ResidentHell
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I was compelled to make this post because the ideas of Geckobus are well-written and elegantly communicated --- Even though much of it includes speculations and jumping to conclusions without a clear, stable line of argument
It seems his understanding on the theory of truth is very limiting. He says “they already have to appeal to some ultimate, perfect standard outside themselves, or their propositions would be meaningless”. But what if they don’t? I could build a logical framework of knowledge based on what is within the range of my senses, and use this framework of mine to derive “truths” about things
Perhaps the axioms of my framework are the “standard outside of myself” that I appeal to. But the axioms of my system of knowledge would be empirically demonstrable. I might “appeal to a standard of perfection”, but this “perfect standard” would be provable. It would be deductive. It would not be based on guesses or inductive reasoning, like Christcuck belief system
IMO Christcuck dogma is all speculation, and I think religious truth can only be acquired by rejecting reason. If he’s so certain of the “truth” about Orthodox Christianity, then perhaps he can explain why it would be better for someone to be an Orthodox Christian instead of a Muslim or Hindu. How does he know that a Jew was murdered two-thousand years ago on behalf of the salvation of humanity?
My argument is not that “truth” doesn’t exist. It’s just that his “truth”, like many other religion followers, does not seem to be a “truth” that is objective. A “truth” that affects him, may not necessarily be the same “truth” that affects me. What is “true” for me, might not be “true” for someone else. What’s “right” for someone else, may not be “right” for me. In short, truth could be relative to some degree. Unless Geckobus can prove objective truth exists, he cannot be sure that his “truth” concerns anything in existence other than himself. His framework for arriving at “truth” pertains to him. Just like the other religion followers, their framework for reaching "truth" pertains to them
Whether someone is “wrong or right” about something, it comes down to methodological framework which was created or/and adopted for arriving at “truths” and “wrongs”. The standard by which someone is “right” or “wrong” about something, belongs to who it belongs. If he’s “wrong” by the standard of my framework, but “right” by the standard of someone else's framework, then that is what it would be. I wouldn’t say “it is true that he is right by the standard of someone else's framework”, as I might not have accepted another person's framework for reaching “truth”. If you reject someone else's framework for reaching truth, you cannot recognize anything as “truth” or “wrong” under their framework
Also he says “if you can just define your own purpose, then anything is valid. The only criterion is that you want it, and therefore it becomes right. Might is right.”. But what if it’s possible for someone to decide their own purpose, but also decide that they don’t want this purpose, even while they’re convinced of the purpose which they decided is theirs? I could say, “I have decided my purpose in life is to be a pilot, but I don’t want to fly planes”. So, if I say my purpose is to be a pilot, do I necessarily need to “want it” to decide that it’s something I’m “meant to do”? Otherwise, why would I necessarily desire something that I decide I was purposed for? Is it not possible for me to reluctantly or resentfully fulfil a purpose that I decided was meant for me, even though I don’t want it? Like if I knew of a way to escape this self-allocated purpose for something else that I’d find more preferable, wouldn’t I?
If a knower were to be immobilized, such that they could not exert any influence or control through objects of knowledge, (e.g., the knower is forced to exist), does the knower necessarily have a choice in order for the knower to be able to know? What if it’s possible for a “knower” to be involuntarily subjected to existential circumstances that are totally outside of their control (e.g., inceldom) --- What choice does the knower have in respect of those existential circumstances?
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zNDw9lO8uKg
Ultimately, a man cannot decide what he has decided. So what allows a man to decide in the first place? What enables man to have the ability of choice? Religion followers will say it was God who decided to make it that way. But who gives God the ability to decide? It would only lead to an infinite regression. The only solution that makes sense, there is a being who either:
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s thought experiments of the “Beetle-In-The-Box” and the “Sensation S” are relevant to this criticism:
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x86hLtOkou8
there is a direct line from amorality to the impossibility of knowledge. No morality = no preferable choices = no choice = no will = no will = no personhood = no knowledge = no argument. If you claim truth does not exist, ditto. You have said nothing since none of your statments are true. Dust in the wind.
It seems his understanding on the theory of truth is very limiting. He says “they already have to appeal to some ultimate, perfect standard outside themselves, or their propositions would be meaningless”. But what if they don’t? I could build a logical framework of knowledge based on what is within the range of my senses, and use this framework of mine to derive “truths” about things
Perhaps the axioms of my framework are the “standard outside of myself” that I appeal to. But the axioms of my system of knowledge would be empirically demonstrable. I might “appeal to a standard of perfection”, but this “perfect standard” would be provable. It would be deductive. It would not be based on guesses or inductive reasoning, like Christcuck belief system
IMO Christcuck dogma is all speculation, and I think religious truth can only be acquired by rejecting reason. If he’s so certain of the “truth” about Orthodox Christianity, then perhaps he can explain why it would be better for someone to be an Orthodox Christian instead of a Muslim or Hindu. How does he know that a Jew was murdered two-thousand years ago on behalf of the salvation of humanity?
My argument is not that “truth” doesn’t exist. It’s just that his “truth”, like many other religion followers, does not seem to be a “truth” that is objective. A “truth” that affects him, may not necessarily be the same “truth” that affects me. What is “true” for me, might not be “true” for someone else. What’s “right” for someone else, may not be “right” for me. In short, truth could be relative to some degree. Unless Geckobus can prove objective truth exists, he cannot be sure that his “truth” concerns anything in existence other than himself. His framework for arriving at “truth” pertains to him. Just like the other religion followers, their framework for reaching "truth" pertains to them
Whether someone is “wrong or right” about something, it comes down to methodological framework which was created or/and adopted for arriving at “truths” and “wrongs”. The standard by which someone is “right” or “wrong” about something, belongs to who it belongs. If he’s “wrong” by the standard of my framework, but “right” by the standard of someone else's framework, then that is what it would be. I wouldn’t say “it is true that he is right by the standard of someone else's framework”, as I might not have accepted another person's framework for reaching “truth”. If you reject someone else's framework for reaching truth, you cannot recognize anything as “truth” or “wrong” under their framework
Also he says “if you can just define your own purpose, then anything is valid. The only criterion is that you want it, and therefore it becomes right. Might is right.”. But what if it’s possible for someone to decide their own purpose, but also decide that they don’t want this purpose, even while they’re convinced of the purpose which they decided is theirs? I could say, “I have decided my purpose in life is to be a pilot, but I don’t want to fly planes”. So, if I say my purpose is to be a pilot, do I necessarily need to “want it” to decide that it’s something I’m “meant to do”? Otherwise, why would I necessarily desire something that I decide I was purposed for? Is it not possible for me to reluctantly or resentfully fulfil a purpose that I decided was meant for me, even though I don’t want it? Like if I knew of a way to escape this self-allocated purpose for something else that I’d find more preferable, wouldn’t I?
How? Is it not possible for a piece of hardware to retain information? Is all hardware cognizant? Maybe by “knowledge”, he meant “consciousness” or “awareness”. Let’s hypothesize something:knowledge requires choices
If a knower were to be immobilized, such that they could not exert any influence or control through objects of knowledge, (e.g., the knower is forced to exist), does the knower necessarily have a choice in order for the knower to be able to know? What if it’s possible for a “knower” to be involuntarily subjected to existential circumstances that are totally outside of their control (e.g., inceldom) --- What choice does the knower have in respect of those existential circumstances?
I cannot say that I’m certain of why I exist. But GeckoBus seems to assume that “free will” and “choice” exist. I’m gonna take a wild guess and say he hasn’t read about the ideas explored in The World as Will and Representation by Arthur Schopenhauer. “A man can choose what he desires. But a man cannot choose to desire what he chooses to desire.”. There is a fundamental limitation in choice; the limitation is that it is non-circular. Choice cannot be applied to itself.if your opponent can not even explain why he exists, as a whole person with free will and choice
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zNDw9lO8uKg
Ultimately, a man cannot decide what he has decided. So what allows a man to decide in the first place? What enables man to have the ability of choice? Religion followers will say it was God who decided to make it that way. But who gives God the ability to decide? It would only lead to an infinite regression. The only solution that makes sense, there is a being who either:
(a) Nothing gave them the ability to make choices. Their ability of choice is timeless and causeless
(b) There was something that had the ability to grant the ability of choice to other beings, but this thing itself did not have the ability of choice. In essence, a spontaneous, random accident took place, which resulted in the existence of beings with the ability of choice. How can someone be certain that no accident occurred that resulted in the existence of a being that’s able to make a choice?
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s thought experiments of the “Beetle-In-The-Box” and the “Sensation S” are relevant to this criticism:
Private language argument - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x86hLtOkou8
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