...Suggestive evidence indicates that individuals who are low in self-esteem, moderately depressed, or both are more balanced in self-perceptions (see Coyne & Gotlieb, 1983 ; Ruehlman, West, & Pasahow, 1985 ; Watson & Clark, 1984 , for reviews). These individuals tend to (a) recall positive and negative self-relevant information with equal frequency (e.g., Kuiper & Derry, 1982 ; Kuiper & MacDonald, 1982 ), (b) show greater evenhandedness in their attributions of responsibility for valenced outcomes (e.g., Campbell & Fairey, 1985 ; Kuiper, 1978 ; Rizley, 1978 ), (c) display greater congruence between self-evaluations and
http://spider.apa.org/ftdocs/bul/1988/march/bul1032193.html (5 of 33) [9/26/2001 12:09:56 PM]evaluations of others (e.g., Brown, 1986 ), and (d) offer self-appraisals that coincide more closely with appraisals by objective observers (e.g., Lewinsohn et al., 1980 ). In short, it appears to be not the well-adjusted individual but the individual who experiences subjective distress who is more likely to process self-relevant information in a relatively unbiased and balanced fashion. These findings are inconsistent with the notion that realistic and evenhanded perceptions of self are characteristic of mental health.
...Mildly and severely depressed individuals appear to be less vulnerable to the illusion of control ( Abramson & Alloy, 1981 ; Golin, Terrell, & Johnson, 1977 ; Golin, Terrell, Weitz, & Drost, 1979 ; M. S. Greenberg & Alloy, in press ). When skill cues are introduced into a chance-related task or when outcomes occur as predicted, depressed individuals provide more accurate estimates of their degree of personal control than do nondepressed people. Similarly, relative to nondepressed people, those in whom a negative mood has been induced show more realistic perceptions of personal control ( Alloy, Abramson, & Viscusi, 1981 ; see also Shrauger & Terbovic, 1976 ). This is not to suggest that depressed people or those in whom a negative mood has been induced are always more accurate than nondepressed subjects in their estimates of personal control (e.g., Abramson, Alloy, & Rosoff, 1981 ; Benassi & Mahler, 1985 ) but that the preponderance of evidence lies in this direction. Realistic perceptions of personal control thus appear to be more characteristic of individuals in a depressed affective state than individuals in a nondepressed affective state.
...Optimism pervades people's thinking about the future ( Tiger, 1979 ). Research suggests that most people believe that the present is better than the past and that the future will be even better ( Brickman, Coates, & Janoff-Bulman, 1978 ). Questionnaires that survey Americans about the future have found the majority to be hopeful and confident that things can only improve ( Free & Cantril, 1968 ). When asked what they thought was possible for them in the future, college students reported more than four times as many positive as negative possibilities ( Markus & Nurius, 1986 ).
...Other evidence also suggests that individuals hold unrealistically positive views of the future. Over a wide variety of tasks, subjects' predictions of what will occur correspond closely to what they would like to see happen or to what is socially desirable rather than to what is objectively likely ( Cantril, 1938 ; Lund, 1975 ; McGuire, 1960 ; Pruitt & Hoge, 1965 ; Sherman, 1980 ).
