that which exists.” That isn't wrong but it's philosophically shallow unless you connect it to a usable framework.

Not true. You can know you exist without reference to time or change. You're assuming knowledge grows. Parminedes is saying its static. To be is to know and vice versa.
But “to know” is not a static state unless you collapse all distinctions between having knowledge, acquiring knowledge, and expressing knowledge. Even in the “I think, therefore I am” sense, there is still a structure: subject, act, awareness. The moment we unpack “being is knowing,” we’re already presupposing distinctions that unfold over time or contrast. If not, then we reduce it to a metaphysical singularity which explains nothing and admits no alternative.

ive already refuted this. Vacuums aren't "nothing". They exist.
I didn’t claim vacuums are true nothing. I said that Parmenides’ concept of change assumes absolute negation, which modern metaphysics doesn’t require. Change can involve reconfiguration, emergence, or gradation.

even if it is, its ontological grounding and necessity arent negated. All you're arguments seem to cycle back to "but this is useless or impractical therefore it must be false"
What I am actually saying is: if your argument cannot be tested, conceived, or distinguished from formalism, then it cannot be ontologically persuasive. I’m not reducing everything to utility. I’m asking: what reason do we have to believe this model maps onto reality? If it doesn’t interact with or explain anything in the world, we’re mistaking consistency for truth.

It doesn't because it allows for epistemology to be built off the phenomenal world. Think of how scientific explanations and religious ones coexist because they operate in seperate domains. In parminides case, you have the real and illusory. One like the divine is unapproachable, the other isn't.
But there's a difference: religion often admits its appeal is faith-based, symbolic, or metaphoric. It doesn’t try to prove that its metaphysics are rationally necessary. Parmenides does. And when you introduce a binary like “real/illusory” but then operate entirely in the illusory without any epistemic bridge to the “real,” you’ve created a sealed-off system. The “real” becomes philosophically inert, so despite its existence, we can't speak meaningfully about it.

That there is the limit of knowledge and language. Wishing it were otherwise doesn't make it so.
True, but the burden is still on the one claiming logical necessity to show how the claim escapes circularity, inaccessibility, and performative contradiction. If nothing can be known, verified, or meaningfully interacted with, then to say “nothing ever happens” is no longer a logical conclusion.
 
You say that, but asserting necessity “period” is still a claim that must be intelligible and applicable beyond its formal definitions if it’s meant to describe reality.


Even if reason “emerges from logic,” the expression and application of that logic is filtered through language, cognitive categories, and distinction-making, which are all shaped by experience. Logic might be formally pure, but its use is always mediated. The burden is on your side to show how pure logic leads to reliable ontology without smuggling in sensory or cognition-shaped scaffolding.


I have. But your argument treats logic as a self-contained access to reality, while dismissing perception. If perception is flawed and logic is shaped by faculties developed in relation to perception, then logic isn’t immune from scrutiny either. You’re separating them too cleanly, ignoring the interdependence that even Kant, Husserl, and others dealt with.
You're assuming interdependence = subordination. You're also assuming its perception conditioning logic and not the other way round. You need to prove this.
Parminides argument is indispensable for any thinking being. It is necessary for *your* existence. Does that mean its ontologically dependent on consciousness? No, because thats logically impossible. It has to be unchanging and therefore eternal by necessity. Yes it is self contained in so far as the limits of language permits. Language comes from thought though not the other way round.
But again, abstraction without differentiation becomes vacuous. Saying “being is necessary” with no specification of how being appears or persists in a plural world is like defining reality as “that which exists.” That isn't wrong but it's philosophically shallow unless you connect it to a usable framework.
Again, lack of utility doesn't matter. If *you* exist then being is necessary.
But “to know” is not a static state unless you collapse all distinctions between having knowledge, acquiring knowledge, and expressing knowledge. Even in the “I think, therefore I am” sense, there is still a structure: subject, act, awareness. The moment we unpack “being is knowing,” we’re already presupposing distinctions that unfold over time or contrast. If not, then we reduce it to a metaphysical singularity which explains nothing and admits no alternative.
They're not seperate stages, they're aspects of atemporal reality. Knowledge is being and being is. Again you're appealing to utility. "This doesn't help me."
I didn’t claim vacuums are true nothing. I said that Parmenides’ concept of change assumes absolute negation, which modern metaphysics doesn’t require. Change can involve reconfiguration, emergence, or gradation.
all those things are phenomenal interpretations for functionial purposes. There's only being and its negation. If you deny this you must deny yourself.
What I am actually saying is: if your argument cannot be tested, conceived, or distinguished from formalism, then it cannot be ontologically persuasive. I’m not reducing everything to utility. I’m asking: what reason do we have to believe this model maps onto reality? If it doesn’t interact with or explain anything in the world, we’re mistaking consistency for truth.
Because you presuppose for something to be ontologically persuasive it must be empirically valueable or have utility. Here's the reason: you are. Has it occured to you that the world can't be explained coherently?
But there's a difference: religion often admits its appeal is faith-based, symbolic, or metaphoric. It doesn’t try to prove that its metaphysics are rationally necessary. Parmenides does. And when you introduce a binary like “real/illusory” but then operate entirely in the illusory without any epistemic bridge to the “real,” you’ve created a sealed-off system. The “real” becomes philosophically inert, so despite its existence, we can't speak meaningfully about it.
This is not true. In christian theology God is a necessary being, he's not symbolic or a metaphor, and all existence is contingent on and partaking in him. It stems at its core from Parminedes One but through a Platonic lense. The rest is appeal to utility.
True, but the burden is still on the one claiming logical necessity to show how the claim escapes circularity, inaccessibility, and performative contradiction. If nothing can be known, verified, or meaningfully interacted with, then to say “nothing ever happens” is no longer a logical conclusion.
Every claim is circular. parminides claim is fundamental to your existence. Without it you dont exist. It precedes from you by necessity. Yes it is self contained but so are you. And you are being.
 
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You're assuming interdependence = subordination. You're also assuming its perception conditioning logic and not the other way round. You need to prove this.
Describing mediation isn't assuming subordination. The relationship between logic and perception is not one-directional. Rather, it's dialectical: logic provides form, but experience shapes content. Even if logic is “prior” in some abstract sense, it only becomes operative and meaningful through categories and distinctions that arise in embodied cognition. That’s literally one of the core aspects of post-Kantian epistemology.

Parminides argument is indispensable for any thinking being. It is necessary for *your* existence. Does that mean its ontologically dependent on consciousness? No, because thats logically impossible. It has to be unchanging and therefore eternal by necessity. Yes it is self contained in so far as the limits of language permits. Language comes from thought though not the other way round.
If it’s self-contained and language-bound, then it’s not metaphysically necessary. And calling it indispensable doesn't make it so; it only shows that if you accept certain definitions, then the argument follows.

Again, lack of utility doesn't matter. If *you* exist then being is necessary.
We’re not disputing the necessity of being, but of a particular framing of being.

They're not seperate stages, they're aspects of atemporal reality. Knowledge is being and being is. Again you're appealing to utility. "This doesn't help me."
This doesn’t answer the structural critique. If knowing, being, and thought are one, then fine—but you still have to distinguish the act of articulating that unity. Otherwise, there's no difference between the claim and silence.

all those things are phenomenal interpretations for functionial purposes. There's only being and its negation. If you deny this you must deny yourself.
Which is exactly why that system is ontologically non-participatory. It doesn’t address what shows up—it just asserts what must be. The logic itself also ignores the fact there's a difference between relative non-being and absolute non-being.

Because you presuppose for something to be ontologically persuasive it must be empirically valueable or have utility.
This isn't about utility; it's about coherence with reality as encountered. You keep shifting the critique into a false dichotomy: either metaphysical necessity or pragmatic usefulness. But the actual standard here is epistemic engagement, for if something cannot even be conceptually approached, it cannot serve as an ontological foundation.

Here's the reason: you are. Has it occured to you that the world can't be explained coherently?
Absolutely, and that’s exactly why I favor models that are open-ended, revisable, and anchored in experience, not ones that rest on an axiomatic negation of plurality. If the world is not fully intelligible, then we should stop pretending one logical monism solves it all.

This is not true. In christian theology God is a necessary being, he's not symbolic or a metaphor, and all existence is contingent on and partaking in him. It stems at its core from Parminedes One but through a Platonic lense. The rest is appeal to utility.
That’s fair, and I agree there’s a metaphysical lineage. But theology admits its basis is revelation, faith, or grace, not deductive certainty alone.

Every claim is circular. parminides claim is fundamental to your existence. Without it you dont exist. It precedes from you by necessity. Yes it is self contained but so are you. And you are being.
If the premise is that only your model allows being, then there’s no room for engagement.

Look—I think at this point we’re treading water. We’ve circled the same core disagreement several times: whether pure logical necessity, detached from experience, can serve as a meaningful ontology. This debate has already been waged and dissected in far greater depth by people way smarter than either of us.

The thing is, you accept the premise—that being is logically necessary and all else is illusion. So by definition, there’s no external standpoint from which your view can be revised or even questioned. That’s not a flaw in your reasoning, but a function of how absolute the claim is.

This is an unfalsifiable structure that already assumes its own truth.
 
Describing mediation isn't assuming subordination. The relationship between logic and perception is not one-directional. Rather, it's dialectical: logic provides form, but experience shapes content. Even if logic is “prior” in some abstract sense, it only becomes operative and meaningful through categories and distinctions that arise in embodied cognition. That’s literally one of the core aspects of post-Kantian epistemology.
Post kantianism doesn’t deny logic's primacy, rather its contingent on it. Categorization and by extension language is informed by logical structures. But parminides argument collapses all categories and distinctions into One because our very experience is logic itself. Logic wouldnt be able to transcend perception if it wasn't apriori. Its the bedrock of cognition, is self-validating and necessitates parminidean monism. I get it, thats an ontological loop but that doesn’t make the problem dissappear. As a being you are confronted by it. All you're doing is shifting the argument.
If it’s self-contained and language-bound, then it’s not metaphysically necessary. And calling it indispensable doesn't make it so; it only shows that if you accept certain definitions, then the argument follows. This doesn’t answer the structural critique. If knowing, being, and thought are one, then fine—but you still have to distinguish the act of articulating that unity. Otherwise, there's no difference between the claim and silence.
Certain definitions have to be. But i concede articulation is where it gets messy and that is what i was referring to. Yet that's as much a problem for you as it is for me.
We’re not disputing the necessity of being, but of a particular framing of being.
My argument boils down to being is necessary

Which is exactly why that system is ontologically non-participatory. It doesn’t address what shows up—it just asserts what must be. The logic itself also ignores the fact there's a difference between relative non-being and absolute non-being.
Relative non-being breaks LNC therefore is false. We've done this already.

Ontology is being. We participate by our existence. If you mean we can't discuss it you're right. We can't. But thats just reality. Now you'll appeal to utility im sure.
This isn't about utility; it's about coherence with reality as encountered. You keep shifting the critique into a false dichotomy: either metaphysical necessity or pragmatic usefulness. But the actual standard here is epistemic engagement, for if something cannot even be conceptually approached, it cannot serve as an ontological foundation.
Coherence with reality = how can i utilize this to explain the percieved world. Utility.

Its funny cause all your critiques presuppose a framework that only works because parminides argument holds.
Absolutely, and that’s exactly why I favor models that are open-ended, revisable, and anchored in experience, not ones that rest on an axiomatic negation of plurality. If the world is not fully intelligible, then we should stop pretending one logical monism solves it all.
Its not intended to solve anything or be a tool to understand the world. It just is by necessity. Its undeniable. Because it is logic.
That’s fair, and I agree there’s a metaphysical lineage. But theology admits its basis is revelation, faith, or grace, not deductive certainty alone.
Irrelevant to my point
If the premise is that only your model allows being, then there’s no room for engagement.
How would you state being without recourse to logic. You cant.
Look—I think at this point we’re treading water. We’ve circled the same core disagreement several times: whether pure logical necessity, detached from experience, can serve as a meaningful ontology. This debate has already been waged and dissected in far greater depth by people way smarter than either of us.

The thing is, you accept the premise—that being is logically necessary and all else is illusion. So by definition, there’s no external standpoint from which your view can be revised or even questioned. That’s not a flaw in your reasoning, but a function of how absolute the claim is.

This is an unfalsifiable structure that already assumes its own truth.
Sounds like you're surrendering like a little cuckhold. Understandable. I can smell when the goose is cooked. Now scurry along and dont waste my time any further.
 
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Post kantianism doesn’t deny logic's primacy, rather its contingent on it. Categorization and by extension language is informed by logical structures. But parminides argument collapses all categories and distinctions into One because our very experience is logic itself. Logic wouldnt be able to transcend perception if it wasn't apriori. Its the bedrock of cognition, is self-validating and necessitates parminidean monism. I get it, thats an ontological loop but that doesn’t make the problem dissappear. As a being you are confronted by it. All you're doing is shifting the argument.
You're conflating logical structure with a particular metaphysical conclusion drawn from it. Logic can be a priori, but deriving Parmenidean monism from that is not logically necessary. That move only follows if you already presuppose a rigid identity theory of being, collapse all difference into illusion, and define "nothing" in a very specific way. Those are philosophical choices, not inevitabilities baked into logic itself. Otherwise, every rationalist post-Kant would’ve ended up a Parmenidean. They didn’t.

And saying "logic transcends perception" doesn’t negate that it still operates through conceptual mediation, which itself emerges within a phenomenal, embodied context. A priori doesn’t mean free from the conditions of intelligibility.

My argument boils down to being is necessary
No one here is disputing that being is necessary. The dispute is over whether your definition of being is the necessary conclusion from logic. It isn’t. That’s why you keep collapsing the discussion into either total agreement with Parmenides or denial of being itself. That false binary is doing all the heavy lifting for your "position".

Relative non-being breaks LNC therefore is false. We've done this already.
Only if you flatten all forms of negation into the absolute. But relative non-being—as in “what something is not right now”—doesn’t violate the principle of non-contradiction. If I’m sitting, I’m not standing. That doesn’t mean I never stand. That’s relational absence, not logical contradiction. Parmenides' framing artificially enforces contradiction where none exists.

Ontology is being. We participate by our existence. If you mean we can't discuss it you're right. We can't. But thats just reality. Now you'll appeal to utility im sure.
Then you concede the whole critique. If the foundation of your worldview cannot even be discussed without violating its own terms.

Coherence with reality = how can i utilize this to explain the percieved world. Utility.
That’s a strawman. Coherence with reality means explaining what is actually encountered, even if imperfectly. Utility follows, but it’s not the same thing. A worldview that’s coherent should make sense of experience, not negate its very possibility and call that insight.

Its funny cause all your critiques presuppose a framework that only works because parminides argument holds.
This is begging the question. You're saying my position is only intelligible because your metaphysics is true. But that assumes what you need to prove. If anything, my critiques demonstrate that intelligibility functions just fine within a dynamic, pluralistic model.

Its not intended to solve anything or be a tool to understand the world. It just is by necessity. Its undeniable. Because it is logic.
Declaring something “undeniable” doesn’t prove it.

How would you state being without recourse to logic. You cant.
You wouldn’t. But that doesn’t mean logic entails your particular metaphysics. You are mistaking the universality of logic for the exclusivity of your interpretation.

Sounds like you're surrendering like a little cuckhold. Understandable. I can smell when the goose is cooked. Now scurry along and dont waste my time any further.
Ok GrAY. The absolute state of 2025cels.
 
You're conflating logical structure with a particular metaphysical conclusion drawn from it. Logic can be a priori, but deriving Parmenidean monism from that is not logically necessary. That move only follows if you already presuppose a rigid identity theory of being, collapse all difference into illusion, and define "nothing" in a very specific way. Those are philosophical choices, not inevitabilities baked into logic itself. Otherwise, every rationalist post-Kant would’ve ended up a Parmenidean. They didn’t.

And saying "logic transcends perception" doesn’t negate that it still operates through conceptual mediation, which itself emerges within a phenomenal, embodied context. A priori doesn’t mean free from the conditions of intelligibility.
Post-kantianism is just pragmatic bias to save empiricism. Monism is a "silly" and meaningless view life but that doesn’t detract from its validity.

Parminides argument is essentially just LNC ontologized. If you deny it you deny LNC and end up with a self destructing philosophy.

You keep conflating presupposition with necessity. Try to assert difference without identity. Its impossible. A has to be A for it to differ from B. Being is, isn't a premise. Its the only rational conclusion.



No one here is disputing that being is necessary. The dispute is over whether your definition of being is the necessary conclusion from logic. It isn’t. That’s why you keep collapsing the discussion into either total agreement with Parmenides or denial of being itself. That false binary is doing all the heavy lifting for your "position".
Ok try to have a 3rd option without breaking LNC. And you keep framing being as if its a neutral term to be defined. Being is what defines our presuppositions. Its synonymous with logic. I cant define logic in a way that fits my desire. Logic just is. How and why and what mediation its expressed through become irrelevant. *You* are still faced with the problem.

Only if you flatten all forms of negation into the absolute. But relative non-being—as in “what something is not right now”—doesn’t violate the principle of non-contradiction. If I’m sitting, I’m not standing. That doesn’t mean I never stand. That’s relational absence, not logical contradiction. Parmenides' framing artificially enforces contradiction where none exists.
Potentiality/change is non-being. Non-being whether absolute or relative cannot have ontological status and relativity still depends on an absolute idea (which you deny) otherwise its incoherent. Relative non-being is still non-being you just redefine it to soften the contradiction and introduce time as a prop. If you stop sitting (was sitting- past tense) sitting becomes non-existent, and standing (present) comes from nothing. If i ask you what happened to sitting you'll tell me its in the past. But what does that mean other than it vanished into nothing. This is why it contradicts LNC because nothing cannot be.

Then you concede the whole critique. If the foundation of your worldview cannot even be discussed without violating its own terms.
If your critique is its useless I've maintained that from the start - utility doesn't preclude validity.
That’s a strawman. Coherence with reality means explaining what is actually encountered, even if imperfectly. Utility follows, but it’s not the same thing. A worldview that’s coherent should make sense of experience, not negate its very possibility and call that insight.
Logic proves the senses arent reliable. Calling sensory experience illusion/false is the only logical conclusion. Because this doesn’t accord with your desire doesn't make it any less true.
This is begging the question. You're saying my position is only intelligible because your metaphysics is true. But that assumes what you need to prove. If anything, my critiques demonstrate that intelligibility functions just fine within a dynamic, pluralistic model.
No im saying you need to refer to being and non being (both absolutes) to make any kind of argument or process any sort of intelligible thought.
Declaring something “undeniable” doesn’t prove it.

You wouldn’t. But that doesn’t mean logic entails your particular metaphysics. You are mistaking the universality of logic for the exclusivity of your interpretation.
Being cannot be non being. Change requires being to be non being. You've already conceded it can't be refuted if you grant his definitions but they're defined that way for a reason. Sense data can be unreliable (im sure i dont have to explain why). Logic cant. The definitions follow logically.
Ok GrAY. The absolute state of 2025cels.
Ok paragonfag. The utter state of 2024cels.
 
Post-kantianism is just pragmatic bias to save empiricism. Monism is a "silly" and meaningless view life but that doesn’t detract from its validity.

Parminides argument is essentially just LNC ontologized. If you deny it you deny LNC and end up with a self destructing philosophy.

You keep conflating presupposition with necessity. Try to assert difference without identity. Its impossible. A has to be A for it to differ from B. Being is, isn't a premise. Its the only rational conclusion.




Ok try to have a 3rd option without breaking LNC. And you keep framing being as if its a neutral term to be defined. Being is what defines our presuppositions. Its synonymous with logic. I cant define logic in a way that fits my desire. Logic just is. How and why and what mediation its expressed through become irrelevant. *You* are still faced with the problem.


Potentiality/change is non-being. Non-being whether absolute or relative cannot have ontological status and relativity still depends on an absolute idea (which you deny) otherwise its incoherent. Relative non-being is still non-being you just redefine it to soften the contradiction and introduce time as a prop. If you stop sitting (was sitting- past tense) sitting becomes non-existent, and standing (present) comes from nothing. If i ask you what happened to sitting you'll tell me its in the past. But what does that mean other than it vanished into nothing. This is why it contradicts LNC because nothing cannot be.


If your critique is its useless I've maintained that from the start - utility doesn't preclude validity.

Logic proves the senses arent reliable. Calling sensory experience illusion/false is the only logical conclusion. Because this doesn’t accord with your desire doesn't make it any less true.

No im saying you need to refer to being and non being (both absolutes) to make any kind of argument or process any sort of intelligible thought.

Being cannot be non being. Change requires being to be non being. You've already conceded it can't be refuted if you grant his definitions but they're defined that way for a reason. Sense data can be unreliable (im sure i dont have to explain why). Logic cant. The definitions follow logically.

Ok paragonfag. The utter state of 2024cels.
You're trying to turn logic itself into a metaphysics, but logic doesn't mandate one metaphysics—it only constrains which ones are coherent. I do agree that Parmenidean monism is one response to the LNC, but it's not the only rational conclusion. You're mistaking a consistent interpretation for the only possible one. The fact that change involves reference to non-being doesn’t mean it violates the LNC—unless you're working with a static, absolutist ontology of being that already rules change out in advance.

As of your challenge: I can assert A ≠ B precisely because A = A and B = B. That doesn’t commit me to monism, it just means identity is a prerequisite for differentiation. Parmenides collapses differentiation into illusion; I affirm that difference presupposes identity. That’s not denial.

Your position hinges on a metaphysical assumption that non-being cannot even be relatively posited, but this is exactly where modern physics, especially relativity and the block universe model, shows your framing isn't logically compulsory. In a four-dimensional spacetime, all events coexist as a complete structure. There’s no “coming into being” or “passing away”—just the illusion of change from within a fixed structure. That preserves the unity of being without denying plurality or change since they are perspectival rather than ontological transitions.

So sitting becomes past when I stand, but that doesn’t mean it became nothing. It still exists as part of the spacetime manifold. Change here is not movement from being to non-being, but reindexing one’s position in a higher-order structure. That completely dissolves the contradiction you're trying to force.

And when you say “you’re still faced with the problem,” I’d just ask—what problem? The problem arises only if you demand that logic be synonymous with your metaphysical reading of it. But if logic is the tool, and not the ontology, then I’m free to apply it to frameworks that preserve coherence without collapsing plurality, experience, or time.
 
You're trying to turn logic itself into a metaphysics, but logic doesn't mandate one metaphysics—it only constrains which ones are coherent. I do agree that Parmenidean monism is one response to the LNC, but it's not the only rational conclusion. You're mistaking a consistent interpretation for the only possible one. The fact that change involves reference to non-being doesn’t mean it violates the LNC—unless you're working with a static, absolutist ontology of being that already rules change out in advance.

As of your challenge: I can assert A ≠ B precisely because A = A and B = B. That doesn’t commit me to monism, it just means identity is a prerequisite for differentiation. Parmenides collapses differentiation into illusion; I affirm that difference presupposes identity. That’s not denial.
No im saying monism is the only one thats logically possible. What interpretation would you propose otherwise. Commonsense? Im sure you dont need me to point out why that would be ludicrous.

Not yet being is the same as not being. You're still stuck with the transition from something to nothing.

For A and B to be distinct that means one of them lacks a quality the other doesn’t have. Which is non being.
Your position hinges on a metaphysical assumption that non-being cannot even be relatively posited, but this is exactly where modern physics, especially relativity and the block universe model, shows your framing isn't logically compulsory. In a four-dimensional spacetime, all events coexist as a complete structure. There’s no “coming into being” or “passing away”—just the illusion of change from within a fixed structure. That preserves the unity of being without denying plurality or change since they are perspectival rather than ontological transitions.
Sounds like monism. How is this refuting me tbh. You need to presuppose your senses are reliable for any argument about relative absence to work anyway so its a moot point
So sitting becomes past when I stand, but that doesn’t mean it became nothing. It still exists as part of the spacetime manifold. Change here is not movement from being to non-being, but reindexing one’s position in a higher-order structure. That completely dissolves the contradiction you're trying to force.
You keep sneaking empirical assumptions into a logical/metaphysical debate.

Sitting requires the presentness of sitting to vanish and the presentness of standing to emerge. Even if you exchange non being for past temporal existence or any other kind of relative absence, LNC remains broken. Past sitting has no ontological status.
And when you say “you’re still faced with the problem,” I’d just ask—what problem? The problem arises only if you demand that logic be synonymous with your metaphysical reading of it. But if logic is the tool, and not the ontology, then I’m free to apply it to frameworks that preserve coherence without collapsing plurality, experience, or time.
For that to be so you must presuppose you have cognisance independent of logic. Which is impossible. You seem to be saying logic is contextual and how its "used" whether tightly or loosely depends on where i choose to draw the lines between the metaphysical and physical (whim)
 
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No im saying monism is the only one thats logically possible. What interpretation would you propose otherwise. Commonsense? Im sure you dont need me to point out why that would be ludicrous.
You're framing monism as the only logically viable model by defining all alternatives in ways that guarantee contradiction, and then using that contradiction to justify monism. I never appealed to "common sense"—I appealed to the fact that logic does not entail monism. It permits it, but it also permits models that retain identity and plurality without violating LNC, like the block model.

Not yet being is the same as not being. You're still stuck with the transition from something to nothing.
That's only if you're operating in a flat metaphysical schema where only the present exists. But that’s exactly what's in dispute. Temporality isn’t a trick or evasion; it’s a framework for describing persistence and transformation without invoking "true nothingness". The moment you grant time—even tenseless time like in the block universe—you no longer need a hard break between being and non-being. So your conclusion only holds by already denying temporality.

For A and B to be distinct that means one of them lacks a quality the other doesn’t have. Which is non being.
No. It just means difference of predicates, not ontological absence. The apple is red, the banana is yellow. The apple doesn’t lack "banana-ness" as some ontological deficiency for it simply differs. You’re treating all difference as privation, which is a metaphysical assumption, not a logical one.

Sounds like monism. How is this refuting me tbh.
It refutes your form of monism, which is the kind that denies plurality, change, or temporal differentiation. If all events are, but experienced differently from within, then yes, being is, but not in the absolute-static Parmenidean claims. It differs from Parmenidean monism because it’s structurally plural and topologically complex.

You keep sneaking empirical assumptions into a logical/metaphysical debate.
I’m also pointing out that you’re drawing metaphysical conclusions from logical grammar. That’s what you’re doing. I’m simply reminding you that logical form doesn’t specify ontological content. You need more than LNC to build a metaphysic.

Past sitting has no ontological status.
Says who? You, because your ontology presupposes only presentness is real. Again, you assume what you need to prove.

you must presuppose you have cognisance independent of logic.
I’m saying logic is a medium, not an origin. You’re conflating the structure of rational discourse with the substance of reality. Logic allows us to test coherence, but coherence does not entail identity-based monism. That leap is yours, and it’s not mandated by logic. You're treating logic like a metaphysical oracle, when it’s actually just the syntax of intelligibility.
 
You're framing monism as the only logically viable model by defining all alternatives in ways that guarantee contradiction, and then using that contradiction to justify monism. I never appealed to "common sense"—I appealed to the fact that logic does not entail monism. It permits it, but it also permits models that retain identity and plurality without violating LNC, like the block model. It refutes your form of monism, which is the kind that denies plurality, change, or temporal differentiation. If all events are, but experienced differently from within, then yes, being is, but not in the absolute-static Parmenidean claims. It differs from Parmenidean monism because it’s structurally plural and topologically complex.
its monism with a modern twist. It tells us everything is but presumes plurality. The problem is plurality doesn’t have a logical basis. It comes from sense data. In other words it is appealing to the commonsensical view of the world. Monism is just being and its contradiction (LNC) and what is logically entailed.

That's only if you're operating in a flat metaphysical schema where only the present exists. But that’s exactly what's in dispute. Temporality isn’t a trick or evasion; it’s a framework for describing persistence and transformation without invoking "true nothingness". The moment you grant time—even tenseless time like in the block universe—you no longer need a hard break between being and non-being. So your conclusion only holds by already denying temporality.
Relative to two points in time non being is still "occuring". What is at point A for example is what is not at point B. As i said before whether you take an absolute or relative view the result is the same. Persistence implies something not ceasing to be so "true nothingness" is still essential to it.
No. It just means difference of predicates, not ontological absence. The apple is red, the banana is yellow. The apple doesn’t lack "banana-ness" as some ontological deficiency for it simply differs. You’re treating all difference as privation, which is a metaphysical assumption, not a logical one.
Predicates arent arbitrary linguistic tricks they're rooted in logic. Your example still requires non being which contradicts pure LNC. Its just framed it in a way thats favourable to you but when unpacked collapses. This isn't metaphysical.

I’m also pointing out that you’re drawing metaphysical conclusions from logical grammar. That’s what you’re doing. I’m simply reminding you that logical form doesn’t specify ontological content. You need more than LNC to build a metaphysic.
You can't seem to process that the very structure of logic places restraints on what can and can't meaningfully be said about reality. And by seperating logic and ontology you yourself are making a metaphysical claim not a logical one.
Says who? You, because your ontology presupposes only presentness is real. Again, you assume what you need to prove.
no it presupposes only being. Presentness requires tense.
You’re conflating the structure of rational discourse with the substance of reality. Logic allows us to test coherence, but coherence does not entail identity-based monism. That leap is yours, and it’s not mandated by logic. You're treating logic like a metaphysical oracle, when it’s actually just the syntax of intelligibility.
you cant test coherence without presupposing logics authority thus it shapes what can be said meaningfully about reality in the first place. To claim reality exist outside of logic not only is self destructive but it relies on logic to be expressed in the first place.
 
its monism with a modern twist. It tells us everything is but presumes plurality. The problem is plurality doesn’t have a logical basis. It comes from sense data. In other words it is appealing to the commonsensical view of the world. Monism is just being and its contradiction (LNC) and what is logically entailed.
You're still confusing permissibility within logic with entailment from logic. The block model is compatible with LNC and doesn’t rely on naive “commonsense". It formalizes plurality through structure. The claim that “plurality has no logical basis” only follows if you've already rejected any model that distinguishes identity across temporal or spatial coordinates.

You're building monism into your definitions and then pointing to the definitions as if they’re evidence, which isn't logical necessity. Plurality doesn’t violate logic; it’s what logic requires to function, since you can’t even assert “being is” without presupposing differentiation between statements that are and are not true.

Relative to two points in time non being is still "occuring". What is at point A for example is what is not at point B. As i said before whether you take an absolute or relative view the result is the same. Persistence implies something not ceasing to be so "true nothingness" is still essential to it.
this is a misapplication of negation. “Not being at B” doesn’t entail ontological non-being, only relational absence. This is exactly how identity across a manifold works. Saying event A is not at point B is no more a violation of LNC than saying 1 ≠ 2.

Persistence doesn’t require something to never not exist, it requires consistency within a frame. You’re assuming that because X is not present here, it must be absolutely not. That’s a false dichotomy born from collapsing relative location or time into absolute ontological negation.

Predicates arent arbitrary linguistic tricks they're rooted in logic. Your example still requires non being which contradicts pure LNC. Its just framed it in a way thats favourable to you but when unpacked collapses. This isn't metaphysical.
But again, you haven't shown why predicates like “red” and “yellow” logically entail non-being. You’re assuming that difference = deficiency, which only holds under your own metaphysical definition of negation. Your use of the LNC already presupposes that any difference must involve ontological absence.

But modern logic and semantics don’t define negation that way. There’s no contradiction in saying an apple is red and not yellow, unless you arbitrarily define “not yellow” as metaphysical non-being.

You can't seem to process that the very structure of logic places restraints on what can and can't meaningfully be said about reality. And by seperating logic and ontology you yourself are making a metaphysical claim not a logical one.
Of course logic places constraints, but not unique outcomes. It weeds out contradiction, not all possible alternatives like you do. My point is that logic does not mandate identity-based monism. That’s the distinction you're refusing to make: just because logic filters out incoherence doesn’t mean it chooses a metaphysics. That requires metaphysical premises, which you keep denying you're using.

Also, recognizing that logic and ontology are not identical is not “separating” them arbitrarily. This is simply a recognition of the limits of formal systems. Godel, Wittgenstein, and others have shown that formal logic cannot close over all metaphysical truth without circularity.

you cant test coherence without presupposing logics authority thus it shapes what can be said meaningfully about reality in the first place. To claim reality exist outside of logic not only is self destructive but it relies on logic to be expressed in the first place.
No one’s claiming reality is “outside logic.” What I am saying is that logic structures our intelligibility of reality, not necessarily the whole of being itself. The fact that logic is required to express thoughts doesn’t mean those thoughts must all conclude with monism.

And you still haven’t shown why the only consistent reading of LNC is Parmenidean monism rather than, say, a structurally unified but pluralistic ontology like the block universe.

You’re also treating a syntax like it’s a god.
 

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