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[Opinion] "Free Will" Does Not Exist. The "Will" is Already Constrained by its connection to Several Preconditions

ResidentHell

ResidentHell

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“Free will”, is the supposed power or capacity of humans to make decisions or perform actions, independently of any prior event or state of the universe

Four reasons why free will doesn’t exist:

1. Biological fatalism - The human is hardwired to survive and reproduce. The will of humans is automatically constrained by this biological predisposition to some degree​

2. Genetic and environmental determinism – The life experiences of two organisms of the same species can vary depending on their genetic traits, morphological characteristics (e.g., biological sex, sexual dimorphism, facial and body bone structure, health condition of internal organs), and whether they have certain genetic or neurological disorders. Environmental and evolutionary factors can also influence life experiences of an organism, e.g., some “incels” today wouldn’t have been incels if they were born in a different country or different era, where society was less gynocentric, or where safe birth control & welfare state didn’t exist​

3. Free will theorem (Conway and Cohen, 2006) – If humans have free will, then so must some elementary particles. This doesn’t necessarily challenge the existence of free will. It only proves that other physical substances must have free will if humans have free will, which can easily come across as absurd when you consider these other physical substances can be microscopic​
4. The will is necessarily constrained by having a previous knowledge of something – It Is impossible to desire something that you do not know about; you cannot want something if you don’t know what it is. You must first discover the thing that can be desired, and only after you discover it, then the desire is trigged and directed at the thing which one can desire. The existence of a will depends on a prior knowledge of existence. You cannot want something that you haven’t discovered in thought or in the external world. This also implies the “will” can be steered or swayed by some other entity who has the power to selectively reveal or hide internal or external data from the subject that experiences this “will”​

A “free will” apologetic might counter-argue with the suggestion, “If free will doesn’t exist, why don’t you do X, or why don’t you do Y?”. But this is a misnomer, because a response to this statement wouldn’t support the anti-thesis that “free will” exists. The key aspect of the concept of “free will” is that it has to do with FREEDOM. If the “will” is constrained, it means “free will” cannot exist. As already stated, the “will” of humans is constrained by biological predisposition, which includes the “will” to SURVIVE (i.e., not trying to commit suicide, not trying to create hazards to physical health). If anything, I think committing suicide is an indicator of “free will”; I believe people who commit suicide are more likely to have a “free will”, than people who instead hold onto life

The issue is that some people seem to have “will” mixed up with “predisposition”. It seems what they don’t realize, is that some “decisions” are not “made”; it’s about the cognitive process that is required to reach a decision, which seems to rely on the neural network of the human brain. For example, if a male exits their apartment and says, “I want to breed a woman by the end of today”, this “decision” already exists as a possibility. It is already a possibility for men and women to breed, and it’s already a part of the biological program for men and women to breed. Therefore the “decision to breed” itself is not crafted as a product that is independent of the event or process by which it is discovered; it’s only admitted as a consequence of a specific thought process as regarding the man having a previous knowledge of its biological capacities and its biological predisposition (to breed or survive)

The male is already hardwired to breed due to biological programming. So if a male desires sex, it’s likely just his brain tricking him into fulfilling its biological function while under the hallucination that it is his own independent “will” to breed. If the man were to be dehumanized in some way, (e.g., castrated, transformed into a full cyborg and his brain is the only organic matter that remains), how can the man be sure his “will to breed” was truly a “free will”, if he cannot retain this “will” under drastically different conditions of his bodily or worldly existence? It’s very improbable that he will, since he would no longer be human, and most non-human creatures do not appear to express any particular desire to breed humans

IMO most humans are not agents; they either have no “will”, or they have a “will” but it’s heavily constrained by biological, societal and environmental factors. Their mentalities, their beliefs and their desires are shaped and confined by the cultures and environment in which they are socialized. At best, a very small minority of humans have something that can be described as matching the idea of an “unconstrained will”

TLDR: Free will practically doesn't exist. Most humans either have a "will" that's constrained, or they have no "will" at all (they are organic NPCs)
 
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I respectfully disagree. Just because the will is constrained within a particular light-cone of potential possibility doesn't mean it is not free within that window of constraint. Consciousness and life itself would not exist without constraints governing self-organization over thermodynamic processes. The complexity of life requires a balance between chaotic entropy and self-organization.
 
Just because the will is constrained within a particular light-cone of potential possibility doesn't mean it is not free within that window of constraint
My original point stands. I cited the definition of "free will" at the first sentence of OP, "...to make decisions or perform actions, independently of any prior state of the universe". As already explained, there are several preliminary factors that constrain the "will". Therefore, "free will" as defined in OP, doesn't exist

Consciousness and life itself would not exist without constraints governing self-organization over thermodynamic processes. The complexity of life requires a balance between chaotic entropy and self-organization.
Prove that consciousness wouldn't exist without "constraints governing self-organization over thermodynamic process". Maybe you could explain what kind of "constraints" govern "self-organization" over "thermodynamic processes"?

I'm not sure what you mean by "the complexity of life". But if I assume it "requires a balance between chaotic entropy and self-organization", maybe you could provide an explanation of why life cannot be "complex" without this balance between entropy and self-organization

Also my 3rd point, the free will theorem by Conway and Cohen: "If humans have free will, then so do some elementary particles". Now I'll say, "elementary particles are just as conscious as humans. Therefore, elementary particles are just as capable of moral and ethical reasoning as humans". If you deny this, it would imply your views are bigoted
 
Why is thy profile private, I intended to read more of your work.

1710275413421945
 
The reason your "free will" doesn't exist is due to its definition. If you define freedom in a classical Christian sense, then freedom is the flourishing of a thing into what it was designed to be. So, a human is most free when it doesn't sin, because humans were made not to sin (according to the Christians). A seed is "free" if it can develop into a flower.

Of course we aren't free according to yourr stat definition. If free will is "supposed power or capacity of humans to make decisions or perform actions, independently of any prior event oe of the universe," then of course it can't exist, since all of us are embedded in a socio-historical and linguistic moment within time. This means that we can only imagine what our language and culture allows us to imagine. So, given your definition, we aren't "free."

Also, suicide is a rational choice for a subject that perceives it that way. So, given your definition of free will, even the choice to commit suicide is predetermined by biological, social, physiological structures in the brain that make a subject depressed/suicidal.

I think it follows trivially that we don't have free will in your definition. The way these debates go (determinism/freedom, etc.) is very much influenced by how you define the most basic terms. So, while I think we have free will, I don't subscribe to your definition of it.
 
then it was my destiny to say
nigger
 
The reason your "free will" doesn't exist is due to its definition. If you define freedom in a classical Christian sense, then freedom is the flourishing of a thing into what it was designed to be. So, a human is most free when it doesn't sin, because humans were made not to sin (according to the Christians). A seed is "free" if it can develop into a flower.

Of course we aren't free according to yourr stat definition. If free will is "supposed power or capacity of humans to make decisions or perform actions, independently of any prior event oe of the universe," then of course it can't exist, since all of us are embedded in a socio-historical and linguistic moment within time. This means that we can only imagine what our language and culture allows us to imagine. So, given your definition, we aren't "free."

Also, suicide is a rational choice for a subject that perceives it that way. So, given your definition of free will, even the choice to commit suicide is predetermined by biological, social, physiological structures in the brain that make a subject depressed/suicidal.

I think it follows trivially that we don't have free will in your definition. The way these debates go (determinism/freedom, etc.) is very much influenced by how you define the most basic terms. So, while I think we have free will, I don't subscribe to your definition of it.
Fair enough, although I did not make up this definition of “free will”. It was the definition that I found on Encyclopedia Britannica

Why is thy profile private, I intended to read more of your work.
I have unprivatized it now
 
A free will thread. In a philosophy forum? Of course.

Fuck. Alright, let's get on with this.

“Free will”, is the supposed power or capacity of humans to make decisions or perform actions, independently of any prior event or state of the universe
OK.

Four reasons why free will doesn’t exist:

1. Biological fatalism - The human is hardwired to survive and reproduce. The will of humans is automatically constrained by this biological predisposition to some degree​
If the will is constrained by this biological predisposition, then it implies that the biological state of the human is a constant i.e., the hardwiring to survive and reproduce does not change from human to human. If that is true, then it would mean that no humans act in a way that is dictated by this predisposition. But since we do know that some humans act in ways that are not in accordance with their biological predispositions, such as suicides, volitional castrations, and intentional use of contraceptives, then those humans are acting in ways that demonstrate that their will is not constrained by their biological predispositions. And since their will would not be constrained, then, by the definition provided, some humans who act in ways that are not in accordance with their biological predispositions possess free will that they exercise.

2. Genetic and environmental determinism – The life experiences of two organisms of the same species can vary depending on their genetic traits, morphological characteristics (e.g., biological sex, sexual dimorphism, facial and body bone structure, health condition of internal organs), and whether they have certain genetic or neurological disorders. Environmental and evolutionary factors can also influence life experiences of an organism, e.g., some “incels” today wouldn’t have been incels if they were born in a different country or different era, where society was less gynocentric, or where safe birth control & welfare state didn’t exist​
Most traditional conceptualizations of free will argue that biological/environmental circumstances simply affect the set of choices available to the agent. Being born in 1000 B.C.E. means that I can't exercise free will to use a computer, but because it true that computers didn't exist back then, that does not negate or invalidate free will. That limitation of choices available is does not impede or hamstring any underlying mechanism that would allow for free will to function.

3. Free will theorem (Conway and Cohen, 2006) – If humans have free will, then so must some elementary particles. This doesn’t necessarily challenge the existence of free will. It only proves that other physical substances must have free will if humans have free will, which can easily come across as absurd when you consider these other physical substances can be microscopic​
It's possible that free will is emergent i.e., a sufficiently complex number and configuration of elementary particles gives rise to the mechanism we understand and experience as free will. New mechanisms form with other sufficiently large enough and complex collection of particles e.g., life itself, so I don't see why free will, as a mechanism, can be excluded on the same basis.

4. The will is necessarily constrained by having a previous knowledge of something – It Is impossible to desire something that you do not know about; you cannot want something if you don’t know what it is. You must first discover the thing that can be desired, and only after you discover it, then the desire is trigged and directed at the thing which one can desire. The existence of a will depends on a prior knowledge of existence. You cannot want something that you haven’t discovered in thought or in the external world. This also implies the “will” can be steered or swayed by some other entity who has the power to selectively reveal or hide internal or external data from the subject that experiences this “will”​
No, it simply means that the choice of the previously-unknown is not included in the set of possible choices from which to freely choose. It is merely added when discovered.

A “free will” apologetic might counter-argue with the suggestion, “If free will doesn’t exist, why don’t you do X, or why don’t you do Y?”. But this is a misnomer, because a response to this statement wouldn’t support the anti-thesis that “free will” exists. The key aspect of the concept of “free will” is that it has to do with FREEDOM. If the “will” is constrained, it means “free will” cannot exist. As already stated, the “will” of humans is constrained by biological predisposition, which includes the “will” to SURVIVE (i.e., not trying to commit suicide, not trying to create hazards to physical health). If anything, I think committing suicide is an indicator of “free will”; I believe people who commit suicide are more likely to have a “free will”, than people who instead hold onto life
Constraining will that is free is different from removing that will altogether.

IMO most humans are not agents; they either have no “will”, or they have a “will” but it’s heavily constrained by biological, societal and environmental factors. Their mentalities, their beliefs and their desires are shaped and confined by the cultures and environment in which they are socialized. At best, a very small minority of humans have something that can be described as matching the idea of an “unconstrained will”

TLDR: Free will practically doesn't exist. Most humans either have a "will" that's constrained, or they have no "will" at all (they are organic NPCs)
Here, you're conceding the point that free will is possible, albeit in a limited and constrained fashion. Further still, you're open to this idea of "unconstrained will," which appears to be some version of free will that you acknowledge.

Free will in reality can be analogous to free will in society. You're free to do as you please, as long as you don't break the nation's laws. You're free to do as you please, as long as you don't break reality's laws (causality etc.). Of course, it's not possible to break any of the physical laws, so whatever free will may be, it has to be something that supervenes on physical laws.
 
Braincels understand that free will and determinism is a false dichotomy.


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y2eOtzEB8D8

He begs the question when he says that nature has a will and what it wills is what it determines, since nature is deterministic. Physics tells us that the universe is probabilistic at the micro scale. If it's probabilistic, then it's unpredictable. If it's unpredictable, then it's future states are indeterminate, hence it cannot be determined.
 
“Free will”, is the supposed power or capacity of humans to make decisions or perform actions, independently of any prior event or state of the universe

Four reasons why free will doesn’t exist:

1. Biological fatalism - The human is hardwired to survive and reproduce. The will of humans is automatically constrained by this biological predisposition to some degree​

2. Genetic and environmental determinism – The life experiences of two organisms of the same species can vary depending on their genetic traits, morphological characteristics (e.g., biological sex, sexual dimorphism, facial and body bone structure, health condition of internal organs), and whether they have certain genetic or neurological disorders. Environmental and evolutionary factors can also influence life experiences of an organism, e.g., some “incels” today wouldn’t have been incels if they were born in a different country or different era, where society was less gynocentric, or where safe birth control & welfare state didn’t exist​

3. Free will theorem (Conway and Cohen, 2006) – If humans have free will, then so must some elementary particles. This doesn’t necessarily challenge the existence of free will. It only proves that other physical substances must have free will if humans have free will, which can easily come across as absurd when you consider these other physical substances can be microscopic​
4. The will is necessarily constrained by having a previous knowledge of something – It Is impossible to desire something that you do not know about; you cannot want something if you don’t know what it is. You must first discover the thing that can be desired, and only after you discover it, then the desire is trigged and directed at the thing which one can desire. The existence of a will depends on a prior knowledge of existence. You cannot want something that you haven’t discovered in thought or in the external world. This also implies the “will” can be steered or swayed by some other entity who has the power to selectively reveal or hide internal or external data from the subject that experiences this “will”​

A “free will” apologetic might counter-argue with the suggestion, “If free will doesn’t exist, why don’t you do X, or why don’t you do Y?”. But this is a misnomer, because a response to this statement wouldn’t support the anti-thesis that “free will” exists. The key aspect of the concept of “free will” is that it has to do with FREEDOM. If the “will” is constrained, it means “free will” cannot exist. As already stated, the “will” of humans is constrained by biological predisposition, which includes the “will” to SURVIVE (i.e., not trying to commit suicide, not trying to create hazards to physical health). If anything, I think committing suicide is an indicator of “free will”; I believe people who commit suicide are more likely to have a “free will”, than people who instead hold onto life

The issue is that some people seem to have “will” mixed up with “predisposition”. It seems what they don’t realize, is that some “decisions” are not “made”; it’s about the cognitive process that is required to reach a decision, which seems to rely on the neural network of the human brain. For example, if a male exits their apartment and says, “I want to breed a woman by the end of today”, this “decision” already exists as a possibility. It is already a possibility for men and women to breed, and it’s already a part of the biological program for men and women to breed. Therefore the “decision to breed” itself is not crafted as a product that is independent of the event or process by which it is discovered; it’s only admitted as a consequence of a specific thought process as regarding the man having a previous knowledge of its biological capacities and its biological predisposition (to breed or survive)

The male is already hardwired to breed due to biological programming. So if a male desires sex, it’s likely just his brain tricking him into fulfilling its biological function while under the hallucination that it is his own independent “will” to breed. If the man were to be dehumanized in some way, (e.g., castrated, transformed into a full cyborg and his brain is the only organic matter that remains), how can the man be sure his “will to breed” was truly a “free will”, if he cannot retain this “will” under drastically different conditions of his bodily or worldly existence? It’s very improbable that he will, since he would no longer be human, and most non-human creatures do not appear to express any particular desire to breed humans

IMO most humans are not agents; they either have no “will”, or they have a “will” but it’s heavily constrained by biological, societal and environmental factors. Their mentalities, their beliefs and their desires are shaped and confined by the cultures and environment in which they are socialized. At best, a very small minority of humans have something that can be described as matching the idea of an “unconstrained will”

TLDR: Free will practically doesn't exist. Most humans either have a "will" that's constrained, or they have no "will" at all (they are organic NPCs)
Great post
 
Consciousness would not exist if it had no causal effect upon reality.
 
the choice of the previously-unknown is not included in the set of possible choices from which to freely choose. It is merely added when discovered.
How can a will be “free” when all the potential options that it can access is restricted due to a prior unknown of a certain set of choices that would “merely be added when discovered”? This doesn’t change the point. The will is constrained by the prerequisite of knowledge of something. Therefore the “will” is subject to control or manipulation by a third party that has the ability to spontaneously hide or reveal information to the being that has this “will”

Constraining will that is free is different from removing that will altogether.
If the will is constrained, it means the existence of “free will” would be counter-intuitive. There would be a being that has a “free will”, but the capacity for this “will” to be exercised would be suppressed by a limitation in the number of available or known possible choices, or / and it would be manipulatable by a separate third party that has the power to control or suppress the accessibility of information to this being

If the “will” exists, is there a way to prove that the case isn’t similar to Descartes’ evil demon, i.e., an external party that “downloads” information into your brain as they see fit, and consequentially influences your decisions via your interpretation of the current state of information (known to you) which they’ve allowed you to have access to? How can you be sure that you know what you know because of independent inquiry by mere curiosity, and not because a mysterious person in the background set up a sophisticated plan in advance to influence your mental development, by selectively hiding information from your senses, and allowing you to only have access information that they were OK with allowing you to access?

Here, you're conceding the point that free will is possible, albeit in a limited and constrained fashion. Further still, you're open to this idea of "unconstrained will," which appears to be some version of free will that you acknowledge.

Free will in reality can be analogous to free will in society. You're free to do as you please, as long as you don't break the nation's laws. You're free to do as you please, as long as you don't break reality's laws (causality etc.). Of course, it's not possible to break any of the physical laws, so whatever free will may be, it has to be something that supervenes on physical laws.
Yes, I think there can be something similar to “free will”. I also think that people who have something close to an “unconstrained will” tend to be divergent thinkers, dissenters or voluntarily neurodivergent (i.e., they’re not normies, usually, and if they are, they don't share the same opinions as the consensus). They also tend to be at higher risk of becoming social outcasts than people who have a more “constrained will”, like normie androids
 
How can a will be “free” when all the potential options that it can access is restricted due to a prior unknown of a certain set of choices that would “merely be added when discovered”? This doesn’t change the point. The will is constrained by the prerequisite of knowledge of something. Therefore the “will” is subject to control or manipulation by a third party that has the ability to spontaneously hide or reveal information to the being that has this “will”
Limiting your options to choose from is not itself a limitation on your ability to make choices (freely). The mechanism itself is separate from the way in which it is able to function.

If the will is constrained, it means the existence of “free will” would be counter-intuitive. There would be a being that has a “free will”, but the capacity for this “will” to be exercised would be suppressed by a limitation in the number of available or known possible choices, or / and it would be manipulatable by a separate third party that has the power to control or suppress the accessibility of information to this being
You can think of it like the muscles in your body. I can tie you down and prevent your limbs from moving, but you're still able to exercise movement in your limbs and struggle, albeit to no real effect.

If the “will” exists, is there a way to prove that the case isn’t similar to Descartes’ evil demon, i.e., an external party that “downloads” information into your brain as they see fit, and consequentially influences your decisions via your interpretation of the current state of information (known to you) which they’ve allowed you to have access to? How can you be sure that you know what you know because of independent inquiry by mere curiosity, and not because a mysterious person in the background set up a sophisticated plan in advance to influence your mental development, by selectively hiding information from your senses, and allowing you to only have access information that they were OK with allowing you to access?
It wouldn't matter. This mysterious person/demon/whatever hidden force is only influencing the choices and their availability, as well as the circumstances surrounding them, not intervening and preventing my ability to choose of my own will. Even in the case where they were to directly intervene, there is nothing fundamentally stopping my own will to choose, short of them controlling my mind.

Yes, I think there can be something similar to “free will”. I also think that people who have something close to an “unconstrained will” tend to be divergent thinkers, dissenters or voluntarily neurodivergent (i.e., they’re not normies, usually, and if they are, they don't share the same opinions as the consensus). They also tend to be at higher risk of becoming social outcasts than people who have a more “constrained will”, like normie androids
I hold that free will (as a metaphysical mechanism) is an intrinsic property of all humans. That is, all human agents, by virtue of being human, possess this mechanism.
 
Free will believers are brainlets
 
Limiting your options to choose from is not itself a limitation on your ability to make choices (freely). The mechanism itself is separate from the way in which it is able to function.


You can think of it like the muscles in your body. I can tie you down and prevent your limbs from moving, but you're still able to exercise movement in your limbs and struggle, albeit to no real effect.


It wouldn't matter. This mysterious person/demon/whatever hidden force is only influencing the choices and their availability, as well as the circumstances surrounding them, not intervening and preventing my ability to choose of my own will. Even in the case where they were to directly intervene, there is nothing fundamentally stopping my own will to choose, short of them controlling my mind.


I hold that free will (as a metaphysical mechanism) is an intrinsic property of all humans. That is, all human agents, by virtue of being human, possess this mechanism.
I agree that “will” is not necessarily restricted by the number of available choices. But it’s possible that all your “choices” have been predetermined by the fact that only ≤n “choices” were knowable in every occasion when n+1 “choices” were available, simply because only ≤n “choices” were known

For some example, if you had the “choice” to eat either cereal or eggs for breakfast, and you chose cereal, maybe it was a situation that eating eggs was impossible. But you would never be able to discover that it was an impossible choice to eat the egg since you only chose to eat the cereal

But suppose you ate cereal and egg for breakfast, then maybe it was the case that eating something other than cereal and egg (e.g., beans) was impossible. But you would never be able to discover that it was impossible to want to eat something other than cereal and eggs, since you wanted to eat only cereal and egg. There are many other things that can be eaten besides cereal or eggs

I will generalize this example for simplicity: If it is always possible to have n+1 “available options”, then you cannot be sure that it was possible for you to want all of the n+1 “available options” in that instance where you had the supposed “opportunity” to choose between n+1 “available options”, when only ≤n “options” were ultimately known

If it turns out that only ≤n options out of the n+1 “available options” could possibly be known, then it could be that you had the ability to want or choose only ≤n options in every instance where n+1 options were available, as you would have not been able to know the extra +1 option before it could become possible for you to want or choose that extra +1 option

Plus the inconceivability of options doesn’t necessarily rule out the availability of options. Back to the breakfast example, it’s possible that there was a mysterious food stored in your kitchen cupboard when you had the opportunity to choose what to eat for breakfast. But since you did not know of this mysterious food, it was impossible for you to want it, even though it was possible for you to have later discovered it (by accident) and ultimately wanted it for breakfast (after the discovery of said mysterious food)

So it leads to a question: if it is impossible for you to knowingly want every option in a list of available options that are possibly endless, then can the will truly be “free” if it is the case that only ≤n “options” could be wanted in a situation where n+1 “options” were available?

If the will is free, then it should be possible to “want” any option that is made "available" to it. But if there are certain “options” that it could not possibly want due to the inconceivability of the options despite its concurrent availability, then it is a clear indicator that the “will” is restricted by imagination or knowledge

In other words, only what is known can be wanted. If the will was truly free, it should be able to want things beyond imagination, it should be able to want things that could not possibly be known or discovered. But the will can only be projected onto what is discovered, not what is undiscovered, even if there are more available options than the number of options that are known. You cannot exercise your ability to want something that you do not know exists, even though it would still be an “available option” to choose (via accidental or sudden discovery). Therefore the will is restricted by knowledge or imagination; the will is confined to what is known
 
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I agree that “will” is not necessarily restricted by the number of available choices. But it’s possible that all your “choices” have been predetermined by the fact that only ≤n “choices” were knowable in every occasion when n+1 “choices” were available, simply because only ≤n “choices” were known

For some example, if you had the “choice” to eat either cereal or eggs for breakfast, and you chose cereal, maybe it was a situation that eating eggs was impossible. But you would never be able to discover that it was an impossible choice to eat the egg since you only chose to eat the cereal

But suppose you ate cereal and egg for breakfast, then maybe it was the case that eating something other than cereal and egg (e.g., beans) was impossible. But you would never be able to discover that it was impossible to want to eat something other than cereal and eggs, since you wanted to eat only cereal and egg. There are many other things that can be eaten besides cereal or eggs

I will generalize this example for simplicity: If it is always possible to have n+1 “available options”, then you cannot be sure that it was possible for you to want all of the n+1 “available options” in that instance where you had the supposed “opportunity” to choose between n+1 “available options”, when only ≤n “options” were ultimately known

If it turns out that only ≤n options out of the n+1 “available options” could possibly be known, then it could be that you had the ability to want or choose only ≤n options in every instance where n+1 options were available, as you would have not been able to know the extra +1 option before it could become possible for you to want or choose that extra +1 option

Plus the inconceivability of options doesn’t necessarily rule out the availability of options. Back to the breakfast example, it’s possible that there was a mysterious food stored in your kitchen cupboard when you had the opportunity to choose what to eat for breakfast. But since you did not know of this mysterious food, it was impossible for you to want it, even though it was possible for you to have later discovered it (by accident) and ultimately wanted it for breakfast (after the discovery of said mysterious food)

So it leads to a question: if it is impossible for you to knowingly want every option in a list of available options that are possibly endless, then can the will truly be “free” if it is the case that only ≤n “options” could be wanted in a situation where n+1 “options” were available?

If the will is free, then it should be possible to “want” any option that is made "available" to it. But if there are certain “options” that it could not possibly want due to the inconceivability of the options despite its concurrent availability, then it is a clear indicator that the “will” is restricted by imagination or knowledge

In other words, only what is known can be wanted. If the will was truly free, it should be able to want things beyond imagination, it should be able to want things that could not possibly be known or discovered. But the will can only be projected onto what is discovered, not what is undiscovered, even if there are more available options than the number of options that are known. You cannot exercise your ability to want something that you do not know exists, even though it would still be an “available option” to choose (via accidental or sudden discovery). Therefore the will is restricted by knowledge or imagination; the will is confined to what is known
I don't understand why you want to necessitate the availability of all possible choices in its entirety, before you would disregard the predetermination of choice as a phenomenon. I think it's a fundamental error to say that if, for example, the choices were reduced from 100 to 2, then this would somehow be "predetermining the choice." I'm certainly pigeonholing your choices, but I'm not doing anything inhibitory to your conscious free will (like drugging you, for example).

There's also the issue that "desire to choose option x" having no knowledge of x's existence as a choice, and hence not having the desire for x in the first place, is an intrinsic limit on free will. Desire is a function of free will, not a condition for it. I could desire none of the possible choices that, either I have available to me or have been made available to me (this distinction, I think, is fundamentally irrelevant), for a given decision, yet still be fully free in choosing any one of them. Why introduce the variable of desire?
 
I think it's a fundamental error to say that if, for example, the choices were reduced from 100 to 2, then this would somehow be "predetermining the choice." I'm certainly pigeonholing your choices, but I'm not doing anything inhibitory to your conscious free will (like drugging you, for example).
That’s why I said it’s possible that you may accidentally discover additional choices (e.g., the mysterious food in your kitchen cupboard). It is predetermining the number of options that can be knowingly chosen. It is not necessarily predetermining the number of choices that can be sought or discovered, whether intentionally or by accident

There's also the issue that "desire to choose option x" having no knowledge of x's existence as a choice, and hence not having the desire for x in the first place, is an intrinsic limit on free will. Desire is a function of free will, not a condition for it
You quote, “desire is a function of free will”. By function of free will, I assume you mean “free will” is the variable of the function, and desire is the output of the function if “free will” as its argument. By definition, free will means “the ability & total freedom to make choices”, and desire means “to want”. So desire is a function of the ability & freedom to make choices. This seems reasonable

However this doesn’t mean the function of free will is the only function that can produce desire. The function of a constrained will can also produce desire - The only difference would be that the total amount of options that could possibly be desired at any time would be automatically restricted. This would not be the case if desire were to be a function of a free will

I could desire none of the possible choices that, either I have available to me or have been made available to me (this distinction, I think, is fundamentally irrelevant), for a given decision, yet still be fully free in choosing any one of them. Why introduce the variable of desire?
If an option is known, it is a desirable option. But an option that is desirable doesn’t necessarily have to be the option that is ultimately chosen

Case 1 - An "Accidental" Choice is not necessarily a "Free" Choice:

A chooser cannot knowingly choose an option that is not desired at all, unless the chooser was forced to make that choice by a third party, which would correspond to a will that is constrained or controlled by external forces. Thus any option that is chosen by accident would not necessarily be an option that was initially desired to be chosen

If you did choose to eat beans for breakfast, it doesn’t have to be a deliberate choice. It’s possible that the cereal you thought you chose for breakfast actually had beans in it, but you didn’t realise this until after you poured what you thought was a box of cereal into a bowl of milk. Then you ate what you thought was the cereal, and it turns out there were some beans in it, and you would only make this discovery after consuming what you initially thought was only cereal in a bowl of milk. Thus, you accidentally chose the beans for breakfast while under the impression that it was cereal; you wanted the cereal, but accidentally chose the beans under the impression that it was cereal

If you choose an option that you did not want, it would be the result of an accidental discovery (e.g., discovering that the box of cereal actually had beans in it). An option that is selected by accident does not amount to a freely-made choice, as the chooser would not have total awareness over the consequence of their actions in the process of choosing this option by accident, hence the accidental

An accidental choice can also be made via a constrained will as long as the number of known choices is less than the number of possible choices. So the choice that is made by accident, can be a choice that was made within the boundaries of what was known (and wanted) at the time of the choice-making process. Otherwise no choices would have been made by “accident”


Case 2 - How can you be sure that all availablw "options" besides the one that you select, were actually "choosable"?
If you are “free” to choose any option in a situation where you desire none of the options that are available, how can you be certain of this?

That’s why it was mentioned in the breakfast example, the extra option for breakfast that wasn’t chosen might have never been "choosable" in the first place. But you wouldn’t be able to prove otherwise since an attempt was not made to choose that extra option. This is similar to the classical argument from ignorance – I could say it was impossible (or may have been impossible) for you to choose apples for breakfast instead of cereal, egg or beans, and you wouldn’t be able to prove it was possible to choose apples for breakfast since you ultimately never selected apples for breakfast

If you cannot prove that X is false, then by ad ignorantiam it wouldn’t be provably false if I said “X is true” or “X might be true”. This type of argument is often used by kike worshippers to justify the existence of their central “divine” figurehead or whatever. This type of argument is also considered to be logically fallacious because it doesn’t deduce the “truth” of the statement that was made by the asserter. However the advantage of the argument from ignorance is that it would not be possible to prove that the conclusion of the argument is “false”, even if the conclusion is actually “false”

If you think you could have chosen to eat beans for breakfast, but ultimately didn’t make that “choice”, I could say it’s possible the choice was never possible to make, and that you only had the illusion of this choice, and you couldn’t prove otherwise since a successful attempt to eat beans for breakfast was never made. You would only be able to assume it was possible at best. The actual probability would be indeterminate. But due to the unprovability of impossibility, there would be a capacity for assuming the probability is non-zero, even if the probability is actually zero
 

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