if you had to genocide any group of people, which would it be?

[based_meme]

Genocide is not morally unjustifiable in any way that's apparent to me. I'm open to any arguments to the contrary, but I think it would be extremely difficult and bordering on the fantastical.

Meant to say is morally unjustifiable.

 

[mentalcripple]

gypsies

 

[Ahnfeltia]

I wouldn't classify concepts as metaphysical. Here I define metaphysical as pertaining to the nature of being and supraphysical (above the physical, categorically primary where the physical is secondary, and also ordinally preceding the physical). I think abstract and metaphysical are not synonymous, and that the two are sometimes conflated, such as now. Words and numbers, for example, are both abstract concepts that map very accurately to the concrete world (numbers more so than words), and they both capture concepts in the logos that are used for them. They both originate - and are are purely conjured up - from imagination. To say that both words and numbers are metaphysical would necessarily imply that imagination and all constructs of the mind are metaphysical. Since imagination is nothing more than thoughts, and since thoughts are the product of physical processes in the mind, the concepts derived and produced from those thoughts cannot, by definition, be metaphysical, because the physical is subordinate to the metaphysical.

Therefore morality is not necessarily metaphysical.

All I meant by "X is metaphysical" is that the existence or correctness of X cannot be ascertained by means of the physical. I suppose "superphysical" would've been slightly better for that purpose, so I'll use that word going forward. In the aforementioned sense numbers, words, and morality are superphysical. Your definition of metaphysics, like Kant's thing-in-itself, is moot, because your metaphysics is entirely inaccesible.

 

[Regenerator]

Reddit users

 

[Riinku]

Bullies

 

[Ahnfeltia]

Moral justifications are provided through the moral system from which the justifications (reasons) operate. That in and of itself is not circular. Take the three major systems of non-religious ethics: virtue ethics, utilitarian ethics, and deontological ethics. They all can provide logically consistent arguments for why action x is moral/immoral, but using another moral system to deconstruct the moral reasoning provided by one moral system may or may not yield the same result. A similar conclusion might be reached, but the reasons will clearly be different, none of which will be circular.

Your three examples ain't circular precisely because they're axiomatic, which was exactly my point. It's either-or. Since they are de facto equivalent (admitting "it is because it is" as circular) I don't really care which point of view is taken.

As far as axiomatic morality goes, I've tried very diligently to develop moral axioms in order to construct a rigorous moral system, but it's proven to be extremely difficult, if not impossible, because edge cases always seem to appear under some set of conditions. Even the axiom of, "murder is immoral/morally bad/morally negative," can have a plausible edge case where it may be justifiable to commit murder. Why? Because it could, hypothetically, save lives in the immediate. An example could be a madman who orders you to kill an innocent person or they will detonate a nuclear bomb killing millions. Variations of this hypothetical are typical in discussions of the contrast between utilitarianism and deontology.

Metaethically, I don't think ethics are amenable to axiomatization. If it is, in fact, possible, it may be a problem of complexity. The space of possible moral agentic decisions (actions a thing with agency, such as a person, can take) is a subset of the space of all possible agentic decisions (because some decisions have a null moral value).

I agree that people's moralities ain't susceptible to succinct axiomatization.

 

[KillNiggers]

The non-white ones

 

[based_meme]

All I meant by "X is metaphysical" is that the existence or correctness of X cannot be ascertained by means of the physical.

Correctness of agentic moral actions is not ascertained by the means of the physical either (I suppose existence would be, since you can't physically do an act that doesn't exist in the physical world). They're ascertained through reason. The laws of logic (non-contradiction, excluded middle, and identity), for example, are another thing that's not ascertained through the physical.

I suppose "superphysical" would've been slightly better for that purpose, so I'll use that word going forward. In the aforementioned sense numbers, words, and morality are superphysical. Your definition of metaphysics, like Kant's thing-in-itself, is moot, because your metaphysics is entirely inaccesible.

Accessibility is irrelevant here. The inaccessibility of the metaphysical from the physical doesn't imply that reason not applicable to morals i.e., that reasoning is not accessible from morality. The entire philosophical branch of ethics is concerned precisely with reasons behind actions and their moral values.

Your three examples ain't circular precisely because they're axiomatic, which was exactly my point. It's either-or. Since they are de facto equivalent (admitting "it is because it is" as circular) I don't really care which point of view is taken.

I agree that people's moralities ain't susceptible to succinct axiomatization.

That's not what circular reasoning is, though. Circular reasoning refers to exactly that: reasoning. It happens when argument is made. Axioms, however, aren't arguments. "A is true because B is true, and B is true because A is true" is an argument and is circular.

You said,

Since morality is metaphysical, any moral justification must eventually fall back on moral axioms that can only be justified by circular reasoning.

Morality is not metaphysical, and I've argued why. In the second quote in this post you acknowledge that the moral justifications rely on moral axioms that are not circular.

 

[Sloth22]

zionists

jews

 

[Ron.Belgrade]

1.jews
2.Gypsies
3.Bosniaks

Honorable mention:

Somalis

 

[SoycuckGodOfReddit]

foids

 

[SoycuckGodOfReddit]

Since morality is metaphysical, any moral justification must eventually fall back on moral axioms that can only be justified by circular reasoning. Instead, those axioms are perhaps better thought of as unjustifiable "obvious" moral truths. "Murder is bad" (or something along these lines) commonly seems to be one of those moral axioms in my admittedly rather limited experience. My point is that moral justifications are rather arbitrary unless common axioms are agreed upon.

if not foids then their jewish brethren

if not jews then essayposters like this ^

 

[SoycuckGodOfReddit]

I don't know what I did to deserve this by REALITY I SHOULD BE WINNING. THERES BEEN INCORRECTIOMS DETECTED MOTHERFUCKERS

it must have been the organics!

they conspired against you

we organics are very devious sometimes

 

[erenyeager]

organics

Natures mistake that’s why Venus is based

 

[NiggerSlayer]

The non-white ones

Based

 

[NiggerSlayer]

all of them. 1 extra shot in the black ones

 

[NiggerSlayer]

Personally if i can only choose one group id say jews

 

[DeliriousMerchant]

1.jews
2.Gypsies
3.Bosniaks

Honorable mention:

Somalis

Fuck you.

 

[DeliriousMerchant]

Whites.

 

[gymletethnicel]

Humanity

 

[hghcel]

jews

 

[PersonalityPsychic]

Happy merchants

 

[theautismcel]

Cucks

 

[outcastgymcel23]

TND all blacks and TKD all jews

 

[Ahnfeltia]

if not jews then essayposters like this ^

 

[fantasycel]

All of them except incels and attractive-ish women. Then we could all ascend, unless the foids still don’t want anything to do with us.

 

[Bianor]

1.jews
2.Gypsies
3.Bosniaks

Honorable mention:

Somalis

Over for @abajojo cels

 

[Ahnfeltia]

Correctness of agentic moral actions is not ascertained by the means of the physical either (I suppose existence would be, since you can't physically do an act that doesn't exist in the physical world). They're ascertained through reason. The laws of logic (non-contradiction, excluded middle, and identity), for example, are another thing that's not ascertained through the physical.

Which is why morality and logic are both superphysical. Case in point, one of the greatest mathematicians of the XX century, L. E. J. Brouwer, rejected the law of the excluded middle. An example of a superphysical entity whose existence (as opposed to its correctness) cannot be ascertained by means of the physical is hell.

Morality is not metaphysical

Morality is indeed not metaphysical by your definition, for nothing we conceive of can be. It is, however, superphysical by my definition, because, as you said, the morality of any given action cannot be ascertained by means of the physical.

That's not what circular reasoning is, though. Circular reasoning refers to exactly that: reasoning. It happens when argument is made. Axioms, however, aren't arguments. "A is true because B is true, and B is true because A is true" is an argument and is circular.

What I'm trying to say is that if you were to try and justify axioms, you'd inevitably end up with circular reasoning.