This actually presents an interesting line of philosophical inquiry. Bear with me as I try to explain this as concisely as I can.
That "free riding" is morally reprehensible has been propounded by some political theorists for decades.
As H.L.A. Hart notes in his reciprocity principle, "When a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when required have a right to a similar submission from those who have benefited by their submission." He concludes that all of us have political obligations to cooperate in a "joint enterprise", i.e. with the state.
The tweet, however, reminds me of
a more recent work by Candice Delmas. Delmas takes Hart's argument further, and not only argues that "justice" requires a "duty of fair play", but that such a duty entails political obligations for participants in unjust schemes. Per her argument,
1. Fairness prohibits free riding.
2. Fairness does not require cooperating with an unfair and unjust scheme of coordination.
3. Benefiting from an unfair and unjust scheme involves the same kinds of wrongs that make free riding reprehensible.
4. Therefore, fairness prohibits benefiting from unfair and unjust schemes
Delmas concludes by suggesting that all individuals, including those who benefit unwillingly and unknowingly, have the political obligation to resist an unjust scheme.
If we apply Delmas' "duty of fair play" argument to feminist theory and critical theory (i.e. the tweet), all men (including nonviolent, "good" men) are free-riding off the "scheme" of "violent men". This also means that nonviolent, "good" men have the moral obligation to resist "violent men".
Now, of course, I have personal reservations about any theory of justice which engenders political obligations over my participation in a scheme in which I benefit unwillingly and unknowingly. The best counterargument to the "duty of fair play" would be Robert Nozick's radio station example in his book
Anarchy, State, and Utopia; taken to the extremes, Nozick concludes that "the [duty] of fair play would allow others to place us under an obligation to them simply by conferring benefits on us". Another argument against such a duty is advanced by
Wellman and Simmons, who makes the moral distinction between someone who is
receiving benefits, and one who is
accepting benefits; a case involving the mere
reception of
non-excludable goods does not necessarily generate "a duty of fair play".
It would seem that the tweet is an implicit endorsement of Hart and Delmas' argument. And based on Nozick's as well as Wellman and Simmons' points, I don't think that I face political obligations over my involuntary participation of a scheme (if indeed we accept the existence of such a scheme) by "violent men" (i.e. low inhib Chads and Tyrones).
I will have to conclude that even if I (as a nonviolent high-inhib subhuman male) did benefit from the actions of violent men, I have no moral obligation to resist (nor any moral culpability of) the actions of violent men.
OP what do you think? Also tagging highIQcels
@BlkPillPres @Anonymous MG @ChinaCurry