I don't know where you are getting this physicalist stuff from.
From your very first reply when I tagged you, as well your posts in the past hinting at the materialist point of view:
Lol. Looks like someone rediscovered Kant. I take some issue with the panpsychism since to me saying that "a rock is an object of consciousness" is different from saying that "a rock HAS consciousness". I take a bigger issue with the idea that knowledge of the thing in itself is possible at all. And maybe they are confusing things or maybe its me who is failing to understand them, but I don't understand how seeing phenomena as conscious agents makes the latter the fundmanetal reality. This seems contradictory to the dualism presented. Also, the multiplicity of conscious agents seems to imply space, which was rejected.
Panpsychism is typically thought of as a form of monism. If you take issue with panpsychism then your alternative choices are dualism, which you've made clear you're not in favor of (in this post below and elsewhere), because you don't think the immaterial exists, and physicalism, which is the most common monist philosophy.
(Though a departure from dualism is definitely a step in the right direction)
This has a plethora of problems:
Firstly, and most importantly, the concepts of wavelength, light and nanometer are themselves phenomenological in nature. You have just replaced the sheer experience of color blue with the experience of looking at numbers on a screen or the concept of a wave which again you mentally derived only after looking at an actual wave. None of this is epistemologically based in the noumena.
The nuomena isn't some idealistic world in the Platonic sense. It's the real world. Everything we (phenomenologically) experience is based on the nuomena. All of our sensory (phenomenal) experiences of it are crude approximations of what's objectively real.
I repeat again, this shallow misunderstanding of what the noumena is must end.
Based on your statement above and some further below, I agree.
Secondly, the absurdity of there being a "true" blue color is laid bare by the question: If wavelength is real and "out there" then what is the wavelength of the true blue color. Is it 451? 463?Then how can the other blues be blue and not different colors entirely?
Blue is just a nominal label. If our sensory experiences were rich enough to distinguish between 450 and 451 nm of color difference and we had the biological apparatus to know (i.e., experience) that difference, then we would probably have about a 10,000 or more words for colors, because we could probably see the entire EM spectrum with that level of granular distinction.
Even if there was an object "blue" in the noumena corresponding to our experience of color blue, (whatever you want to mistakenly consider it, wavelength or light, despite the fact that these objects are still phenomenal), it still doesn't follow that the object "blue" in the noumena has a corresponding absolute
experience of it.
This is true. The state of a thing simply being in the real, objective world does not imply that there must be a corresponding experience to that being or its various states of being. In this regard, we can never truly know the true nature of any other being or what it's like to be anything else in the real world other than what we are: human. We can't know the true nature of a stone pebble, because we'd have to be a stone pebble to experience what it's like to be a stone pebble. But stone pebbles can't experience (themselves or anything), because they don't possess consciousness to any degree. We also can't know the true nature of light emitted at 450 nm, because we're not photons and photons also don't possess the ability to experience themselves or things around them (that we know of).
However, this Nagelian framing of nuomena is not what Kant had initially meant when he referred to the inaccessibility of the nuomena. He simply
defined this as a blanket limitation. To know a thing-in-itself as-is is to experience the thing-in-itself as-is. Kant epistemologically pigeonholed himself out of knowing the true nature of a thing, because he had framed all knowledge as phonemenological experience distinct from his definition of nuomena. The problem that Kant either doesn't state or himself realize is that not all nuomena are the same, just as not all phenomena are the same. The nuomena of godhood, for example, is not the same as the nuomena of doghood. They are in the same category of things-in-themselves, but that's where the similarities begin and end. This is where the nuomena/phenomena distinction has its logical limitations when applied to truth-seeking, and why you can't apply Kantian metaphysics holistically to the study of consciousness. It's unclear if Hoffman realizes this limitation in Kantian ontology, but regardless, he doesn't fully subscribe to Kantian metaphysics, because Hoffman's conscious realism is a non-physical monism, whereas Kant's transcendental idealism remains within a physicalist monist framework.
While you're stating that looking at numbers on a screen about the wavelength of a particular color is a phenomenon (yes, the phenomonon of looking at numbers on a screen JFL), there is knowledge gained about the thing-in-itself without experiencing the thing-in-itself (the wonders of consciousness...). But what does it mean to know the thing-in-itself here when we're speaking of the wavelength band of 450-495? The question itself is absurd and demonstrates why the nuomena-phenomena distinction is not entirely useful in the context of consciousness and experience.
I again reiterate that it is absurd to think of an experience that exists beside a consciousness that could experience it. We could talk about the potentiality of different experiences that are not discovered yet (aliens or evolved species or mosquitoes) but we are only just replacing one type of experience for another.
"Experience" can only be had by conscious agents or entities possessing consciousness, so yes, it is in fact absurd to think of experience that exists beside a consciousness that could experience it. It doesn't make sense to talk about things which can't experience things to experience things. I didn't claim otherwise, so I'm not sure where this confusion is coming from.
We haven't proven that an ultimate experience could even exist for a so called "higher" consciousness to experience it.
But we can - even through
a priori reasoning - prove that higher and lower experiences exist.
Because no matter how "high" we get on this ladder (I think the very concept of there being heirarchies in experiences is stupid) , the experience we see is still just a creation of the mind.
What the fuck is this? Are you fucking kidding me right now?
Are you honestly trying to tell me that a person with Down syndrome, who is also born blind and deaf (holy fuck, talk about
NEVER BEGAN), does NOT have a lower category of experience than a 145 IQ chad with top-tier athlete genetics?
Forget intra-species differences. Are you seriously trying to tell me that a goldfish has the same richness of experience as a human does?
Not even this higher species could prove that they have achieved the metaphysical philosopher's stone of the ultimate experience of our world.
That's only attainable through godhood, if we're being hypothetical. You might experience the ultimate experience of probably a very small set of things (one, maybe two things max), but never possess the totality of experience.
Thirdly,
This is exactly the kind of fanciful thinking that was so thoroughly and rigorously dismantled by 18th century that it forced Kant to come up with this novel idea where he had to make the noumena unknowable by definition and tuck away all knowledge and experience in the realm of mental constructs.
This isn't an argument. Try again, or don't try at all, brocel.
That's not what my alternative meant. There's a subtle difference between "reality reveals itself to us as it is" and "consciousness is everything". The former is closer to physicalism while the latter is not. You got confused between them because they are both kinds of monisms.
But then how do you meaningfully differentiate between the two - "reality reveals itself to us as it is" and "consciousness is everything" - if reality is only revealed phenomenologically through conscious experience, as you're arguing in the defence of the Kantian position?
If everything that is revealed is revealed through conscious experience, then conscious experience itself is the revelation of everything. They effectively become one and the same.
Rejecting the interface does not equate to consciousness is everything. Infact if we say that consciousness is everything then that means interface is all there is that exists. Anyway, I only argued this so you can reject it and see why we cannot have an ultimate experience of reality. Because , since any such claim cannot be proven hence one can posit that we actually are having the ultimate experience right now.
I repeat, I've never claimed that "ultimate experience" is possible by us. In fact all of the examples of experience I gave demonstrate how our experience of reality is severely limited and how we augment our understanding of reality better through technology.
My claim was that true knowledge of reality is attainable. It may or may not be through personal experience, and it certainly is not attainable by us, but the definition of the nuomenal does not exclude the possibility of the attainment of this knowledge - directly or indirectly - by default. You can't simply
define something out of the realm of possible experience when you yourself are but a droplet in the massive ocean of possible experiences.
Yes. This is self explainatory and obvious. And this is indeed my conclusion but with a small correction. I am talking about the absolute true experience not just any random phenomena.
I see.
Ok. Consider this. Let's say there indeed is a perfect experience which exists a priori to any mind or consciousness.
No, sorry. I can't consider that, because I never claimed that such a consideration is possible. But I will entertain your hypothetical nonetheless.
Let's say there's an alien species that claims that it can experience reality for what it truly is. You can always ask them, "How do you know that your experience, the images created by your mind, are indeed equal to fundamental reality"? That those images exist in the noumena itself and your brain has evolved to copy them perfectly.
The problem is, this alien can't do that. He can't prove that his experience is indeed the perfect one. Why? Because all his knowledge, including the knowledge that his experiences are absolute, is derived his own experiences themselves! How can he prove that his experiences are equal to something that exists outside the realm of experience (i.e. the perfect experience coupled with noumena that existed way before the alien consciousness evolved) . Since his knowledge is bound to his own conscious experience of the world. He cannot possibly claim that he has gained knowledge of the perfect noumenal experience since it exists a priori to consciousness, while the alien's knowledge is bound to his own consciousness i.e. his knowledge is a posteriori. And if he can't gain knowledge about the perfect experience then how can he claim that his own experience equals it?
How can a caveman who has zero access to a 1 meter scale ever prove that his axe is indeed 1 meter in length? He cannot. He can either admit that he cannot know ever if his axe is 1 meter since 1 meter scales ,as we know them now, don't exist yet. Or he can redefine the meter to be the length of his axe. Which leads us to the position that reality reveals itself to us humans just as it is. And we indeed are having the perfect absolute experience of reality right fucking now. If this doesn't sound right to you then the only option left is to admit that perfect experience of reality isn't possible
Are you trying to claim that
a priori knowledge is not possible and that the only knowledge possible is
a posteriori?
The key word here is "experience". No matter what level of reality you experience. No matter how much knowledge you gain from it. You are still dealing with only the phenomenal. You can learn knowledge of different experiences in reality but at the end of the day those are mere experiences as well. You have not and never will even scratch the surface of noumena, something that has to be outside experience. Something that can only ever be speculated, (sometimes in very fanciful manner) but never truly known. Since, all knowledge comes from phenomenal experience.
See, it's precisely this kind of statement that your entire positions rests upon that is made with such authoritative vehemence and gusto that it's almost like a peculiar philosophical naivety.
There are many theories and sources of knowledge.
You can't have knowledge or experience of fundamental reality (if you presume such a thing exists). Only speculations.
We can (at least some aspects of it), but not with our human bodies, and certainly not with the current state of our technology.
Again, we have only theorized, hypothesized, and proven what we gained from experience of this world. Nothing more and nothing less. We are still dealing in the phenomena. That's why atoms , non-classical physics, proton rays etc are still part of the video game interface and not the circuitry behind it.
I think you may have lost the plot on the video game analogy. In the video game world atoms and waves don't exist, only underneath it. Electrical signals and the hardware behind the software for the video game world would be analogous to subatomic particles and quantum mechanical systems for our world. For the video game world, our quantum mechanical system (in the real world) would be what's under the hood of the electrical systems and chipsets the software runs on. Whatever is behind/underneath the subatomic particles and quantum mechanical systems governing our real world (i.e., what is beneath our circuit board and chips), we don't know yet.
I agree, my point is that we don't know what the objects that are "out there" even are. We only know things as they appear to us i.e. stars etc. Which indeed are mental constructs. You may mistakenly think that for a star that is "in here" there's a corresponding star that is "out there". But.....
You don't know anything about the object that is "real". You don't know what's out there that is causing the experience of the stars or galaxies or atoms or even your bedroom. Only thing you can say is that something exists that is not mental (again many thinkers even reject this idea) , and that thing is causing projection of objects in your mind which are indeed mental objects.
Calling them approximations is a claim of knowledge you cannot confirm. Basically more fanciful thinking that was dismantled by 18th century.
OK, so when you look up and see the twinkling of a star, what do you see? Suspend, for a moment, our knowledge that this is light from millions of years ago and that we're witnessing the past of the star that may not currently exist in its relative time.
A BMG gun in a video game is not even close to an approximation of electrical signals in a circuit.
So...consciousness is not a particular arrangement of atoms?
Yes, you are misunderstanding me here. I do talk of impossibility of true reality as an experience. And I do think that stars and other phenomenal objects are mental constructs in Kantian context. These statements are not contradictory since there are no stars in the noumena that we know of.
Interesting. And how do you
know that there are no stars in the nuomena?
It is not my fault that you have shown continuos Incapability to grasp the difference between phenomena and noumena.
I never did. Not now, and not when I first read Kant. But your condescension and inaccurate estimation of my understanding is noted.
Or that you continue to make fanciful claims about noumena based on your experiences in the phenomena. In Kantian metaphysics there is definitely "something" in the noumena but if you think that you are going to find equivalents of phenomenal objects like stars you are gravely mistaken.
Someone is indeed gravely mistaken here, brother, but it's not me.
Nuomena is defined as the nature of the thing-in-itself. What thing, you may ask? Things that we have phenomenal experiences of. It's absurd to say that some things in our phenomenal experiences have no nuomenal equivalents, because everything in our phenomenal experiences, by definition, have some true nature of the thing we're experiencing - including stars.
You could, however, cautiously say the converse and be correct. You could say that there may be nuomena, which have no attached phenomenological experiences out in the world, but the problem is that nuomena refers to the physical, real, objective world, and not some abstract and nebulous theoretical world.
The only events that precede one another in "reality" and "nature" are themselves phenomenological objects.
What caused the universe, and is that cause a phenomenon? If it is a phenomenon, then who experienced this phenomenon of the universe's cause? And if you want to say "no one," then why does cause have a special exemption from being a phenomenon?
The "interface" as Hoffman may call it. Hence any experience of causality that may connect them is also a part of the interface itself.
And btw, people irl do come up with different causes for the same phenomena.
Of course. Human knowledge is full of all sorts of theories trying to explain one thing. One of those may be the lucky guess. Or not. Regardless, there is one true cause (or chain of causes) of whatever phenomenon in question.
Causality has 0 ontological grounding other than mental.
If the nuomenal world is the true world as it is, independent of our experiences of it, then whatever (true) causes that exist in the world cannot intrinsically be mental, because the mental, by virtue of the nuomena-phenomena distinction, does not represent the thing-in-itself. Therefore, whatever causes things in the objective world cannot be mental.
You're knocking down your own argument.
If we are talking about the universe as in fundamental reality or being, i.e. the noumena then by definition it rests outside the realm of mental experience (phenomena) and therefore not bound to mental constructs like causality. Therefore it can exist outside of the mind, since it is noumena by definition and also be free from needing any kind of causality.
I'm sorry, brocel, but I you're fucking up big time here.
Something being nuomenal does not exempt it from having causes. Your premise that causality is strictly in the mind doesn't hold from a very basic understanding of science. Gravity is the cause of two objects with mass being attracted and coming closer to one another. This cause is not a mental phenomenon.
Lol no. You've only just restated what was apparent in the two statements. Basically repeating them. Not moving forward.
Yeah, sure, OK. You want to correct me here, then?
Its not "my" premise lol. I'm only arguing from the point of view of Kant or Hoffman. What Kant calls phenomena, what Hoffman calls interface, these are indeed mental objects or more precisely objects of experience created by the mind.
It's the premise you're using. But that's not all you're doing. You're arguing through the lens of your own physicalism and empiricism.
That's fine, whatever. Just be aware of it.
I mean its fine if you disagree with these people. But you are the one who brought up a video of Hoffman saying that the reality we see is an interface. Now you take objection when I basically say the same thing, that the objects we see in this reality are mental constructs. Weird.
I disagree with certain aspects of certain philosophies. As I said, I brought up the video to offer alternative theories of consciousness, because the subject is related to the thread topic of reconstructing your consciousness post-mortem, not because I'm a personal proponent of the philosophy of the person outlining his theory of consciousness.
I'm proponent of no such thing. I'm just a little bit allergic to spiritualistic and mystical horseshit is all.
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So you're an empiricist with a Humean metaphysic who is triggered by anything that he thinks is outside the physicalist purview which enters the realm of the mystical/spiritual. But the idea of a philosopher defining something into existence and re-framing all possible knowledge around this definition is something you're fine with.
OK, great.